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INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of the Problem. 
This dissertation is an investigation in the 
general metaphysics of William Ernest Hocking, one of 
America's most outstanding philosophers who retired in 
1943 after a long and distinguished career as Alford 
Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and 
Civil Polity in Harvard University. 
To say that it is an investigation in the 
"general metaphysics" of Hocking is to announce that the 
attempt is here made to expound and evaluate Hocking's 
metaphysical system as a whole, rather than to center 
attention on any single aspect of it. Thus, the concern 
is with the basic metaphysical issues of the experience, 
knowledge, and nature of ultimate reality, considered 
primarily in the context of man's relationship to that 
which is most real. In order to deal comprehensively 
with what is, in itself, a wide-ranging topic, it has 
not seemed wise to develop to the full Hocking's theory 
of value (or meaning), his doctrine of the self, or his 
views on the nature of God. Germane as these problems 
1 
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are in metaphysics, each of them is alone an adequate 
1 
subject for a dissertation. 
2. Significance of the Problem. 
It will not be denied that the problemsof meta-
physics go directly to the ilmer.·mainsprings of man in 
his daily living. For metaphysics probes the principal 
assumptions of the realities and illusions of life, and 
all men, whatever their station, carry with themselves 
throughout their lives some basic metaphysics, even 
though it be the confused and contradictory product of 
common sense and unreflective thought. The task of phil-
osophy is to bring the forces of reason to focus on this 
problem of thought and action in order to articulate the 
crucial questions which life proposes, to offer certain 
lines of resolution, and to aid in the formulation of a 
comprehensive and coherent system of ideas which will 
serve us as a guide to more effective living. This dis-
sertation, therefore, attempts to address itself to a 
1. As a matter of fact, two of these problems have al-
ready been the subject of Ph.D. dissertations, while 
the third problem, Hocking's idea of God, is now under 
investigation by Paul G. Rademacher in his preparation 
of a Ph.D. thesis at Boston University. There have 
also been a number of other treatments of Hocking's 
philosophy of religion. Detailed reference is made in 
a later section ofthis Introduction to the various 
studies of the different aspects of Hocking's thought. 
2 
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living issue in the minds of men, one which may truly be 
said to be the basic problem of human existence. 
Furthermore, there may also be said to be 
specific significance in the selection of the meta-
physics of William Ernest Hocking as the point of ori-
entation for this dissertation. To anyone familiar with 
the history of recent American philosophy certainly no 
apologia is necessary to defend this choice. Suffice 
it is to say that since the publication in 1912 of his 
great work, The Meanin& of God in Human Experience, 
Hocking has ranked as one of the foremost figures on the 
contemporary philosophical scene. As successor to Jo-
siah Royce at Harvard, he continued (with noteworthy 
modifications) the tradition of absolute idealism which 
Royce had so firmly established, and he must be ranked 
as the leading exponent of that branch of idealistic 
metaphysics in the world today.l 
At a time when idealism has been too much 
relegated to the background by the disproportionate 
amount of attention given to logical empiricism and the 
1. Writing solely on the American scene in their Ameri-
can Pbiloso~hies of Religion, Wieman and Meland point 
out that "1 Is generally held that (Hocking) supports 
the tradition of absolute idealism more faithfully 
than any other thinker of commanding importance in 
A.merica." (page 109) 
3 
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manifold varieties of existentialism, it is all the more 
important that the best insights of metaphysical idealism 
be continually discussed and re-worked on the contemporary 
1 philosophical scene. Hocking himself is very much aware 
of this need for idealism to reassert itself with vigor 
and authority, and this dissertation in some measure may 
be considered as speaking to that need and seeking to de-
fine the position of idealism in the current "strife of 
systems." This, it is maintained, is further demonstra-
tion of the significance of the problem of this disserta-
tion. 
3. Previous Investigations of th~ Problem. 
There have been no previous investigations of 
Hocking's metaphysics as such, although as already noted, 
supplementary aspects of it have been studied and brief 
appreciations of it have appeared as part of larger con-
siderations, as introductions to his thought in various 
anthologies and textbooks, or in reviews of his major 
published works. Indeed, in view of Hocking's promi-
nence in philosophy it is somewhat strange that there 
1. For a brief statement of Hocking's views on "the con-
clusion to which much of the philosophy of our time has 
come," with particular reference to logical empiricism 
and existentialism, see Art.{l950)4, especially pp. 5-8. 
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have not been many more detailed expositions and evalua-
tiona of his thought, although this may be due to the 
anti-idealistic spirit of the times. 
According to the listing of subjects of doc-
5 
toral dissertations in recent years, there have been only 
two special studies of Hocking's thought since 1934. 1 
-In 1935 at the University of Chicago Edmund Jabez Thomp-
son presented An Analysis of the Thought of Alfred ~orth 
Whitehead and William Ernest Hocking concerning Good and 
Evil, while in 1941 Neal Bond Fleming submitted a disser-
tation at Boston University on Hocking's Philosophz of 
the Human Self. Another dissertation dealing in part 
with Hocking's philosophy, and particularly his idea of 
God, is James Alfred Martin's Empirical Philosophies of 
Religion, which considers in turn the views of Boodin, 
Brightman, Hocking , Macintosh, and Wieman. This study 
was accepted at Columbia University in 1946 and published 
by the King 's Crown Press. 2 
1. This information was obtained from Doctoral Disserta-
tions Acce ted b American Universities, Volumes 1-17 
inc us ve. ork: H.W. i son Company, 1934-1950.) 
2. These works, together with other expositions of 
Hocking's thought, are all listed by author in the Bibi-
ography of this dissertation. 
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As a matter of fact, most of the published 
journal articles on Hocking's thought have been concerned 
with his mysticism and philosophy of religion, thus indi-
cating perhaps wherein he has been regarded most highly 
in philosophical discussion. Following the publication 
of The Meaning of God in Human Experience, D. c. Macin-
tosh published two articles on Hocking's philosophy of 
religion, one in the Philosophical Review in 1914 and 
the other in the Yale Divinitr_Quarterll for the same 
year. John E. Russell took issue with Hocking's "argu-
ment from experience" in a Journal of Philosophy article 
in 1915, while in 1924 James H. Leuba, with whom Hocking 
had long carried on a vigorous discussion on mysticism, 
published "The Immediate Apprehension of God according to 
William James and William E. Hocking" in the Journal of 
1 Philosophy. The most recent major article on some as-
pect of Hocking's thought is D.S. Robinson's discussion 
of "Hocking's Political Philosophy," published in the 
Personalist in 1947. 
Two articles have appeared in France in an ef-
fort to introduce Hocking to a French audience. 2 One of 
1. The substance of this article is also to be found in 
Leuba 1 s Psychology of Religious Mysticism, .PE• 307-3_17 _  •
2. None of Hocking's major works have been trans lated into 
French, although tbree of his articles have appeared in 
translation. It might also be noted here in passing that 
at least two French students are currently studying Hock-
ing's philosophy in Paris. 
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these, Gabriel Marcel's "W. E. Hocking et la dialectique 
de l'instinct," was written by Hocking's long-time friend 
who sees him in the tradition of the great French phil-
1 
osopher, Henri Bergson. The other article, by Louis 
., 
Dalliere, was entitled w. E. Hocking: La Refonte de la 
Nature Humaine, and published in small pamphlet form in 
the 1920's. This article deals primarily with Hocking's 
argument on the nature of religious experience in both 
The Meaning of God in Human Experience and Human Nature 
and Its Remaking. 
Among the discussions of Hocking's thought in 
larger works on various subjects, at least four need be 
mentioned. The presentation of Hocking's views on the 
immediacy of religious consciousness is discussed at some 
length by Rees Griffiths in his book, God in Idea and Ex-
2 perience. As W.P. Patterson attests in his foreword to 
that work, Griffiths' view is "akin to Dr. Hocking 1 s,"3 
1. The fact of Bergson's influence on Hocking is men-
tioned further in a later section of this Introduction, 
pnge 17. 
2. See especially pp. 189-206. 
3. Griffiths 1 GIE, xiv. All references in footnotes to 
books and articles quoted, including Hocking's works as 
well, will use an abbreviation to indicate the source or 
authority. The explanation of these abbreviations is 
supplied in the Bibliography of this dissertation, ar-
ranged according to authors. 
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and the author offers the arguments of Hocking in sup-
port of his conclusions. A brief, but comprehensive re-
view of Hocking's philosophy of religion is provided in 
Wieman and Meland's American Philosophies of Religion, 
and a much less satisfactory account is included in Types 
1 
of Religious Philosophy: by Edwin A.. Burtt. Perhaps the 
most systematic and concise summary of the main points in 
Hocking's thought is to be found in The Development of 
American Philosophy by Muelder and Sears. 
While all these studies and discussions are 
8 
relevant to the problem of this dissertation, it is ob-
vious that none of them bears directly or solely on the 
problem here discussed. For the most part they are ex-
positions or summaries of one aspect of Hocking's thought, 
and there has been to date no single, comprehensive study 
of Hocking's general metaphysics. 
4. Method of Procedure. 
This dissertation is based primarily on the 
writings of W.E. Hocking. Partly as the result of work 
in the preparation of a complete Hocking bibliography, 
which is appended to this dissertation, it can be re-
1. The discussion of Hocking's philosophy of religion, 
together with that of William James, ~lexander, White-
head, and Bergson, was omitted in the revised edition 
of Burtt's book, which appeared in 1951. 
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ported that with the exception of two or three minor arti-
cles which could not be located, all of Hocking's pub-
lished works have been reviewed. Further, many un-
published manuscripts, frequent correspondence , and . occa-
sional conversation with Hocking have also served as ba-
sis for the research. 
Also consulted were the works of those thinkers 
who have been of greatest influence on Hocking's thought, 
among whom should be numbered especially Descartes, Kant, 
Fichte, Hegel, James, Royce, Husserl, Bergson, and White-
head. The various expositions and criticisms of Hocking's 
thought, including those mentioned in the preceding sec-
tion, have also been reviewed as part of the preparation 
for this dissertation. 
The dissertation itself is divided into four 
major chapters. Following an introductory chapter on 
Hocking's view of the metaphysical problem in general, 
there follow three chapters which seek to approach his 
metaphysics progressively by considering in turn the ex-
perience, the knowledge, and the nature of metaphysical 
reality. In these chapters the primary concern has been 
to expound carefully and comprehensively the most im-
portant lines of Hocking's thought, and as a consequence 
specific criticism and evaluation has been deferred until 
9 
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the final chapter which attempts to indicate the various 
strengths and weaknesses of Hocking's position. 
In addition to the bibliography of all the 
books and articles consulted in the preparation of this 
dissertation, there is also appended the bibliography of 
all the published works of William Ernest Hocking. This 
bibliography is the most complete account in existence 
of his literary accomplishments, and was recently pre-
pared and published through the courtesy and co-operation 
of Mr. Hocking. 
5. Some General Remarks concerning w. E. Hocking. 
It is desirable here to offer a few general re-
marks concerning the development of Hocking's metaphysi-
cal position and to comment briefly on his writings as a 
whole. 
i. The Development of Hocking's Thought. In any 
serious and sustained study of Hocking's thought on~ can-
not help but be impressed by the substantial identity of 
idea and expression in his earliest writings down through 
and including his most recent publications. It is a fact 
that his greatest work to date (1952) w~s also his first 
published book, and The Meaning of God in Human Experience 
still stands, after more than thirty-five years, as the 
definitive statement of his philosophical position. In 
10 
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reading more recent works, particularly certain journal 
articles, one is constantly brought back to that first 
book. This is to say that on the basic philosophical 
issues Hocking's thought to date has undergone no radi-
cal change, although he has from time to time singled out 
various aspects of his position for special consideration. 
One of these special considerations may be said 
to be the problem of the self, and particularly the prob-
lem of human freedom, and it may possibly be that in cer-
tain writings yet to be published, he will develop fur-
ther this aspect of his metaphysics. 1 It is also true 
that in recent years Hocking has made an even stronger 
appeal to the findings of modern science, and particular-
ly to mathematics and physics, as supporting his meta-
physics. However, in fairness it should be said that 
from the start he has sought to acknowledge the relevance 
2 
of science for any adequate metaphysical construction. 
This is without question one of the marks of "modernism" 
1. Hocking has foreshadowed this possibility in his 
article, "Theses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysics 
by a New Route," published in 1941, which announced "the 
pivots of an argument which I expect to develop in more 
intelligible form." (p. 688) 
2. Hocking in his undergraduate work at Iowa State was 
specifically trained in mathematics and physics (civil 
engineering~:; and his interest in mathematics was further 
stimulated in his graduate work with Josiah Royce at Har-
vard. Hocking's first published article, which he later 
referred to as "my first philosophical essay, 11 was a crit-
ical discussion of the theory of number. 
11 
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in Hocking's thought to which Burtt, Muelder and Sears, 
1 
and Wieman and Meland all call attention. 
Because Hocking's present thought reflects so 
thoroughly the early influences in the development of 
his phllosophical pesition, it is desirable to catalog 
2 briefly those sources of greatest influence. 
It has already been mentioned that Descartes, 
Kant, Fichte, Hegel, James, Royce, Husserl, Bergson, and 
Whitehead · were the great individual influences in Hock-
ing's thought. It is Hocking's view that any adequate 
metaphysics in modern philpsophy must return to think 
through the problems posed by Descartes and his contem-
poraries, and in the development of his own volume on 
12 
metaphysics which is now in preparation he can be expected 
to give renewed recognition to the contribution of that 
first great French philosopher. Writing on Chu Hsi's 
1. See Burtt, TRP, 415; Muelder and Sears, DAP, 487; and 
Wieman and Meland, APR, 108. BUI'tt:- characterizes Hocking's 
religious philosophy as "most sympathetic with modernism," 
while Muelder and Sears declare that "Hocking's philosophy 
is original in structure but reflects influences from most 
contemporary movements." Wieman and Meland comment that 
Hocking continues the tradition of absolute idealism, 
"modified in the light of contemporaneous thinking." 
2 .. The best statement of these influences from Hocking's 
own hand is found in his article entitled "Some Second 
Principles,'' published in Volume I of ContemporarJ Amer-
ican Philosophy, edited by George p. Adams and WI 11am 
Pepperell Montague. See especially pp. 385-393. 
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theory of knowledge a number of years ago, Hocking re-
marked that Chu Hsi is "pre-Cartesian in his categories: 
he has not made the radical distinction between the 
mental and the non-mental," and then he continued as fol-
lows: 
In the eyes of certain contemporary 
philosophers, who consider that Des-
cartes did his cleavages too well, 
this may rank as a merit. I believe, 
however, that while the Cartesian 
dualism, like all other dualisms, has 
to be overcome, the cleavage can only 
be cured by being first clearly seen; 
so that the cartesian stage has to be 
gone through in every philosophical 
position, sooner or later.l 
Hocking's indebtedness to Kant is great indeed, 
2 
as that of every modern thinker must be. It was during 
his graduate study in Germany that Hocking came fully to 
appreciate the immensity of German thought, and he spe-
cifically mentions his study with Natorp, Husserl, Paul-
sen, Dilthey, Simmel, Windelband, and Rickert, calling 
special attention to 11 the value of Husserl 1 s discipline, 
and his insistence on the importance of Hume and Mill."3 
1 1. ~rt.(l936) , 121. 
2. The most concise statement of one of Hocking's dif-
ferences with Kant is found in his article in Contempo-
rary p~erican Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 395 ff. 
3 • Art • ( 1930) 1, 3 98 f • 
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During this period in Germany in the first years of 
this century, Hocking was able to study particularly the 
writings of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, to whom he accords 
deep obligation. 
Incidentally, it should be noted here with re-
spect to the Hegelian influence, that in his writings 
Hocking does not often acknowledge his great indebted-
ness to that German thinker. However, it is quite ob-
vious that he stands clearly in the tradition of German 
idealism, and that the great influence and impact of this 
tradition came to Hocking largely through his teacher, 
Josiah Royce. 
It was Royce and William James in particular 
who exercised the greatest influence on Hocking's thought 
during his early years, and in the Preface to The Meaning 
of God in Human Experience he appropriately acknowledges 
his indebtedness to those two men. Thus he writes: 
If I have taken frequent occasion in 
this book to express dissent from the 
views both of Professor Royce and of 
William James, it is but a sign of the 
extent to which I owe to them, my hon-
ored masters in these matters, the 
groundwork of my thinking. I have dif-
fered freely from both, in the spirit 
of their own instruction, but not with-
out the result of finding myself at one 
with both in greater measure than I 
would once have thought possible--or 
logically propertl 
1. MGHE, xxii. 
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Hocking had read James's Principles of Psy-
chology during his undergraduate days at Iowa, and this 
stimulated him to come East to study under James at Har-
vard. But even then Hocking did not expect to make 
philosophy his life's work. As he puts it: 
I did not then know that this would 
become my life's occupation: I 
thought that with James's guidance 
my philosophy could shortly be 
settled.l 
James was abroad delivering his Gifford Lectures when 
Hocking arrived at Harvard, and thus he began his stud-
ies in that great circle of philosophers which included 
Palmer, Santayana, Miller, Mnnsterberg, and Royce. To 
each of them save Santayana, whom Hocking avoided 11 with 
the intolerance of a young bigot ••• to my great loss,"2 
he acknowledged a special debt of gratitude. On James's 
return in 1901 Hocking went to him "with the enthusiasm 
of deferred hope," and while vigorously impressed by 
James, and particularly by his Gifford Lectures which 
had just appeared under the title The varieties of Re-
llgious Experience, Hocking found that "James's method, 
or lack of method, and his results left me confused and 
1. Art.(l930)1, 388 f. 
1 2. Art.(l930) , 389. 
15 
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1 
unsatisfied." In this connection it might be noted 
that much of Hocking 's early Wl'iting is devoted to a re-
ply to James's attacks on idealism which was now becom-
ing, under the tutelage of Josiah Royce; Hocking's own 
philosophical poaition. 
16 
It was following his return from study in Ger-
many that Hocking came most strongly to feel the influence 
of Royce. As Hocking writes: 
Royce was concerned with bringing 
the sciences into comradely relations 
to philosophy, and especially with 
exploring the consequences of the rap-
prochement between logic and mathe----
matics •••• Under Royce's guidance 
I studied the concept of number, and 
conceived the idea of writing a ''mor-
pholog y of experience" in which the 
mathematical idea of a "group" should 
serve to define and explain the dis-
tinct ~oundaries of the several sci-
ences. 
From this work issued Hocking 's doctoral dissertation on 
the general problem of the knowledge of other minds, 
which later took expanded form in The Meaning of God in 
Human Experience. And, as is well known, it was the pub-
lication of this work which established Hocking as a pre-
1. Art.(l930)~389. 
2. Art.(l930)~ 391. Two of Hocking's early articles 
based on these studies are "The Function of Science in 
Shaping Philosophic Method" (1905), and "The Group Con-
cept in the Service of Philosophy" (1906 ) . · 
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eminent figure in American philosophy. 
Hocking's interest in mysticism and intuition 
caused him to take great interest in the writings of Hen-
ri Bergson, an interest which is reflected in the attempts 
' of Marcel and Dalliere to awaken acceptance of Hocking's 
thought in the Bergsonian tradition in France. Hocking 
offered his own evaluation of Bergson in an article en-
titled "The Significance of Bergson, 11 which was pub-
lished in 1914, and he deals with Bergson at some length 
in other subsequent writings. 1 
In more recent years Hocking felt the power of 
Whitehead's thought, and to him he acknowledges a greater 
debt than to any other thinker. 2 Hocking had been a mem-
ber of the faculty at Harvard since 1914, and held the 
distinguished Alford Professorship when vVhitehead was in-
vited to Harvard from the University of London in 1924. 
The two served together at Harvard until Whitehead's re-
tirement as Professor Emeritus in 1937, and their friend-
ship continued until Whitehead's death in 1948 at the age 
1. See especially 'rypes of Philosophy, pp. 188-194, and 
Hocking 's various discussions of intuitionism. 
2. See Hocking's article on "Whitehead on Mind and Na-
ture" in the Schilpp volume, where Hocking says of White-
head, "From no man have I received so wide a sense of the 
dignity of the human calling to think the world; from no 
man have I learned so much." (p. 404) 
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of eighty-seven. Specific marks of the relationship 
between Hocking's thought and vVhitehead's are considered 
at some length in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
The wide range of these influences in the. de-
velopment of Hocking's thought should furnish ample evi-
dence of why his philosophical position exhibits such di-
verse tendencies as pragmatism, realism, and idealism. 
As Muelder and Sears correctly state, "This philosoph y 
is a tantalizing fusion of monistic and realistic view-
points."1 One reason for this special accommodat i on of 
realistic elements in his position, which on the whole 
represents absolute idealism, is Hocking's firm convic-
tion that the work of philosophy is a corporate endeav-
or in which all men of good will and rational temper 
must participate, and that no one individual or small 
group of individuals may lay claim to the whole garment 
of truth about the ultimate reality which, in some re-
spects, is beyond finite understanding, or certainly be-
1. Muelder and Sears DAP, 487. It is a fairly simple 
procedure to detect ~~onistic and realistic viewpoints" 
in Hocking's thought, but it is very likely that the 
presence of pragmatic elements has been overestimated. 
That is, Hocking thoroughly . disavows the pragmatism of 
James and others as inadequate, and represents his own 
view as that of "negative pragmatism." (MGHE, xiii-xv, 
and SIG, vii.) Very few references to his actual employ-
ment of "negative pragmatism," however, can be found in 
Hocking's writings. 
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yond adequate statement in the categories of finitude. 
Furthermore, there bas been during Hocking's. lifetime an 
increasing dissatisfaction with the arguments of idealism, 
expressed primarily in the writings of pragmatists and 
realists, revealing that idealism has been, and perhaps 
still is, an unfinished philosophy. In the field of the 
philosophy of religion idealism has been specifically 
criticized in some quarters for failing to offer an ade-
quate and accessible God of worship, and The Meanin~ 
God in Human Ex2erience is Hocking's attempt to suggest 
mysticism as a desirable supplement to classical ideal-
ism and in so doing to lay the foundation for an empiri-
cal philosophy of religion. 1 
More recently Hocking has discussed the inade-
quacies of traditional idealism in its account of the 
physical world, and in the forthcoming publication of 
his Gifford Lectures he will attempt to show clearly how 
idealism can be adequate to the facts of the space-time 
order. In an outline of the first series of the Gifford 
Lectures, published in 1951 1 Hocking pointed out that 
'ldealism. • • has not yet made good its claim to indicate 
how ideas may become adequate to fact," and in this 
1. This is the fundamental purpose of MGHE, as Hocking 
describes it in the Preface, especially pp. vi-xix. 
INTRODUCTION 20 
series of lectures he proposed a "metaphysic of fiat," a 
concep~ of the cognitive element of will and action, which 
1 
will bridge the gulf between universal and particular. 
Thus it is apparent that Hocking's metaphysics, 
like the idealism of which he spoke in the Preface to The 
Meaning of God in Human Experience, is an "unfinished 
philosophy." This fact calls for brief comment on Hock-
ing 1 s writings in metaphysics for an indication of how 
an adequate picture of his position is possible under 
that condition. 
ii. Hocking's Writings on Metaphysics. In their 
discussion of Hocking's philosophy of religion Wieman and 
Meland quite rightly point out that 
one difficulty in treating him is 
that he has not yet made a systematic 
and comprehensive statement of his 
philosophical position. His Meaning 
of God in Human Experience comes 
nearer to this than any other book 
written by him. But this was written 
to deal with a special problem in re-
ligion rather than to present2a rounded system of philosophy. 
1. Art. (1951), passim. This article presents "the argu-
ment of the first five lectures," and may be considered 
the most adequate statement of Hocking's position now in 
print. 
2. Wieman and Meland, APR, 109. Hocking's Types of Phil-
losophy, which first appeared in 1929, furnishes a kind 
of "systematic and comprehensive statement of his phil-
osophical position," but this book was specifically writ-
ten as an introduction to the study of philosophy, and 
thus is hardly adequate as a complete statement of Hock-
ing's position. The most appropriate section of this book 
for this purpose, incidentally, is Part IV, entitled 
"Synthesis of the Types." 
INTRODUCTION 
This. statement, which appeared in 1936, is still true 
more than fifteen years later, but it must be admitted 
that the absence of any definite statement is not an in-
surmountable obstacle. Lacking Hocking's own systematic 
and comprehensive statement of his metaphysical position, 
which is not yet in form for publication, it should be 
noted that the lines of that position are especially re-
vealed in the following published articles: "Outline of 
a System of Metaphysics" in the Husser! memorial volume, 
1940; "Whitehead on Mind and Nature" in The Philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead, 1941; "Theses Establishing an 
Idealistic Metaphysics by a New Route," in the Journal 
of Philosophy for December 4, 1941; "Metaphysics: Its 
Function, Consequences, and Criteria," in the Journal 
of Philosophy for July 4, 1946; and finally two articles 
entitled "Fact and D~stiny" and based on his Gifford 
Lectures, which appeared in Review of Metaphysics for 
September, 1950, and March, 1951. In addition to these 
articles, use has been made of certain as yet unpublished 
manuscripts and of the rather complete newspaper accounts 
of each of his Gifford Lectures, which appeared in the 
Glasgow Herald on various dates in 1938 and 1939. 
At the present time Hocking is working on at 
least three different writing projects, two of which are 
21 
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directly relevant to the problems of metaphysics, namely, 
the published form of his Gifford Lectures and the defin-
1 itive statement of his metaphysical position. The third 
current project is the collection and editing of his writ-
ings on the philosophy of education. 2 
The question may justifiably be raised as to why 
there has been so long a delay in the preparation of his 
definitive statements, and here at least two factors 
should be mentioned. First, for the past thirty-five 
years Hocking has been in great demand as a lecturer on 
3 
various foundations and endowed lectureships, and 
1. It is quite obvious the Hocking's Gifford Lectures will 
contain a careful and detailed statement of his metaphysi-
cal position, but this work, according to the conditions 
of the lectureship, must be oriented primarily in the phil-
osophy of religion, and it is Hocking's hope to offer at scme 
future time a more directly "philosophical" statement of his 
present position. 
2. Before beginning his student work at Harvard Hocking was 
a schoolmaster at Davenport, Iowa, and in 1915 he and ~~s. 
Hocking founded the Shady Hill School in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts. Hocking's philosophy of education, incidentally, 
is based on a restatement of the Deweyan emphasis on "Le§.rn-
ing by Doing" in stressing learning to think by thinking 
{See his Commencement address delivered at Colby College in 
1950), and in encouraging learning by feeling and inspira-
tion, especially through the medium of poetry. 
3.Some of the more important foundation lectureships which 
H~cking has delivered are the following: the Alden-Tuthill 
Lectures at the Chicago Theological Seminary, the Hyde Lec-
tures at the Andover Newton Theological School, the Haskell 
Lectures and the Hiram W. Thomas Lecture at the University 
of Chicago, the Earl Lectures at the Pacific School of Re-
ligion, the Chancellor's Lectures at Queen's Theological 
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naturally the preparation of these lectures for delivery 
and in many cases for publication has consumed an inordi-
nate amount of time and energy. The fact that most of 
these lectureships required statement for an audience un-
tutored in the technical intricacies of a highly devel-
oped philosophical system has necessitated a more or less 
popular approach to the various subjects. Thus, a large 
number of his writings on different topics do not reveal 
in detail the deeper probings of his philosophical po-
sition. 
Another reason for the long delay in the prep-
aration of his metaphysics has been his firm conviction 
that the philosopher cannot wholly withdraw to the un-
disturbed precincts of his study, but must participate 
in the life and problems of the contemporary world. 
Thus, during the first World War Hocking spent consider-
able time studying the morale of military troops, in-
cluding a visit to the battlefields of France. After the 
war he took an active part in the attempt to win American 
3. (cont.r College, Kingston, Ontario, the Carew Lectures 
at the Hartford Theological Seminary, the Henry Martin 
Loud Lecture at Ann Arbor, Michigan, the Ingersoll Lec-
ture at Harvard, the Hibbert Lectures at Oxflord and Cam-
bridge, the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, the Scripps 
College Lectures on Recent Trends in American Philosophy, 
the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina, 
the Rockwell Lectures at the Rice Institute, and the Gar-
vin Lecture in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. 
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acceptance of the League of Nations. In the 1920's he 
became especially interested in the social and political 
problems of the Middle East, and in the 1930's he headed 
a commission which studied the church's missionary en-
terprise in the Far East. More recently he had been ac-
tive in a group which studied the problem of freedom of 
the press in this country, in supporting the efforts of 
the United Nations, and in calling special attention to 
the plights of Arab peoples in the Middle East. Many of 
these special interests and projects have resulted in 
articles or books on a wide variety of topics, as a re-
view of his bibliography will attest, but again it is 
obvious that not only are these works on subjects only 
remotely connected with the finer points of his general 
metaphysics, but also that they are for the most part 
writings directed to a wide and oftentimes unphilosophi-
cal public. 
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Now retired on his farm in Madison, New Hamp-
shire, Hocking is devoting as much time as possible to the 
systematic presentation of his philosophical position, but 
it is impossible to predict how soon this statement will 
be ready for publication. 
iii. Other Difficulties in the Study of Hock-
~· As if the absence of a complete and final statement 
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of Hocking's general metaphysical views were not enough, 
other difficulties mi ght also be mentioned. For cer-
tainly one of the foremost problems of any examination 
of Hocking's thought is the lack of precise and systemat-
ic definitions of crucial terms in most of those writ-
i ngs which are available. Hocking is not only inclined 
to use the same word for a variety of meanin gs, but more 
commonly, as it will be noted in the next chapter, he 
uses a number of different words to express substantial-
ly the same meaning. This of ·course can lead readily to 
ambi gui ty and misunderstanding, and any investigator of 
his thought must tread slowly and carefully lest he com-
pound meanings and confound issues. One such investiga-
tor a number of years ago confronted this loose use of 
terms in Hocking 's thought, and based his chief criti-
cism of Hocking's thought on that fact alone. Thus, 
Edmund Jabez Thompson writes that 
the practice of using the terms 
good and evil as both nouns and 
adjectives is responsible for 
considerable confusion •••• Mr. 
Hocklng ••• uses the words good 
and evil as both nouns ••• and ad-
jectives.l 
It should be pointed out that Hocking's avoid-
1. Thompson, AT, 104, 105. 
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ance of precise definition does not necessarily stem 
from laziness or looseness of thought. Rather, it is 
his view that the deeper meanings of life and the uni-
verse, which it is the business of philosophy to ex-
press, cannot be conveyed in neat little packages of 
idea rigorously labeled by precise definition. As he 
says in his article on Bergson, "Only the more super.fi• 
cial and relatively physical experiences fit well into 
speach. • • .The deeper meanings of the soul can find no 
1 
words at all." Therefore, he demands of his reader 
that he understand more than the plainly printed word, 
that he glean from his paragraphs a sense of the total 
meaning which he is seeking to express. 
This same sentiment is announced in his dis-
26 
cussion of feeling in The Meaning of God in Human Ex-
perience, where he aQmlts the lack of precise def~nitlon, add-
!ng · of t he word "feeling" that "few terms in the language 
are so highly ambiguous." Notwithstanding that fact, 
:however, he declares that "some truth about feeling may 
be conveyed, even without def1nition."2 His position re-
garding the precise definition of terms is also clearly 
1. Art.(l914), 315. 
2 • MGHE, 68 n • 
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stated in an article which appeared during the Second 
World War. There, in 11 A New East in a New World, 11 he 
contrasts Herbert Spencer's ttunknowable 11 with Lao-Tse 1 s 
11Unname.ble" as the primary factor at the geginning and 
center of the universe. "Our question, n he writes, 11 is 
whether we can know what we cannot define. 111 And then 
he continues: 
Here, unless we allow ourselves to be 
victimized by that fast crew of aca-
demic roughriders, the hard-shell 
semanticists, the answer is a clear 
yes. • • .As against them, meaning 
is first, language afterward; kno~ 
edge is first, definition afterward; 
nothing of first-rate importance is 
f ully sayable or definable.2 
Not only in vocabulary, but in literary style 
also, Hocking requires careful at tention. As one of 
the principal reviewers of The Meaning of God in Human 
Experi ence remarked: 
The book, it may be said at the out-
set, is not an easy one to read. 
This is due in part to the style, 
which is singularly uneven, now sug-
gesting Carlyle in the ornateness of 
its rhetoric, and again speaking the 
sober and exact language of science. 
1. A.rt. (1942) 4, 120. Unless otherwise stipule.ted, all 
ite~ics in quoted passages sre found in the sources 
themselves. 
4 2. Art.(l942) , 120. 
3. Brown, Rev.(l913), 243. Jay Willism Hudson also 
compared Hocking 's style to that of Carlyle in his 
review of MGHE. See Hudson, Rev.(l913), 547. 
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Be that as it may. Such a problem can be overcome. And 
as this same reviewer continues~ "These difficulties lie 
on the surface. The reader who follows Professor Hock-
ing to the end will find himself richly repaid."1 
Finally, it might be observed that Hocking fre-
quently states the arguments of an opposing position with 
such convincing force that one is often tempted to be-
lieve that this may represent his own view of the whole 
truth. Thus, constant care must be exercised to separ~te 
the author's thought from the thought he is criticizing 
in order to understand clearly the lines of his own po-
sit ion. 
1. Brown, Rev.(l913) , 243. 
CHAPTER I 
The Problem of Me taphysical Reality 
The problem of this dissertation is the meta-
physical one of setting forth an adequate description 
and evaluation of the fundamental reality of the uni-
verse and human life, as it is expressed in the thought 
of w. E. Hocking. For a fuller understanding of the 
scope of the problem it is desirable tn this opening 
chapter to make certain remarks concerning the nature of 
11 adequate description," as Hocking defines it, and then 
to offer a definition of metaphysics as it is understood 
in his thought. This chapter, therefore, will adumbrate 
certain preliminary considerations of the metaphysical 
problem. 
1. The Nature of Adequate Descr~ption. 
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Metaphysics is the search for a certain kind of 
knowledge about ultimate reality, a kind of knowledge which 
Hocking expresses in the phrase · "adequate description." 1 To 
geasp the depth and extent of this ideal of knowledge 
for metaphysics it is necessary to distinguish between 
1. Art.(l946), 373. 
PROBlEM OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 30 
description and explanation as two different, though not 
mutually exclusive, kinds of knowledge about metaphysical 
reality. 
i. Description and Explanation. For Hocking, 
description is the faithful recording of empirical data, 
where "empirical" refers only to that which is given or 
can be verified by the senses. Such information, or 
knowledge, is the product of unswerving obedience to 
steady observation and the faithful recording of the de-
tails which that observation makes known. It is best ex-
emplified by the vast store of data which the several 
natural, and to a certain extent the social sciences pro-
vide concerning the physical world. It is characterized 
primarily by "a scrupulous obedience to fact. 111 However, 
perhaps more accurately this should be termed mere de-
scription, the faithful record of fact; it is inadequate 
for metaphysics. It is necessary but not sufficient, for 
it merely records the data of sense and makes no further 
attempt to interpret or understand. 
Explanation, on the other hand, includes those 
details of mere description, but goes beyond them to ren-
der an account of the object of study--in this case ul-
timate reality--in terms of concepts not given directly 
1. A.rt.(l946), 374. 
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1 to the senses, i.e., in terms of principles and causes. 
If mere description is founded on "a scrupulous obedience 
to fact," then explanation is based on insight and 
courage, and particularly the latter "in trusting human 
powers of knowledge." 2 It is Hocking's comment that 
much of contempor~ry philosophy, particularly that which 
passes under the banner of empiricism, prominently dis-
plays the morality of obedience, but shirks the courage 
so necessary to the achievement of new insight into the 
nature of things. Further, it is a common error in phi l!'! ... 
msophy today to blur the important distinction between 
description and explanation with the result that what is 
in sum only a description is allowed to suffice for an 
explanation. This confusion is often pertinently dis-
played in so-called interpretations of the problem of ev-
elution where a formulation of the problem as "the sur-
vival of the fittest" is offered as an explanation, thus 
leaving the crucial question of "the unheralded arrival 
1. The only basis of the claim that explanation is not 
empirical can be based on a narrow use of the term "em-
pirical," wherein it is restricted solely to referring 
to that which can be verified in sensory experience. 
Hocking, however, objects to such a restriction; he 
would include as empirical all that is found in con-
scious experience, for obviously there is much in ex-
perience that cannot be verified by sensory references. 
2. Art.(l946), 374. 
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1 
of qualitative change" untouched. 
Hocking's main point here is to emphasize that 
the mere description of any fact or phenomenon is inade-
quate as an explanation. Thus, he calls for "adequate" 
as opposed to mere description, or to use the terminol-
ogy of the present discussion, description must give way 
to explanation in any worthwhile attempt to meet the 
32 
metaphysical problem. In brief, an adequate description 
constitutes an explanation, and in the case of metaphy-
sics, as will be pointed out in a later section of this 
chapter, an adequate description of the fundamental real-
ity is tantamount to an explanation "in terms of princi-
ples and causes." It is an explanation, not mere descrip-
tion, that promotes the increase of understanding, which 
is the goal of all philosophy. Indeed, explanation is 
the currency of understanding. Mere description is only 
the beginning of explanation, and in Hockings words, 
metaphysics "must take its task of careful analytic 
description--essential as it is--as a basis for the fur-
ther task o:f understanding the world. 112 
1. Art.{l946), 375. Bowne made this same observation in 
his Metaphysics when he wrote that "the arrival of the 
fit, and its arrival in so many forms, are left quite un-
accounted for by the great principal of natural selection.'' 
(p. 280) 
2. Art.(l946) 374. Italics supplied. 
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ii. The Incompleteness of Knowledge. It should 
also be pointed out that the goal of adequate descrip-
33 
tion cannot be the final certainty of absolute knowledge, 
inasmuch as complete adequacy in any department of knowl-
edge, no matter how small or great it be, is an unattain-
able ideal for the finite mind. The accumulation of 
knowledge for the human mind is always an infinite 
process, and man in his philosophies and his sciences 
is ever striving little by little to overcome the inad-
equacies of his knowledge. In one of his Gifford Lec-
tures Hocking commented briefly on the respective efforts 
of the two main historical traditions in philosophy to 
describe the world, and, speaking of idealism and realism 
he wrote: 
By its present definition idealism 
is committed to work for an under-
standing of the world; realism must 
be content to describe. And if we 
agree that science is the attempt 
to achieve an accurate and usable 
descri¥tion of the world, realism, 
merging philosophy with science is 
less a type of philosophy than a. 
resignation of the specific phil-
osophic effort, whereas idealism 
in this sense is less a type of 
philosophy than philosophy itself. 1 
Now because many passages in Hocking's writings 
seem to carry the implication that man can ultimately 
know all there is to be known about metaphysical reality, 
1. Art.(l951), 324. 
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it is particularly important to interpret his view very 
carefully. Two or three of these equivocal passages 
might be noted. For example, his assertion of the im-
mediate experience of the fundamental reality of the 
universe throughout one's life--"in its full infinity 
and wholeness it is now before me ••• the same from 
birth to death"1 --might conceivably be taken to mean 
that man fully knows this reality. However, it must be 
remembered that the immediate experience of reality and 
a knowledge of it "in its full infinity and wholeness" 
are not one and the same, for Hocking or anyone else. As 
a matter of fact, even self-experience and self-under-
standing are two very different processes. 
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Further, Hocking's forthright rejection of the 
kind of skepticism which contends that man's mental pow-
ers are inadequate for understanding the basic principles 
of the universe might lead one to believe that he goes to 
the other extreme and holds that man's mind can embrace 
all those basic principles in a lifetime. But in truth 
Hocking is simply protesting against a type of intellec-
tual humility which disavows all attempts at understand-
ing, and he remarks that this is "the poorest virtue in 
1. MGHE, 96. 
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1 the catalogue ••• a labor-saving virtue, I fear." And 
finally, Hocking's confidence in the powers of human rea-
son to achieve some kind of intellectual certainty in its 
thoughts of reality, and in particular his assertion that 
"philosophy aims at certainty, and can be content with 
nothing else, rr2 may seem to bring certainty in all human 
thought within the range of possibility. But in the 
same context Hocking makes clear that he intends only to 
emphasize that at least a minimum of certainty is neces-
sary for .constructive thought on any subject, and that 
philosophy endeavors to establish that "pole of cer-
tainty" which, together with the "region of exploration," 
is necessary to the life of knowledge.3 
Contrasted with these passages which seem to 
indicate--~t 'face value at any rate--that a large 
measure of certainty in human knowledge is possible and 
even highly probable, are other passages which unequivo-
cally affirm that human knowledge of ultimate reality is 
incomplete. Two of them may be cited without the neces-
sity of interpretation. First, in his discussion of the 
accumulation of metaphysical knowledge, which he says 
proceeds apace with the "couplings" or connections be-
1. MGHE, 104. 
2. TP, 501. 
3. TP, 501. 
-------
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tween ideas of reality, he remarks that "such a process 
has no end--of all possible couplings only a relative 
few can be effected."1 And second, a passage which 
needs not even a minimum of comment: ''For some touch of 
finitude must cleave to all things human; and none of 
our ideas, religious or other, can be more than the idea 
of some poor mortal. n2 
Metaphysical knowledge, therefore, while ex-
hibiting a modicum of certainty, is necessarily incom-
plete. And this for the reason that the vast recesses 
and intricacies of ultimate reality are beyond the lim-
its of complete human intelligibility. But one must 
not leave the matter there, and give the impression 
that Hocking stresses to any marked extent the weakness 
or inadequacy of human thought. Rather, by his very 
profession he seeks to elevate the mind of man, and thus 
it is more accurate to say that the primary reason for 
the finitude of human understanding of ultimate reality 
is basically that that reality itself is unfinished and 
incomplete. Man can achieve the whole truth only insofar 
as he is able to participate in the labors of that real-
1. MGHE, 96. 
2. MGHE, 107. 
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ity and, so doing , to find his own fulfillment as a 
rational, intelligent creature. This distinction, which 
is probably more one of emphasis than of actual differ-
ence in kind, is brought out in the Preface to ~he Mean-
ing of God in Human Experience, where Hocking denies 
flatly that there is any truth totally inaccessible to 
the human mind. "There is no inaccessible truth," he 
says, and then continues as follows: 
If any object has possible bear-
ing on human interests, such as 
to make it a matter of choice, it 
has a bearing on human fact also--
there is some cognitive way to it. 
Truth is indeed variously acces-
sible: there are regions of the 
world unsounded, long to be un-
sounded, ample playground for imag -
ination; but in truth-getting these 
very regions are to be approached 
(and are approached) with a more 
delicate chivalry just because of 
their comparative helplessness--
with more care, not less, to re-
strain the impulses of objectivity. 1 
If truth is always accessible, then, how can one account 
for the finitude of understanding? Hocking answers this 
with the observation that truth about reality is un-
finished because that reality itself is unfinished. In 
thi s vein he asks: 
But, at last, is there no unfinished 
truth? No reality yet unmade, or in 
the making, no chance to co-operate 
1 • .MUHE, xvi. 
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with God in the work of creation, 
in determining what truth shall 
be? • • .The world is infinitely 
unfinished; here lies the oppor-
tunity of freedom, the only ex-
cuse, indeed, for time-existence 
at all.l -
Further developing this point Hocking goes on to dis-
tinguish between "a tolerable and untolerable unfin-
ishedness,11 and declares tbat in the substantial identi-
ty of Other Mind, which is for him the ultimate reality, 
the world [i.e., ultimate reality] does have a "toler-
able unfinishedness," and that the exercise of human 
freedom among rational men is to share in the ongoing 
process of completion. This is the essence of human 
creativity, and the fulfillment of all human life. 
This problem of the knowledge of metaphysical 
reality will be discussed at considerable length in a 
later chapter, and the role of the self in the process 
of continuing creativity is considered in the last two 
chapters of the dissertation, so that these questions 
need not be developed more fully here. Suffice it to 
say, then, that the goal of adequate description toward 
which philosophy, and in this case metaphysics, strives, 
is not the final certainty of absolute knowledge, which 
is not only impossible but which would, if attainable, 
1. MGHE, xvi. 
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put an end to all further thought, but rather what Karl 
Groos has called a "theoretical relativism ••• united 
with a practical absolutism,"l which will enable man 
to meet his world with greater understanding and greater 
effectiveness, thus gaining a firmer hold on the meaning 
of life and on ultimate reality itself. 
iii. A Note on Definitions. In this general 
discussion of adequate description it is also desirable 
to offer some brief comments on definitions, inasmuch as 
the practice of defining one's terms, especially the 
fundamental concepts, is a necessary part of any investi-
gation. A.s stated in a slightly different manner in the 
I ntroduction to this dissertation, the source of the 
trouble lies in the fact that the fundamental concepts 
are often ultimate terms which may lay claim to be in-
definable. Reality, and to a lesser degree the self, 
are two such concepts in this dissertation. 
In speaking of this problem of definition, 
Hocking remarks that "the difficulty in defining ultimate 
terms of this sort is that we must define them in terms 
of what they are or what they are not. To define them 
in terms of what they are is circular. To define them 
1. Cited by Brightman in POR, 131, from "The Problem 
of Relativism." 
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in terms of what they are not is false ••• n1 The first 
kind of definition is fruitless, the second is false, 
and yet some kind of satisfactory solution to this di-
lemma must be found if effective thought is to be at all 
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possible. Hocking's principal discussion of this problem 
is included in his essay in the Whitehead volume where, 
with slightly different terminology, he addresses him-
self to this question. There he uses the word "explain" 
instead of "define"--although he admits that 11 the same 
dilemma exists if instead of 'explain' we read 'describe 
in terms of1'" 2 --and it is referred to as the problem of 
explanation rather than of definition. However, the Lm-
port is substantially the same, and this is another of 
the frequent occasions where Hocking uses different 
words more or less interchangeably and without warning. 
"We seem to be in the presence of a perfectly 
good dilemma," he says in this Whitehead essay. "We 
must either explain things by what they are or else by 
what they are not." And then continuing he writes: 
If we explain them by what they 
are, we leave them unexplained. 
If we explain them by what they 
are not, our explanation is fal-
lacious •••• This brings all 
metaphysical effort to so sudden 
a halt that we must examine the 
case further.3 
1. Art.(l942), 183. 
2 • Art • ( 1941 )~ 4 00 . 
3. Art.(l941) 2 ~460. 
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By way of introducing the further examination Hocking 
labels the two kinds of explanation 11 homeotypal 11 and 
!1heterotypal11 respect! vely, and for the purposes of the 
present discussion they will be considered as homeotypal 
and heterotypal explanations. Hocking discards the home·o-
typal explanation as sterile and void, and sets about to 
attack the alleged absurdity of the heterotypal explana-
tion. His argument proceeds in the following manner. To 
explain, or define, an object, A, in terms of what it is 
not, namely, B, is fallacious and absurd so long as there 
is no plausible connection between A and B) or so long as 
the relation between the two goes unaccounted for. In 
other words, if object B is to serve as an explanation 
or definition of object A, it cannot be "anything else 
whatever Q:>uiJ it is always a related otherness. 111 And 
further, the relevance of B to A. must be pointed out as 
part of the explanation if absurdity is to be avoided. 
Heterotypal explanation is the only type of explanation 
that will serve adequately to account for the basic 
reality of the universe, which in Hocking's thought is 
mind, for "mind is the sort of thing which has to change 
in order to be itself, and which is heterotypal to all 
1. Art.(l941) 2 , 402. 
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its objects."1 And as Hocking had said in an article 
written . over thirty years before the discussion referred 
to above 1 "The business of all explanation is to express 
a thing in terms of what it is not." And furthermore 1 
other things f}:>eing] equall the 
more alien in nature the terms 
in which a thing is expressed 
the more successful the explana-
tion •••• The difficulty is to 
see that such explanations ex-
plain. To explain a thing by 
what it is not--that is to ex-
plain one mystery by another. 
But is there nothing illuminat-
ing about that?2 
All definitions 1 like all descriptions and ex-
planations, and indeed like all knowledge 1 must neces-
sarily be fragmentary and incomplete. But in terms of 
the foregoing discussion, the central problem is to dis-
cover new regions of "related otherness" for these funda-
mental concepts, so that heterotypal definitions and ex-
planations will not be absurd, and so that man's under-
standing of the universe in which he lives will be mani-
festly increased. To fulfill such a task is, in Hock-
2 1. Art.(l941) , 403. 
2. Art.(l908) 1 , 13~ This article is published asAp-
pendix II in MGHE, 539-557, and the quotation cited 
above is to be found on p. 540. 
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ing's words, "the hope of metaphysics." 1 With this fact 
in mind, it may be well to probe more deeply into what 
Hooking means by metaphysics. 
2. Hocking's Definition of Metaphysics. 
What might be called a happy accident in the 
arranging of the Aristotelian corp~s in the library at 
Rhodes over two thousand years ago gave to the history 
of philosophy the term "metaphysics," when Andronicus 
so described one of the Peripatetic's books because it 
was placed after the Physics ( TA;M~,;. r~ 9 vGrl:~ 1 "the 
treatise after the physics") on the library shelfl 
Through the centuries this word has come to take on a 
more or leas definite meaning, stemming from the con-
tent or subject matter of that particular volume (which 
Aristotle himself had called Theology or First Philos-
op~, and which he insisted must come prior to physics 
as an object of investigation). For in his Metaphysics 
Aristotle was seeking "the principles and causes of the 
things that a.re.n2 To him that required the study of 
"being qua being,n3 and 11 the study of this must be prior 
1. Art.(1941)2, 402. 
2. Aristotle, Metaph., 1025b 1. 
3. Aristotle, Met~ph., 1026a 33. 
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and must be first philosophy."1 
Hocking joins with aristotle in regarding 
metaphysics as the search for "the principles and causes 
of the things that are" (although his monism would re-
quire him to say, 11 the mind that is"), but he insists 
that metaphysics must be more than the study of "being 
qua being." Furthermore, he objects to those who would 
arbitrarily limit Aristotle's metaphysics to ontology 
alone without consideration of the doctrine of matter, 
the soul, causality, and entelechy, for such articles 
are a part of any adequate metaphysics. "Metaphysics, 
therefore, in its nature cannot adopt 'Being' as an ulti-
mate character of things, calling for pure acceptance •• 
• • .(for] there is some light to be had about 'Being,' 
some ration~le of the world.n2 Thus, metaphysics is 
not rarefied speculation on hypothetical questions of 
no practical moment, nor futile discussion of empty 
categories. Rather, it is an assault on the vital ques-
tions of man and his world-- 11 the moat general account we 
can give of man and his world in rational terms ••• in 
1. Aristotle, Metaph., 1026b 30-31. 
2. Art.(l940) 1 , 252, 253. 
PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 
terms of 'principles and causes. 1 " 1 In this regard 
Hocking would agree with Ludwig Landgrebe, the German 
phenomenologist, that "the question of the meaning of 
Being, of what we really mean when we say •Something is' 
and 1 It is this or that,• becomes the fundamental ques-
tion of metaphysics."2 
The central point, therefore, in Hocking's 
various definitions of metaphysics is that metaphysics 
is the search for some rational account of Being, and 
particularly for a rational account which will serve to 
articulate the purpose and place of human life in the 
schema of ultimate reality. However, in order to bring 
Hocking's view into clearef focus, it is necessary to 
consider briefly this central term "being" around which 
the metaphysical quest is oriented. 
1. The Problem of Bel~. The word "being" is 
most commonly used to indicate the basic category for 
metaphysical investigation. Hocking uses the word oc-
casionally, but it is only one of several words in his 
philosophical vocabulary which serve more or less inter-
changeably to signify the basic metaphysical reality. 
1. Art.{l946), 366. 
2. Landgrebe, Art.{l949), 199. 
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Thus it may be said that in Hocking's thought "being" 
is synonymous with "reality." In some cases "world" or 
"Nature" or 11 the universe 11 are also used in this sense, 
although they usually refer primarily to the physical 
world in space-time. At any rate, the reader must al-
ways be alert lest this facile and fluctuating use of 
terms result in confusion and misunderstanding. 
In this dissertation, as in Hocking's thought 
generally, the words "being" and "reality" are the terms 
most often employed to indicate that fundamental meta-
physical category. For that reason, a few comments on 
their definition are now in order. 
In his essay on Whitehead, which is one of the 
46 
richest sources of his metaphysical thought, Hocking re-
marks, "I have been inclined to define 'reality' by way of 
the notion of dependence: the real is that independent be-
ing on which other beings depend ••• nl Reality is, in brief, 
independent being; the mark of reality is independence, 
but this independence can be known only in relation to 
1. Art.(l941) 2 , 389. In the light of the discussion of 
definitions in an earlier section, this definition may 
be seen to be heterotypal in its attempt to define reali-
ty in terms of what it is not, namely, dependent being. 
The problem, therefore, becomes that of determining the 
"significant" relation of the dependent to the independ-
ent. Quite plainly for Hocking this involves somethin~ 
more than the offerings of the senses. In his words, The 
relation of dependence may, obviously, take us behind the 
senses in search of the independent." 
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dependence. Hockin g had distinguished between two kinds 
of independence in his first great work, published in 
1912, and that distinction may aid in clarifying the 
issue here in the Whitehead article of more recent date. 
Mutual, or symmetrical, independence is such 
that of two units, A and B, A is independent of B and B 
is independent of A. The two never meet in any way, 
they have nothing in common; they cannot even be known 
by the same mind. In non-symmetrical independence, how-
ever, A is still independen t of B 1 but B is dependent 
up on A. Independence in this case is on one side only. 
Now Hocking maintains that the independence of metaphys-
1 ical reality is of the latter kind, and in order to 
understand adequately the nature of metaphysical reality 
it is necessary to probe both sides of t he equation, to 
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con s ider independent being primarily in terms of the de-
pendent. In brief, metaphysics moves t hrough and beyond 
the concept of dependence to discover "independent being 
on wh ich other be i ng - -perhaps Nature, perhaps we our-
selves--depends.112 Starting with that which is immediate-
ly at hand, the world of physical things and the self, 
metaphysics inquires whether there is anything e lse mor e 
1. MGHE, 153 n. 
2. Art.(1946), 371. 
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unconditionally independent than either or both of them. 
Thus 1 "the enterprise of metaphysics in the West becomes 
tangent to a sirnll&_r enterprise in the Orient 1 which goes 
1 
under the general name of 'overcoming illusions.'" To 
get at the real it is necessary to cast away the unreal; 
to get at independent being it is necessary to move be-
yond dependent being. The metaphysical quest, therefore, 
if it is to be adequate and empirical, must begin in the 
immediate experience of the self and the physical world 
given in experience to discover the Urgrund of all ex-
perience--personal, social, and physical. 
ii. Metaphysics and Philosophy. There is an 
occasional suggestion in Hocking's writings that there 
is little difference between metaphysics as a special 
philosophical discipline and philosophy as a whole. For 
just as he .oflten tends to identify "the world" and "real-
ity," so to a very large degree are the terms "metaphys-
icsn and "philosophy" similarly joined. This apparent 
identification may be observed in several passages, al-
though most notably when Hocking is addressing himself 
to the wider conception of metaphysics, particularly in 
its relationship to everyday problems of human living. 
1. Art.{l946), 368. 
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For example, in his Ingersoll Lecture he states that 
"philosophy is committed to the view that the universe 
has a meaning--which it is out to find; and that human 
life, by inclusion, has a meanin g also."l And then, in 
an article written four years later, he remarked that 
"metaphysiqs must postulate simply that the world is not 
meaningless: it is fact, but not 'mere fact.' If the 
world were mere fact, ergo meaningless, metaphysics 
would be meaningless with it." 2 And further, whereas 
most persons would be inclined to say that philosophy 
is the comprehensive organization of the problems of 
man and his universe, or as Hocking himself puts it, 
"When in the vernacular we speak of a man's philosophy 
3 
we mean simply the sum of his beliefs," Hocking stated 
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in a recent article that, "The term 'metaphysics' has 
simply served as the collecting point for the more sweep-
ing and radical questions which man puts to his world." 4 
At least as far as the problem of human significance is 
involved, it seems that for Hocking philosophy and meta-
physics are one and the same. 
1. TDL, 152. 
2. Art.(l940) 1 , 252. 
3. TP, 1. 
4. Art.(l946), 367. 
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This apparent identi£ication of philosophy and 
metaphysics can be traced to Hocking's central contention 
that en idealistic metaphysics--the assertion of ~~ the ex-
istence of objective meaning in the world which implies 
some kind of mental life at the core of reality111--is a 
kind of liphilosophic c minimum" without which the phi-
losophical enterprise is 11 a meaningless occupation.n As 
a matter of fact, Hocking goes so far as yo say that 
11 Idealism. • • is identical with philosophy, u and he says 
of realism that it is t1not so much a type of philosophy 
2 
as the abandonment of philosophy. n In a similar vein 
in a later article he writes that realism is nnot a va-
. 3 
riety of metaphysics: it is the negation of metaphysics. n 
Thus it appears that not only are metaphysics and phi-
losophy bound up together, but that idealism joins in 
as a third partner. Lest this be taken as the height 
o£ confusio~ and ambiguity, it is necessary to examine 
closely the basis of Hocking's argument. 
Philosophy, in general, is a system of beliefs 
which is based primarily on either metaphysical or 
1. TP, 495. 
2. Art.(l938), 3-4. 
3. Art.{l940) 1 , 252. 
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epistemological pre.aupposl t ions . These presuppositions 
are "stem-beliefs" about which hang "clusters" of ideas 
which are called "types of philosophy." Naturalism and 
idealism are types of philosophy based on metaphysical 
presuppositions--in fact, "they are metaphysical beliefs 
to begin with"--while rationalism, pragmatism, and in-
tuitionism are types based on epistemological consider-
ations. In fact, they deserve to be called types only 
because they have "certain characteristic tendencies" 
to reach conclusions in metaphysics and ethics. The 
distinctive mark of a philosophy, it would then appear, 
is that it embodies certain beliefs about reality. 1 But 
is it not also true that metaphysics constitutes a ra-
tional account of what is believed to be real? 
Remembering that Hocking speaks of naturalism 
(and realism may also be included here) and idealism as 
the basic metaphysical types, it may be observed that he 
reads both naturalism , and realism out of the picture be-
cause they are content to rest their efforts with a mere 
description of the universe and human life in relation 
to it. Speaking of naturalism Hocking says, "There are 
some features of the world which naturalism does not 
profess to explain: it regards them as inexplicable,--
1. TP, 18-19. 
_.: - · - --· -· ··:: --=.'3 
----- - ~-
- ... ... - - -
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we must simply take them as given matters of fact. 111 
And of realism he says~ "Realism holds that we must be 
content to describe~ and in practice to adapt ourselves 
to what is~ after all, there." 2 With naturalism and 
realism so disposed of because they stop short with 
description and thus fall to explain, only idealism, and 
more particularly, the metaphysical presuppositions of 
idealism, are left as the truly adequate philosophical 
position. In sum Hocking says, 
I take idealism. • .as the centre 
of my metaphysics •••• To this 
extent, I believe that idealism 
is not so much a separate type of 
philosophy as the essence of all 
philosophy.3 
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In his discussion of the branches of philosophy, 
which was prepared for beginners in the subject and thus 
is greatly simplified, Hocking mentions that there are 
three principal divisions within the philosophical en-
terprise: metaphysics, or "beliefs about reality;" eth-
ics, ?r "beliefs abou t ri ght and wrong ; n and episte-
mology, or "beliefs about belief."4 Hocking places meta-
1.- TP, 105. 
2. Art.(l938), 3. 
3. TP, 495. 
4. TP, s~1rz . 
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physics first in the plan of philosophy, and in his 
thought ethics and epistemology are dependent upon, and 
to a very large degree a part of, metaphysics. When 
Hocking refers to the native human quest for an under-
standing of the nature of reality, it is obvious that 
considerations of right and wrong, which are the province 
of ethics, are intimately bound up with metaphysics 
itself. Thus he says, "The proposition that ethics has 
no need of metaphysics runs close to absurdity: it is as 
much as to say that ethics is indifferent to the nature 
of reality."l Similarly, epistemology, like ethics, is 
closely related to metaphysics, and in this connection 
Hocking remarks that "the theory of knowledge is thus an 
inseparable adjunct of the metaphysical adventure of 
ideas ••• (for] theories of knowledge seem to require 
metaphysical assumptions. 112 The priority of metaphysics 
within the framework of philosophy is thus made clear in 
Hocking's view. And with the earlier assertion of the 
priority of idealism, it becomes apparent that for Hock-
ing an idealistic metaphysics, which seek s not only to 
describe but also to explain the nature of reality, is 
1. TP, 344 
2. Art.(l946), 367 
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the indispensable core of any adequate philosophy for 
man. But this raises the question, Why should man be 
concerned with philosophy anyway? Why should philosophy 
and particularly metaphysics, lay any claim to attention 
from the minds of men? The next section will endeavor to 
point out the relationship between metaphysics and human 
nature in Hocking's thought. 
iii. Metaphysics and Human Nature. · Hocking 
would have no objection to paraphrasing Aristotle's well-
known dictum to say that "man is by nature a metaphysical 
animal."1 For just as man is made for communal life, for 
social and political life, so is he by the. same token 
made for the intellectual life for the persistent and 
promising inquiry into the fundamental nature of being. 
To call man a metaphysical animal "by nature" does not 
mean that he inherits some specific fund of detailed 
knowledge of ultimate reality as he inherits blue eyes or. 
brown hair. Nor does it mean that he has possessed from 
birth certain innate ideas which reveal to him the nature 
1. Cf. Aristotle, Polit., 1253a 2, 1278b 20. nMan is by 
nature a political animal." Hocking comments on this par-
ticular statement in the Politics by saying that man is a 
political animal because he is, or can become, a moral 
agent. 11 We may put Aristotle 1 s meaning in this way," he 
says. "The communities which men make are political be-
cause men are fitted by nature to frame ideas of fair and 
unfair dealing , of right and wrong, and to use them. • • 
We · are social and political creatures, at least in part, 
because we need to inject our r.ea sons and our moral per-
ceptions into the world's work.' (HNR, 111, 112-114.) 
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of being. Vfhat it does mean is that man is by nature a 
rational creature, that he possesses an inquiring mind 
which demands for its own activity and satisfaction some 
kind of minimal comment on the nature of reall ty. Man 
puts to his world the vital questions of metaphysics "be-
cause he is human." "The function of metaphysics," Hock-
ing continues, 11 is derived from a primitive and inescap-
able human concern, man's ambition to know where he is, 
what he is, why he is, and what the whole thing means."l 
Thus, the mind of man demands to know something about the 
world in which it must live; there is a constant attitude 
of mental restlessness in the face of the cosmos. To say 
that "man is by nature a metaphysical creature" is to es-
tablish one of the primary facts of hL~an existence, to 
emphasize that the answer-seeking mind of man drives 
through to some kind of answers to basic, metaphysical 
t . 2 ques 10ns. 
The very act of living requires the acceptance 
of basic assumptions concerning the self and the reality 
1. Art. (1946), 367 • 
2. The issue of whether man should be called a rational 
or metaphysical creature is not a critical one, for both 
are reducible to each other. Here it may be said to be 
better strategy to call man metaphysical rather than 
rational, inasmuch as so much of the contemporary evi-
dence, including personal experience, seems to belie the 
rationality of man. 
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. 
which is external to it--the physical , social, an~most 
important for Hocking, the spiritual. As a matter of 
fact, whether brought fully into consciousness or not, 
this interest in reality is the necessary condition of 
every human actiYity. In Hocking's words: 11 The interest 
in reality is not derived from the interest in other 
things, '(and] there is a strong suggestion that the in-
terest in other things may be derived from the interest 
in reality." 1 That there is a mutual dependence between 
t he interest in reality and the interest in other things 
is not to be denied, but Hocking would insist that the 
interest in reality is both logically and temporally 
prior. The interest in reality, the problem of metaphys-
ics, is grounded not only in the nature of man, as sug-
gested above, but it is also in some way grounded in the 
nature of reality itself. For if there were other 
sources of stimulation and inspiration greater than real-
ity, then they must lay some aboriginal claim to that 
title themselves. In other words, reality must be such 
that it makes itself known immediately in experience and 
calls forth the individual to respond to it. Man, con-
stantly confronted by this reality waiting to be dis-
1. MGHE, 12!Z . 
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covered, applies himself to the task of discovering its 
meaning for him and his life. 
This metaphysical search for the nature and 
signif icance of reality is a quest which man pursues 
throughout his life, literally from the cradle to the 
grave--and perhaps even beyond, according to Hocking 's 
views of the "immortability" of human life. Speaking of 
reality in this connection he says, "It is now before me 
and has been so from my conscious beginning, the same 
from birth to death. 111 Thus, the infant in his first 
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mements ·· of awareness meets reality in some vague, yet 
firmly demanding way. As Rocking nemarks, "The infant's 
first thoughts are metaphysical, that is to say, thoughts 
of Reality--though not by name and title."2 These first 
thoughts may be called metaphysical., not because they 
represent any developed system of ideas, but because they 
refer to or intend something about what is real, or taken 
to be real, although, like the infant himself, they may 
be more a "blooming, buzzing confusion" than anything 
else. Nevertheless, they quickly become guides to activ-
ity and to the formation of certain fundamental habits 
baaed on the dependability of those ideas. From such 
1. MGHE, 96. 
2. MGHE, 215. 
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vague and inarticulate beginnings in infancy meta-
physical questions assume more and more an important 
role in the life of the individual. 
The adolescent period is particularly im-
portant in this regard, for this is the time when the 
young person begins to express himself in critical or 
creative thought, re-thinking the world with new-found 
reflective powers. Hocking states that "youth is meta-
physical not because metaphysics is a youthful malady, 
but because the youth has metaphysical work to do; it 
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has been attached to the universe through the mental 
veins of its authorities; now it must win an attachment 
of its own."4- Beginning in these early years and con-
tinuing all through his life, man as a metaphysical 
creature is seeking to understand the nature of what is 
real, and it is in that understanding that he finds the 
significance of his own life. No man is without a meta-
physics, and it is these beliefs about reality which con-
stitute a vi tal part of his ~_equipment of ideas" with 
which he meets his world. His primitive, natural in-
terest in reality does not seek for casual answers to 
idle questions, but for effective answers to crucial 
1. HNR, 275 .• 
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questions which will enable him to face that world with 
firmer assurance and greater success. "What funda-
mentally interests man," says Hocking, "is, in truth, 
just reality--nothing more special, nothing less. 
Around this original meaning gather all practical con-
1 
cerns; in this all importances are funded." 
It is these basic ideas about reality and its 
relationship to the individual which provide alterna-
tives for decision and guideposts for action. The order 
and coherence which a man is able to achieve go a long 
way toward producing wiser decisions and more effective 
actions , thus fulfilling what Hocking calls "the deepest 
impulse of man ••• the will to be effective. 112 Order 
and coherence breed wisdom and effectiveness, but vague-
ness and contradiction spawn ignorance and disability. 
The reasoned, intelligent metaphysics which is within 
the grasp of all men who can be and will be rational can-
not help but produce an enlightened awareness of the 
truths of the world and a more effective role in its 
destiny. The need for metaphysics as the increase of 
1. MGHE, 122 .• 
2. Art.(l942), 198. 
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understanding about the meaning of the universe is thus 
specific and crucial. For those who persevere in the 
search it brings a partnership with the real 1 giving the 
individual ·self its firmest bond with that which is. 
to 
Hocking alludes/this metaphysical quest in the follow-
ing passage: 
Many people have a feeling 1 perhaps 
a superstition, tha t they have a 
spea:lfi c. f unction to fulfill 1 which 
has been assigned to them in the 
deeper councils of the world. They 
do not know what that function is. 
mut they are kept in search of it, 
kept from a sense of meaningless 
by the conviction that it exists. It 
is a version of this view that life 
has meaning only so long as one keeps 
on growing 1 that is 1 continues in the 
progressive realization of capacities 
assumed innate •••• It does confer an 
enobling sense of appointment and of 
inward relation to the ul t imate pur-
pose of things.l 
Therefore, Hocking 's definition of metaphysics 
as the continuing quest for an understanding of the na-
ture of ultimate reality is seen to be a ' de libera tely per-
sonal and important adventure of ideas. It implies with-
out question that man is able in some way to experience 
and to know that ultimate reality, at least in some small 
measure. Thus, the stage is now set for the major in-
vestigative work of this dissertation. The next three 
1. TDLI 136, 137. 
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chapters will consider successively the experience, the 
knowledge, and the nature of ultimate reality, all as 
part of the great adventure of ideas in which all must 
participate. 
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·cHAPTER II 
The Experience of Metaphysical Reality 
It is Hocking's view that man experiences met-
aphysical reality directly and without mediation. "In 
its full infinity and vrholeness it is now before me •• 
the: .. s ame from birth to death," he remarks in a passage 
previously cited. 1 Or again, in a similar vein, "For 
one thing I cannot by any means escape: namely, that 
reality itself is present to me in experience ••• n2 
Indeed, experience is "the region of our continuous con-
tact with metaphysical reality. 113 This fundamental fact 
of · t he immediacy of metaphysical reality is called by 
Hocking , 11 the principle of initial empiricism," and con-
cerning it he comments that "everything that is worth 
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knowing about the world , including metaphysical knowledge, 
is to be known in experience; for experience is metaphysi-
cal--it is dealing with reality.n4 
The problem of the present chapter is to de-
1. MGBE, 96. • See p. 34 above. 
2. MGHE, 310. 
3. MGHE, 215. 
4. Art.(l930), 394. 
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termine how it is that man is able to experience ultimate 
reality, while the succeeding chapter will indicate the 
way in which "metaphysical knowledge is to be known in 
experience." 
Now at first v.iew this contention that man con-
fronts metaphysical reality in experience may appear a 
bold and venturesome statement. And in a sense it is, 
for it suggests that the deepest mystery of the world--
11everything ••• worth knowing"-- is somehow revealed in 
the ordinary channels of daily routine. But on deeper 
sight it is obvious that if ultimate reality could not 
be known in experience, it could not be known at all. 
For experience is all a man is--it is man--and reality 
beyond or outside that experience is reality unknown, 
and further, reality unknowable, so long as it remains 
beyond. However, even to say that reality is extra-em-
pirical is to know at least something about it--that it 
exists, and that it is beyond experience--so that reality 
thereby is not completely unknown. And also, to say that 
the tables and chairs, the friendships ~nd disappoint-
ments, that all the varied items that constitute one's 
experience are not real, either individually or taken 
together, that too is to know something about reality. 
"All this process of judging this or that to be unreal 
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or less than real,n writes Hocking, 11 is made possible s1mply 
by that grasp of reality which at any moment I have." 1 
Thus it would seem that to say that man confronts reality 
in experience is to utter a truism, rather than to make 
a daring proclamation of new discovery. Perhaps, how-
ever, it is a truism that can yield new discovery. 
Thereby it becomes all the more necessary to go further, 
to see more clearly just what Hocking means by experience, 
and then to detail, if possible, just how it is that man 
confronts, or is confronted by ultimate reality in ex-
perience. 
1. Hocking's Definition of Experience. 
One of the recurring weaknesses of philosophy 
in the past two centuries, says Hocking, has been the 
frequent, uncritical use of the word "experience" by 
philosophers of every type and description, with the in-
evitable result that its meaning has become confused and 
ambiguous. "The word 1 experience, 1 " he remarked at the 
open ing of his Gifford Lectures in January 1938, "has 
.. 
become a court of appeal for thinkers of all schools. 
This fact alone is sufficient to indicate that it has be-
come ambiguous . When taken as a non-committal or par-
1. MGHE, 310. Cf. Bergson, CE, 310. "The act by which 
we declare an object unreal therefore posits the ex-
istence of the real in general." 
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ticularly secure point of beginning, it is full of false 
suggestions. ttl And similarly, in the SgJripps L.ectures a 
few years later he said: 
All movements of philosophy in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
have more or less trusted to one 
phase of thought, namely, exper-
iencel •• In the West we have used 
the word "experience" as a tower 
of safety to which all schools 
could run ••• After two centuries 
of trusting this use of the term, 
we begin to see that experience is 
an ambiguous mirror. The word 
"experience" is tired. After serv-
ing all schools, it ends by being 
of doubtful service to any. It is 
not alone ambiguous: what is more 
dangerous, it is the source of 
misconception.2 
For this reason there is dire need in philosophy today 
for a full-fashioned revolt against the unrestrained 
uses of "experience" which give rise to misconception. 
There must be "a new beginningn in philosophy for this 
word of central importance, and Hocking is not content 
to let other types or schools of philosophy rob idealism 
of the initiative in bringing on this new beginning. To 
eliminate misconception and "unite the elements of these 
various protests," Hocking suggests "that we need at 
1. Art.(l938), 1. 
2. Art.(l941)1, 16, 17. 
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least three terms to contain what the word 'experience' 
attempts to compress into one: (1) 1The Self' (2) 
"Meeting the World 1 (3) 'More or Less Well. r nl This 
then, in the rough, is his definition of experience: 
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The self meeting the world more or less well. Here "the 
self 11 refers primarily to an individual person, 11 tre world 11 
refers primarily to metaphysical reality (which for the 
present should be considered external to, and other than, 
the self), and ltmore or less well" refers generally to the 
varying efficiency of the way in which the self and the 
world are brought together. But this definition is primi-
ti ve; it is only a tt general description, u as Hocking ad-
mits,2 and the issue must be pushed further to de-
termine more adequately what he means by experience. 3 
1 1. Art.(l941) , 18. 
2. Art.(l938), 1. 
3. It might be interjected here that this definltion of 
experience as expounded in the Gifford and Scripps Lec-
tures, as well as in other recent works, is not an en-
tirely 11 new beginning 11 in Hocking's thought. In addition 
to the designation of experience as "the region of our 
continuous contact with metaphysica.l _reality" in The Mean-
ing of God in Human Ex~erience (p. 215), he had also de-
scribed experience asan interplay between an active Self 
and an active External . Reality" (p. 285) • This great work, 
of course, was written a full quarter-century before the 
above-named lecture series, and despite the announcement 
of "a new beginning," the similarity between the earlier 
end .later definitions is striking. However, Hocking is 
here calling philosophy back from wayward paths to an 
ancient insi&ht, perhaps first seen by Plato, that the 
experience of man can offer more than shadows on the wall, 
that man can behold in his own mind's eye the ultimate 
reality of the universe. To discover this secret afresh, 
as Hocking has urged in all his writings, is indeed to 
achieve a new beginning of philosophic insighj. 
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Typically~ Hocking does not furnish his 
readers with a concise~ systematic exposition of his 
meaning of the word experience. 1 However~ one way to 
discover and interpret that meaning is to determine just 
how his definition, or more accurately~ an understanding 
of his definition, overcomes the misconceptions which 
have gathered around the loose application of this term 
in recent philosophy. 
i. The Misconceptions of "Experience". In the 
Scripps Lectures~ and also in a somewhat similar manner 
in the Gifford Lectures, Hocking cited "the misconcep-
tions of subjectivity~ passivity~ shreddibility~ ~n~ 
indifference," which have been commonly associated with 
the word experience in recent thought.2 It is now ap-
propriate to consider each of these sources of error in 
the light of Hocking's definition, The self meeting the 
world more or less well. 
(1) Subjectivity. The first-named misconcep-
tion which conventional definitions of experience have 
fostered is that of subjectivity. The assertion that 
1. Commenting on Hocking 's literary style~ a reviewer 
of MGHE complained that "a greater difficulty is the 
lack of a clear and concise summary of the author's 
argument." Brown, Rev. ( 1913), 243. 
2. Art.(l941) 1 , 18. 
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all experience is the experience of a self has intro-
duced the ambiguous concept of self-experience; this, in 
turn, has encouraged the idea that the external world, 
or the object of experience, is created by and dependent 
upon the individual experiencing self'. This attitude 
Hocking regards as "one of the chief dangers of the ap-
1 peal to experience." Further, it is one to which many 
idealists have been prone to succumb. The fundamental 
maxim of all idealism, that ultimate reality is of the 
nature of mind, has been mismanaged by some--Hocking 
calls them "subjective idealistsU~who accept this pri-
mary proposition, but then go on to add that ultimate 
reality is of the nature of ~ mind. "The world is my 
idea," is the characteristic utterance of this group, 
represented in . the history of modern philosophy chiefly 
by Leibniz, but claiming as close kin ~escartes, 
Berkeley, and Kant, to name a few~ And because these 
1. Art.(l938), 1. 
2. TP, 274 ff. 
3. Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant saved themselves from 
complete subjectivism only at the last moment by an ap-
peal to the intuition "that we are not alone, and that 
the figures we deal with are real and present persons." 
'!'TP, 288) 
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subjective idealists and near-subjectivists have been 
prominent men in the history of thought, nidealism has 
too long been identified with the subjective theory of 
knowledge: it is time for a fairer statement of its po-
sit ion. • ttl • Unfortunately, it is the common assump-
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tion that all metaphysical idealists must be subjecti-
vists in their epistemology, and that any assertion that 
ultimate reality is of the nature of mind tacitly assumes 
that is of the nature of, ergo a product of, my own mind. 
Thus, in his own metaphysical position, which in the 
context of this discussion would be termed ttobjective 
idealism," Hocking endeavors to combat (and he would 
also hope, to refute) subjectivism by stressing the 
authority of the intuition of a world external to the 
observer; the intuition of a real not-self, or more 
correctly, a real not-myself. To free himself, ahd 
idealism, from the bonds of subjectivity he emphasizes 
in his discussion of experience that a two-sided sub-
ject-object situation is always involved. There is 
always that which experience~, , the self, together with 
that which is experienced, the not-(my)self. Of course, 
it can be said that 11 that which is experienced" is oc-
1. TP, 293. 
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casionally one's self in the sense that one is particu-
larly aware of, or thinking about, himself. However, 
for all intents and purposes Hocking does not take seri-
ously this fact of "pure" self-experience, a point which 
will be considered later in Chapter VI. Vlhat Hocking 
wants to emphasize is that experience is not only by a 
self, but also of a world; both factors must be accounted 
for in a definition of experience. Thus, in his own def-
inition, experience is the meeting between a self and a 
world. To regard experience in this manner, he maintains, 
is to overcome subjectivity: "The description is not sub-
jective. It evades subjectivit y because it brings the 
Self and the World together." 1 
However, it appears that on the surface Hock-
lng's definition does not evade subjectivity; in fact, 
because "it brings the Self and the World together," it 
might be said to fall into subject~vity. But that is 
not to heed his concept of "the World" in this definition. 
By 11 the World" Hocking means that which is other than and 
1. Art.(l941) 1 , 18. Hocking's phraseology in this con-
text is perhaps misleading, as the succeeding paragraph 
suggests. ~fuat he means in saying that subjectivity is 
avoided in bringing the Self and the World together is 
that the world is not a creation of that Self, that 
there is present a genuine subject-object relationship 
which overcomes any taint of subjectivism. 
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independent of the experiencing self. That there is 
such an external reality is not now under debate. Here, 
on the question of subjectivity and Hocking's definition, 
let it simply be said that subjectivity is avoided in the 
insistence that experience involves the co-existence of a 
self and an independent reality. Discussion of the val-
idity of those arguments establishing the existence of 
that independent reality must be postponed to another 
section. 
(2) Passivity. The second misconception to be 
wary of in a definition of experience is that of pas-
sivity, the fallacy that in experience the self is a com-
pletely passive agent. Indeed, 11 the word •experience' 
suggests passivity," Hocking wri 'Ges. 1 In this view, 
experience is something that happens to a person; the 
self is merely the recipient of some activity from with-
out. But in Hocking's view, this is only "halfway the 
case." In addition to the activity from without, there 
is always the reaction of the self to that activity. To 
describe experience in terms of a meeting, or contact or 
interplay, is to rule out passivity inasmuch as the idea 
of meeting carries with it the idea of activity on both 
1. Art.(l951), 321. 
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sides. There is action and reaction; there is the 
presence of reality and the response of the self to 
that presence. That is what experience is-- 11 the un-
divided totality, ,Q.n whic~ there can be distinguished 
(1} a stuff of experience and (2) a way of dealing with 
it.« 1 In dealing with reality the self is an active 
agent. As the self meets the world, it does not remain 
a silent partner in the transaction, but, quite literal-
ly, it goes out to meet the world. The self, in ex-
perience, is an active self, just as the reality Which 
it meets is also active. Any view of experience which 
fails to account for this two-sided activity is based 
on a faulty understanding of the self and/or an inade-
quate picture of ultimate reality. 
(3) Shreddibilitz. Another misconception in 
popular noti9ns of experience is the idea that while ex-
perience does involve two factors, both of which ·are ac-
tive, these factors can be considered adequately apart 
from one another. This is the fallacy of shreddibility, 
the view that all experience is "shreddible" into these 
1. Art.(l940) 3 , 230. In this quotation Hocking is ac-
tually describing John Dewey's theory of experience, but 
quite obviously on this particular point, as he also 
admits, he is in agreement with Dewey. 
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two elements, the self and the world. 1 A more subtle 
and r 'efined expression of this same fallacy ls the as-
sumption that the content of experience, that is, the 
exper,ience of a world, can be sundered from the self 
which endures that experience, the experience by a self. 
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As a matter of fact, it is perhaps the common view to 
separate content from self. "When we speak of experience," 
Hocking remarks, "what is called to mind is usually ex-
perience with the experiencers left out." David Hume is 
criticized for taking precisely such a view of experience. 
11Hume in his examination of experience, found no Self; he 
had g one out of his house, as one noted rejoinder had it, 
and looking in at the window, was unable to find himself 
at home. 112 Now it is possible, and common, to attain a 
1. In a sense this fallacy of shreddibility is the op-
posite of the first-named misconception of subjectivity. 
For while subjectivity would unite the two elements of 
experience under the heading of the self, thus making 
the world an unreserved part of self, the fallacy of 
shreddibility would keep them exclusively apart. Hocking 
does not mention the juxtaposition of these two miscon-
ceptions, but it is not unreasonable to say that in the 
presence of these two alternatives he would acknowledge 
that both are right to a certain extent, and that the 
truth of the situation must be found in a synthesis of 
the two views. In the language of the article analyzing 
Dewey(s concept, as cited above, the two factors in ex-
perience may be "distinguished," but they must remain 
"undivided." 
2. MGHE, 280 f. , Cf. TP, 196. 
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purely conceptual idea of experience, that is with the 
self abstracted, which is perfectly satisfactory for 
certain critical purposes so long as it is remembered to 
be purely conceptual. But such an abstraction falsifies 
experience insofar as one forgets that he has abstracted. 
As Hocking once wrote in a somewhat different context, 
"Illusion arises ••• when one assumes that the piecemeal 
aspec:t of a thing analyzed is identical with the whole 
1 in its integrity." Because this tendency to isolate 
the e:xperiencing self from that which is experienced is 
a common one, Hocking would want it made particularly 
cleai" that experience, for him, brings and keeps the 
self and the world together. 
(4) Indifference. The fourth· misconception 
of experience which must be overcome is that of indif-
ference. It is too common to think of the content of 
experience solely in terms of ideas. In fact, says 
Hocklng, "the word •experience• suggests a kind of know-
ing ••• What it fails to suggest is that, life being 
profoundly emotional, every item of experience is charged 
with feeling. "2 There is no indifferent content in ex-
perience. In the meeting of a self and the world there 
1. Art.(l914), 324. 
2. Art.(l951), 321. 
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is a c:onstant tenslon--"a constant undercurrent of feel-
ing al)out the very act of experiencing. 
• • 
nl In Hock-
ing's account of experience he would be emphatic that 
due rocognition be given this element of feeling, for 
"all life has feeling as its substance.n2 A section of 
the following chapter will bring out more clearly the 
importance of feeling in Hocking's thought. 
(5) Invariabilitz. In addition to these four 
misconceptions of experience, cited in the Scripps lee-
tures in 1941, there is a further misconception, closely 
related to indifference, which has been discussed a lit-
3 
tle more fully in the earlier Gifford lectures. Hock-
ing does not provide any distinctive term for this mis-
conception, which is concerned with the variability in 
the effectiveness of experience. ttThe content of ex-
perience," he writes, "is subject to judgment at every 
point as better or worse; but can ·our activity of ex-
1. Art.(l951), 32L 
2. Art.(l938}, 1. 
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3. In the first Gifford Lecture (1938), entitled "Ex-
perience and Ideas," Hocking had discussed specifically 
only 1ihree of "several prevalent misconceptions of the 
nature of experience." These three were passivity, in-
diffel~ence, and invariability. The fa(llacies of sub-
jectivity and shreddibility, noted in the 1941 lectures, 
were not considered separately, but were mentioned in the 
initial development of the definition of experience. 
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periencing be better or worse? 111 Booking maintains with 
assurance that it can be, and he adds further that any 
adequate definition of experience must reckon with this 
matter of how effectively a self meets the world, a mat-
ter which is constantly of critical importance to the 
self. Thus, in Hocking's definition, the words "more or 
less well" bear reference to the fact of varying efficien-
cy in the meet i ng between a self and the world that is ex-
perience. 
ii. Summary statement. In summary, then, on 
Hocking's definition of experience as "the self meeting 
the world more or less well," let it be said that ex-
perience has at least these characteristics. First, it 
involves two different factors, a self and a world which 
is not part of nor dependent upon the self. And these 
two factors must be taken together, for fundamentally 
experience is a unity, or perhaps more accurately, a uni-
fying activity in which disparate and often contradictory 
elemEJnta are brought together. This problem will be con-
sider•ed in detail in Chapter V. Second, experience is not 
the self, nor is it a stream of content. It is both, a. 
complex unity perhaps best expressed in the cumbersome 
phrase, by-a-self-of-a-world. Third, experience is pri-
1. Art.(l951), 322. 
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manily an active feeling-response of the self to the 
vivid, living Weltstoff which it confronts, a response 
which is uneven in the extent of its meeting, this 
variability depending on the character of the self as 
well as the nature of the world. 
With this characterization in mind it becomes 
necessary now to move on to determine more specifically 
how it is in experience that the self actually confronts 
ultimate reality. 
2. The Immed iate Experience of Reality. 
The most adequate discussion of how metaphys-
ical reality is revealed in experience is to be found in 
Part IV of The Meaning of God in Human Experience. This 
section, entitled "How Men Know Gbd," seeks out the 
"original sources" of the knowledge of God and thus de-
termines the way in which external reality is immediately 
present to the self. It can be said, almost without 
question, that this important section, together with Part 
V on "Worship and the Mystics," deserves to be ranked as 
Hocking's most original and significant contribution to 
date to metaphysics and the philosophy of relig ion. 
The definition of experience as a meeting be-
tween a self and the world announces only that metaphysi-
cal reality can be experienced and known by the self; it 
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makes no claims whatsoever for how this reality is ex-
perienced. The solution to this problem must lie in 
the direction of a further analysis of the nature of 
experience. 
Certainly one way of describing experience 
would be to regard it in terms of the various objects 
of awareness which are presented to the self. For all 
experience, as Hooking's definition suggests, is ex-
perienoe of something. Hooking further suggests that 
the various objects of awareness given to consciousness 
may be grouped in three fundamental classes, which he 
identifies as follows: 
The physical objects, which with 
their relations we sum up as Na-
ture; the payohioal objects, which 
with their relations we sum up as 
Self; and the social objects, 
which with their relations we sum 
up as Society, or still more con-
clusively, as our Spiritual World, 
ourselves being inoluded.l 
That 1s, every experience is definable as experience by 
a self, but it is also further definable as the ex-
perience of (1) the physical world--trees, buildings, 
automobiles, and the like; and/or (2) one's own self 
in spt3oial moments of self-reflection on memories, fears, 
1. MGHE, 241. 
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and bnpes; and/or (3) the experience of a social world--
friends, family, the people in the next block. In these 
fundamental categories of Nature, Self, and Society all 
experience can be assigned. 
However, as the final phrase of the quotation 
in tbs preceding paragraph indicates, a closer inspec-
tion of experience makes it possible to reduce these 
fundamen tal categories to two. By regarding the self as 
mind and by classifying it with other similar minds, the 
entire range of experience of mi nd can be considered 
under the single classification of socia l experience. 
This, it may be debated, is an highly questionable pro-
cedure- -to place t he experience of one's self in the 
same category as the experience of other persons. How-
ever, it can be defended briefly on two counts (although 
Hock ing does not attempt to do so), with both arguments 
being based on the definition of experience, and the 
cr•iticisms which that definition attempts to meet, as 
outlined in the preceding section. First, while it is 
true t hat all experience is in a limited sense self-ex-
perience, it is also true that as the self experiences 
itself, it experiences itself as a discrete self in 
which the r e is a dist i nct i on , somewhat tec:b..nical though 
it be, between the self which is experiencing and the 
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self which i s being e xpe ri enced. From a metaphysical 
point of view, of course, it is only one self which is 
i n volved. Nonetheless, the subject-object convention 
cornmor:1 to all experience can be invoked here , and indeed 
it mus.t be invoked in this rather special circumstance in 
which.; t :qe self is peculiarly aware of its own identity. 
Second , it mi ght be suggested (although nowhere explicit-
ly stated) that Hocking is anxious to include the i ndi-
vidual self with society in this particular discussion in 
order to guard agains t any implicati ons of subjectivism, 
wherein it mi ght be thought that metaphysical reality is 
to be found unreservedly in the individual self. Vfhile 
"the psychi cal objects, which with their relations we sum 
up as Self" may indicate something about the qualit i es of 
the most real, it is impos sible to consider that the 
whole story of metaphysical reality is to be found in the 
self's experience of itself. 
Rather, in Hocking's view, ultimate reality is 
to be found ·somewhere and somehow in the social experience 
of other minds and in the experience of nature. As an 
initial verification of this view he undertakes a cursory 
examination of the history of religion and concludes that, 
"speaking broadly, there are two distinct phases of ex-
perience wherein God is apt to appear: in the experience 
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of nature and in social experience."1 Primitive man 
from the first has marked the activities and influences 
of his gods in the physical world or in some aspect of 
his community life. Thus, trees and glens and small, 
runni.ng brooks were believed to be the homes of the 
gods, and the climaxes of personal and social life, 
birth, marriage, attainment of manhood, and the rest, 
these also were special provinces of the divinities. 
Seen in this light, physical and social experience as-
sume the added stature of religious experience, the 
chief' underlyl.ng characteristic of which is man's sense 
of h.i.s own limitations. Confronted by the obstinacy of 
nature or the decisions of other minds which he cannot 
contr•ol, man discovers his ignorance and impotence, so 
that ignorance and a "sense of mystery" conditions his 
behavior. Hocking insists that this discovery of his 
own limitations is "made possible by some prior recogni-
tion of a positive being , on the other side of his limi-
tation.112 This ttprior recognition" of some other ex-
istent thing besides one's self is "an experience of not 
being alone in knowing the world," and here and here only 
1. MGHE, 230. 
2. MGHE, 236. 
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is to be found 11 the original source of the knowledge of 
God.nl As Hocking declares: 
At the source of all religion •• 
we : find an experience of God as 
the Other Knower of our World, al-
ready in close relation to self, 
and also in some natural bond with-
oun social and physical experience.2 
Howev~~r, this is only ttthe report of the elementary re-
ligious consciousness."3 It is necessary to go further 
to examine more closely soc.ial and physical experience 
in tm:>n. 
i. Social Experience: The Knowledge of Other 
Minds .. What has been called "social experience" is the 
experlence of other minds, other persons, in the ordinary 
avenues of everyday activity. Man is basically a social 
creature; he lives in a community, and only the highest 
abstrstction can fail to identify man as a member of some 
community or social group, whether it be that of family, 
economic class, political affiliation, or geographical 
residetnce. Whatever else he is and does, man is also a 
1. MGBE, 23 6 • 
2. MGHE, 239 f. 
3. MGEE, 240. 
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member of a social group, and his social life is an in-
tegral part of his being a self. The fact of membership 
in a social group, or more accurately, in many different 
social groups, is the occasion of his social experience. 
And yet, strictly speaking, man does not really have 
social experience, for it is impossible to experience 
directly other finite minds or selves. What we do have, 
says Hocking, is "the knowledge of other minds than our 
own. n
1 That is, instead of social experience man actual-
ly has social knowledge. But why must this be so? 
It is an obvious fact that the nature of mind, 
non-material as it is, is not given directly to men in 
sensation, but rather is inferred from the various 
senso:ry data which impinge on one 1 s consciousness. In 
Hocking's words: 
The other mind must be beyond my 
powers of direct experience. It 
can be no object of sensation, be-
cause it is not a physical thing • 
• • • What I do directly experience 
is the physical presence of the 
other person.2 
A.ll the signs one can have of other finite mind are phys-
leal :3igns--body 1 voice, gestures 1 and the like--and from 
these signs one can infer the presence of other minds as 
1. This is the title of Chapter XVII of MGHE. 
2. MGHE 1 244, 242. 
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thinking beings similar to one's self, with a "practical 
certainty" that is adequate to all social experience. 
Other minds must be thought, they cannot be sensed, and 
other selves are known indirectly by inference rather 
than immediately. 
However, some might say that apart from this 
"physical presence of the other person" it is still pos-
sible to experience other minds directly. Hocking ex-
amines two such claims advanced by his colleagues at 
Harvard. Josiah Royce, in his Gifford Lectures, main-
tained that insofar as other persons responded to one's 
own wlshes, claims, and commands, and thus completed 
one's meanings and intentions, the experience of other 
minds is direct and infallible. Hocking insists, how-
ever, that this response is still presumed or inferred 
(and further, the signs are still physical), and that 
while we may have a strong belief in the reality of other 
minds, this belief is still one step removed from 1m-
media 1ie experience. Similarly, the proposal of Professor 
MiinstE~rberg that we directly experience other persons by 
acknowledging them real is regarded by Hocking as no 
more than an inference, no matter how compelling it 
might seem to be. Thus Hocking concludes: 
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All of these ways--by physical 
criterion, by response, and by ac-
knowledgment--have a common pre-
supposition. They all suppose the 
mind to be furnished in advance 
with an idea of Other Mind. We 
are able~read signs as we do, 
because we already expect them to 
mean something, we have alr'eady 
framed somehoy the conception of 
another mind. 
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In the presupposition of these other theories concerning 
social experience Hocking discovers the pnesupposition 
of all social experience which, in turn, becomes one of 
the cardinal points of his own system, namely, that man 
has an aboriginal idea of Other Mind which is a neces-
sary precondition of his social experience. In his 
words: 
My current social experience, the 
finding of any fellow finite mind, 
is an application of my prior idea 
of an Other; In a sense, an appli-
cation of my idea of God. It is 
throu~h the knowledge of God that I 
am ab e to kriow men; not first 
tbro~h the knowledge of men that I 
am a e to know or Imagine God.2 
While it is true that God, or Other Mind or ultimate re-
ality, does appear in social experience, it is also true 
that it was there all the time, perhaps as part of the 
very nature of the self, thus makin g social experience 
1. MGHE, 250. 
2. MGHE, 29'7 f. 
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possible. This, then, is the testimony of social ex-
perience: that man's experience of other persons is known 
only in and through a prior knowledge of ultimate reality 
which is Other Mind. Now it remains to determine the 
verdict of physical experience, or man's experience of 
Natur'e. 
ii. Physical Experience. The most casual and 
yet the most convincing experience of man is his ex-
perience of the physical world which borders him on 
every side. Indeed, he cannot escape it. Occasional 
and intermittent flights into solitude may minimize the 
fact of social experience (although it is likely that 
at base social experience is always continuous), but of 
physical experience it can be said with Wordsworth that 
"the world is too much with us , late and soon.u 11 The 
undertone of Nature's presence never deserts me, even in 
deep sleep," Hocking declares. 1 Because "Nature's pres-
ence" is continuously experienced in and through sensory 
data, it becomes necessary to consider sensation as the 
next step in determining how metaphysical reality is ex-
perienced by a self. 
(1) Sensation . "Sensation," says Hocking , 11 is 
a metaphysical experience" insofar as it "brings us into 
1. MGHE, 269. 
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contact with a reality which is independent of our will. 111 
The physical world is often set over against man, frus-
trating his efforts, and the fact that like Canute one 
is unable to command the flowing tides to recede is in-
dicative that there is some kind of reality over which 
man has little or no authority. For as Francis Bacon 
2 
acutely perceived, 11Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.n 
It must be granted, then, that sensation is one way in 
which reality C&i be directly experienced, although this 
is not to say that it is time only way. As Hocking flatly 
states, 11 0ur experience of reality is not confined to 
sensation. " 3 To make the sweeping claim, as contemporary 
positivists and others do, that reality is found only in 
sensation, is for Hocking an 11 irrationalistic conclusion11 
' 4 
that is f~~ too hasty to accept. 
1. MGHE, 155. 
2. Bacon, Novum Organum, III. 
3. MGHE, 155. 
4. Art.(l910), 304. This important article, which dis-
cusses the role of sensation in the knowledge of inde-
pendent reality, appeared at a time when idealism was 
under heavy attack by pragmatists and realists for al-
legedly denying the existence of the physical world, and 
it is therefore one of Hocking's vigorous attempts to 
account for the reality of the world of nature within 
the framework of his idealism. It is also reprinted as 
Appendix III, PP• 558-573, of MGHE. 
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Sensations are perhaps the most common charac-
teristic of experience; certainly they are i~~ediately 
present as a constant accompaniment of conscious life. 
The manifold of sensations which bulk so large in human 
consciousness constitutes the sense-datum or "given," 
which is immediately experienced by the individual self. 
To saJ that sensations are given is to say t hat they are 
part of the immediate consciousness of the self , and .f.!ur-
ther, that they are given to the self ''as the result of 
an activity from without." l · The given is that which is 
immedlately experienced without interference or inference; 
in Hocking ' s thought this immediate experience of sensa-
tions is an authentic experience of the basic metaphysical 
reality of the universe. Thus, sensations as given pre-
sent the reality 111which is independent of our will . " In 
physieal experience ultimate reality is an object of im-
mediate experience. 
But does this mean that sensations themselves 
are to be considered the ultimate reality'? Certainly 
not in Hocking ' s view. For him sensations are the s igns 
of ultimate reality, the most accessible and common 
signs available to man . Thus he writes, "This primary 
and universal and incessant presentation of the stuff of 
1. SIG, 118. 
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being is an activity of God •••• [It isJ the literal 
element in God's action. 111 God, or ultimate reality 
which is synonymous here, must be active and known in 
some way to the self~ to that extent metaphysical knowl-
edge is primarily empirical rather than speculative. 
Hocking puts it this way: 
Now God can appear in experience ~ 
only through some working of his. 
If no effect of God were visible 
in the world, his existence must 
always be a matter of conjecture • 
• • • Yet I venture to say that un-
less God does operate within ex-
perience, in an identifiable man-
ner, speculation will not find 
him, and may be abandoned.2 
Sensa.t ion, for Hocking, is the "identifiable mannertt by 
which ultimate reality is "visible in the world," and 
insofar as sensation outlines to ma.n the physical world, 
it is necessary now to turn to the experience of Nature 
for further insight on man's immediate experience of 
ultinmte reality. 
(2) Nature. Sensations are commonly referred 
beyond themselves to what i .s usually called Nature, 
1. SlG, 118., 119. 
2. MGHE, 215, 216. This quotation states succinctly the 
centx•al theme of MGHE, that ''God does operate within ex-
perience, in an identifiable . manner." In a very recent, 
unpublished manuscript Hocking writes similarly, "And 
indeed, all the components of the idea of God arise in 
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the first place not from speculation but from experience." 
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which Hocking defines "in a literal sensett as "the sum 
of things and events in a single space and time , subject 
to a single system of causal laws.n 1 From a physical or 
biological point of view Nature is of vital importance to 
man as it sustains him on every side . But Hocking is 
here primarily concerned with the intellectual signifi-
cance of Nature, and he points out clearly that 11 nature 
is object of our knowledge, 112 or similarly, that "nature 
is an indispensable raw-material for experience, which 
is the basis of all thinking." 3 Fundamentally, what 
Hocking means here ts that mind, whose activity is think-
ing, requires Nature in order to exist as a mind. Mind, 
then, is dependent upon Nature in a way that Nature is 
not dependent upon mind. For it is Nature which furnish-
es to mind those objects of thought with which it thinks; 
a mind without Nature, which provides the subject-matter 
of ideas, would be an empty and· meaningless mind.4 "An 
idea," Hocking writes, ttis always an idea of something, 
and the all-available first something is physical stuff, 
1. TP, 40. 
2. MGHE, 283. 
3. TP, 241. 
4. Hocking carefully points out on many occasions that 
man thinks with ideas rather than of ideas. "We need 
constantly t"'Oremind ourselves," hesays in JviHHE, "that 
our ideas are what we think with, not what we think of , 
in the order of nature." MGHE, 79. -
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whatever else it may be."1 Without the "physical stuff" 
of Nature, given in sensation, the mind would be empty, 
void of contents, and even its existence would be highly 
improbable. The mind of man, from the very moment of 
birth, confronts the physical w:cr.ld which furnishes the 
infinite variety of sensations which are taken up in 
thought, to be renewed, modified , displaced throughout 
one's life. Hocking writes: 
An idea shares the history of the 
body; it needs to ripen and mature; 
it must find its way by gradual 
processes to the surface where it 
will show itself in language and in 
action. • • Idea as well as Matter 
must be "mixed with labor" before 
it can become property. 
And thereupon he continues to the conclusion that "It thus 
requires time and Nature in order that a mind shallexist.'~ 
The fact that Nature is necessary to the ex-
istence of mind by virtue of ita unique provision of the 
raw-material for thought is a fact of great implication 
for Hocking. Nature is seen to have a kind of p.r.iori,ty , 
over mind, a priority which at times is manifest in re-
sistance and obstinacy, and which calls forth both 
mystery and anticipation, so that ''toward that Outer Re-
ality I hold myself as toward that which .sustains me from 
1. MGHE, 260. 
2. MGHE , 258, 259. 
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moment; to moment in my present being. nl Hocking con-
tinue :s: 
Is not that outer activity then 
essentially creative in its con-
stant action ••• creative of me? 
My dependence upon Nature, my mo-
mentary submission to its inde-
pendent, obstinate decision of 
what Fact and Truth shall be, 
both in principle and detail:--
is not this a finding of my own 
mind? It is here, in this mo-
mentary (as well as permanent) 
creation of my Self that I begin, 
I say, to find Nature taking2 on the aspect of an Other Mind. 
• • • • • • 
But since Nature obstinate is 
Nature creative, and creative of 
mind; since my deepest roots and 
those of all co-experiencing 
mind are in her deepest objectiv-
ity, I cannot clear Nature of 
selfhood, though I can well clear 
her of my own self or of any other 
particular self.3 
. . . . . . 
For immediately experiencing my 
Self as limited and determined •• 
• • by an Absolute Other, I am ex-
periencing that Other as Other 
Mind. As space is found limited 
by no other than more space, so 
Self is found limTtea and Indi-
vidualized by no other than Other 
Selfhood.4 
1. MGHE, 286. 
2. MGHE, 286 f. 
3. MGHE, 287. 
4. MG-HE, 288. 
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These passages are quoted at length because in 
them is found the very crux of Hocking's argument con-
cernl.ng the experience of metaphysical reality, and fur-
ther, one of the central arguments of his metaphysics. 
The sum of it all is that ultimate reality is given in 
physi.cal experience, through sensation, when the indi vid-
ual mind discovers itself to be limited and created by 
a n other, which can be none other than Other Mind. Na-
ture itself is not ultimate reality, but is literally 
the body of Other Min d, and thereby the way in which it 
can be known, so that, in Hocking's words, "my knowledge 
of Na ture and Other Mind are in their whole history in-
terlocked and inseparable." 1 
To recall the discussion of social experience 
in the preceding section, it will be remembered that 
one's knowledge of other selves was wholly contingent 
upon "an application of my prior idea of an Other. "2 
Here in the physical experience of Nature is found the 
locus of this "prior idea." Nature thus becomes the ve-
hicle, not only for the knowledge of God (or ultimate 
reality), but also for the knowledge of other persons. 
Small wonder, then, that Hocking should warn that "we 
1. MGHE, 271. 
2. See p. 85 above• 
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have no reason to think slightingly of sensation, or to 
refer it to the lowest level of our being.ttl For it is, 
indeed, the beginning of all knowledge, and most im-
portant, of all knowledge concerning the things that mat-
ter most. In his words: 
Meager as the glimpse of Deity may 
be which i s ope ned through the hum-
ble channel of the experience of' 
physical Nature, even through sensa-
tion, it is sufficient to initiate 
that long course of the knowledge of 
God in which mank~nd has found its 
highes t ambi tion . 
The next section will examine more fully the 
impo:rtant "prior idea" of Other M:ind, whic.h is at the 
center of all man's experience--of himself, the phys ical 
world , and other persons. 
3. The Idea of Other Mind. 
Ultimate reality, for Hocking , is God or Other 
Mind , which is immediately experienced by the self 
through the common sensory data of the physical world. 
Howevwr, the suggestion that sensations present to man 
this ultimate reality call forth two problems which must 
be solved preliminary to an understanding of what Hock-
1. MGHE, 302. 
2 • :MGHE, 3 00. 
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ing me,ans by the immediate experience of metaphysical 
reality. 
The first problem lies in the implication that 
sensations are, or might be, ultimate reality itself. In-
asmuclL as man immediately experiences fundamental reality 
and semsations are immediate experience, might it not be 
true that sensations are the fundamental reality'? It has 
already been stated above that sensations are definitely 
not retgarded by Hocking as the ultimate reality •1 Senso-
ry experience is too fickle and too contradictory to be 
regarded as the source of all that is. The most that can 
be said for sensations, and this indeed is a great deal, 
is that they present man with some of the characteristics 
of ultimate reality. "Sensation embodies for us much of 
what we conceive all reality ought to be in definiteness 
2 
and vivid individuality,n Rocking writes. Or similarly, 
in a more comprehensive statement: 
For reality cannot detach itself 
from the experience of Nature: 
sensation has some of the charac-
ters and dimensions of reality 
not elsewhere found. Sensation 
lends to experience its pungency, 3 its vividness, its particularity. 
1. See1 p. 88above. 
2. MGHE, 301. 
3. MGHE, 260. 
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Sensations are signs of what reality ought to be, and 
more, of what reality must be. But they are not that 
reality. They are only signs of reality, they point to 
reality, the reality which is Other Mind. 
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This statement, that sensations point to Other 
Mind, brings on the second problem concerning the rela-
tionship between sensations and Other Mind. For if Other 
Mind i.s non-material in ita very nature it obviously can-
not bet given in sensa tiona. And further 1 Hocking has al-
ready said that "The other mind must be beyond my powers 
of direct experience. It can be no object of sensation 
becau::;e it is not a physical thing."1 How then can Other 
Mind be the object of an immediate experience by the self'? 
The answer to this important question lies in a further 
examination of sensory experience. 
The earlier discussion of Hocking's defini t ion 
of experience emphasized that all experience must be 
thought of as t•an interplay between an active Self and an 
actiVE~ External Reality. \t 2 And so with sensory experience 1 
it is untrue to say that the self passively receives sensa-
tions, the nactivity from without 1 ° with no reaction what-
1. MGHE, 244. See p. 83 above 
2. MGHE, 285. 
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soever on its own part. No experience is ever com~letely 
passive; the "misconception of passivity" must be avoided. 
Further, the attempt to isolate here sensations from con-
sciou~mess, or to remove the "immediacy" from experience, 
this t;oo is an highly dogmatic abstraction and never an 
actual experience for a self. The "misconception of 
shreddibili ty" must also be guarded against. Tre ref ore, 
it is an impossible endeavor for a self to take sensa-
tion, even a single sensation, as sensation alone with-
out reference to anything else, not even memories of 
past sensations. Such a "sensation," if it can be called 
that, lifted out of its context in consciousness and be-
reft of any objective referent, is "mere fact." "It 
means nothin g , and nothing can be made of it. But we 
never take it that way," Hocking remark s. 1 For him 
there are always two factors in every datum of immediate 
experience. In his words, "There are always two things 
in this one thing--the stuff, and how I take it.n2 
In the case of the sense-datum, a self always 
"takes" sensation as the sign of an object; to refer the 
sensation to an object is an immediate and inextricable 
1. TP, 322 f. 
2. SIG, 113. 
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part of the sensory experience itself. Thus Hocking 
writes: 
To the beginning mind as to the 
mature mind every sensation calls 
for an activity of exploration •• 
• .This is an aboriginal generosi-
ty of the mind, an act of faith if 
you like, attributing to the sensa-
tion a context in a being which re-
quires attention.l 
There is to be found at the core of every sensation "a 
being which requires attention," and this fact presents 
to man what Hocking has called in another passage, "~ 
sUl!l..mons to think, 11 which is to every man 11 the primitive 
moral choice . 112 For Hocking then, "there is an element 
of conscien~e or moral obligation in the way we at every 
moment meet sense-experience. 113 The issue at stake here 
is essentially the decision to think or not to think; to 
refuf!:e to think is to sink into "subjective self-enjoy-
ment" where sensory experience is little more than ani-
mal pleasure and where the high calling of man as a 
rational creature is thoroughly frustrated. On the other 
hand, to accept boldly the summons to think is to plunge 
through to discover "that the awareness of an obligation 
to know , which is at the root of all further experience, 
is at; the same time an awareness of other mind, " and 
1. TP, 323. 
2. SIG, 113. 
3. TP, 324. 
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this, as already noted, is for Hocking the fundamental 
metaphysical reality. 1 
Substantially the same conclusion was reached 
by Hocking in one of his earliest philosophical writings, 
which appeared about a quarter-century before the sources 
cited in the preceding paragraph. There, in an acute 
analysis of the nature of sensory experience, he pointed 
out that it is a necessary part of the mental processes 
involved in sensation to transform the object-sensed in-
to object-thought whereby every sensation becomes an 
idea. In the case of physical experience nature-sensed 
becomes nature-thought, so that this experience 11 is ex-
perience of independent being, known both in sensation 
and idea at once."2 While Hocking in this passage does 
not admit unequivocally that "there is nothing in idea 
which was not previously in sense," he does agree that 
"there is nothing in sense which cannot be taken up in 
idea. 11 And from this fact we can conclude that ''we 
have not only sensations, but also ideas of independent 
reallty."3 Sensations and ideas are not independent of 
one another, that must be emphasized; indeed, they are 
two aspects, or stages, of the same fact. 
1. TP, 323 f. 
2. Ar•t.(l910), 309. 
3. Ar• t .. ( 1910;), 3btr. 
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So the idea is not something 
other than the instinct or sensa-
tion. It is the identical thing 
with newly acquired powers of 
speech and of influence upon ac-
tion. To become idea is the fate 
which is imposed alike upon all 
sensations and all instincts be-
cause of the fact that there is 
such a forum in nature as a 
'mind.' 1 
These two parallel observations of the nature 
of sensory experience show more clearly how Other Mind 
is experienced by the self. Both demonstrate that 
sensory experience involves more than sensa.tions 1 and 
it is in the additional factor, not seen in the sur-
face view, that the metaphysical significance of the 
sensory experience is found. Sensations are received by 
the self and literally at the same time they are referred 
back by the self to the "activity from without" in which 
they originate. They are referred back as idea in re-
spons~e to the summons to think, and in the act of refer-
ence Other Mind is discovered. But it is discovered, 
not as sensation but as idea, and it is only because 
Hocking regards this act of reference, which is actually 
the functioning of idea in thought, as an integral part 
of sensory experience that he can say that sensations 
1. Art.(1910), 311. 
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present ultimate reality to the self. More clearly 
should it be said that the i dea of Other Mind is dis-
covered in man's native response to the resisting, cor-
recting , and creating processes of sensory experience. 
The response of man to his physical environ-
ment 1s thus characterized, at least in part, as idea 
of Other Mind. But where does this idea come from? 
Hocking is clear on this point. It is not innate, nor 
is it an analogy from or extension of experience. Rather, 
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i t is a part icular and unique experience which finds its 
or i gin in Other Mind alone. " We should have no idea of 
an Other Mind," he insists, 11 unle ss we have the expert-
ence itself. 111 Man thus immediately experiences ultimate 
reality as idea; the idea. of Other Mind and the experi -
ence of Other Mind are fundamentally the same thing . 
Hocking describes this more fully as follows: 
My idea of Other Mind is at the 
same time an experiencff().:f'-otner 
Mi nd . • . As an Idea of a funda-
mental and constant experience , 
bound up with my equally permanent 
experiences of Self and Nature , 
this idea is not prior to experi-
ence; but is indeed prior to all 
further social experience.2 
1. MGHE , 279. 
2. MGHE , 278. 
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Thus the lines of solution for the problem of 
the present chapter are now drawn. The effort 11 to de-
termi.ne how it is that man is able to experien ce ulti-
1 
mate real ity" has brought forth this fundamental con-
nection in Hocking's thought between the idea and the 
experience of ulitmate reality . Man experiences the 
ultimate reality as idea , the idea of Other Mind , which 
springs f rom his constant , vital contact with the \Vorld 
of Nature. The idea of an independent reality , which 
issues from this contact , is literally the experience 
of the se l f-same reality . Or more directly , in Hocking 's 
parti cular phrasing of the ontol ogical argument , "I have 
an idea of God , therefore I have an experience of God . 112 
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This , for him, is the direct and infall ible report of ex-
perie.nce . 
1 . See p .62abova. 
2. MGHE , 314 . 
CHAPTER III 
The Knowledge of Metaphysical Reality 
Ultimate reality is experienced by the self as 
idea, in particular as the idea of Other Mind. Or, as 
it might be better stated, ultimate reality is experienced 
and known at once as the idea of Other Mind. Whereas the 
previous chapter considered this fundamental fact of Hbck-
ing_!,s metaphysics in the context of the experience of 
metaphysical reality, this chapter will address itself to 
that fact in a discussion of the knowledge of metaphysi-
cal reality. It requires no sustained argument to es-
tablish the interrelation of experience and knowledge in 
the metaphysical problem. The arbitrary division of 
these i~wo chapters is simply a convenient device to pro-
mote a more adequate discussion of Hocking 's metaphysical 
though1;. 
In the light of his emphasis upon seasations 
as the signs of ultimate reality it is natural to suspect 
that they are of primary importance for the knowledge of 
reality. They are important, that is not to be denied, 
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but Hocking is by no means a phenomenalist. And further, 
the significance of sensations is not found a.o much in 
their own quantity or quality as it is in their ability 
to evoke from the self a response to outer reality. It 
is the response which is important; sensations are the 
trigger mechanisms which touch off, as it were, that re-
spons•e. Now this response is of importance, not solely 
beca u:se it is most truly the occasion of the immediate 
experience of ultimate reality, but because it is the 
chief beginning of all knowledge of that reality. It 
is therefore timely to consider more carefully the na-
ture of that response as part of the p1•oblem of metaphysi-
cal knowledge. Because this response is primarily an af-
fective experience, Hocking's discussion of feeling will 
furnish the principal orientation. 
1. Th~3 Role of Feeling. 
Like sensation, feeling is a common experience 
of the self. As a matter of fact , it can . be said that 
Hocking emphasizes feeling even more than sensation in 
his discussion of experience and of the nature of the 
self. That it is closely related to the fundamental 
reality of the universe there can be no doubt. Indeed, 
Hocking remarks that "feeling is essentially metaphysi-
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ltl cal. • • Reality is euch that it calls forth from man 
a native impulse and emotion, "a feeling of the total en-
vironment of life," and this feeling may properly be 
called , "the sense of reality.t12 Feeling is basically 
man's '·'total response to the total situation, 113 or as 
Hocking stated it in a more recent work, ''a direct per-
sonal response" to things ."4 Like sensation also, feel -
ing as "a direct personal response 1' is intimately a part 
of the individual self--0 it is the chief mark of individ-
5 
uality." "My feelings, of course, are my own, my most 
intimate property, and most property I can exchange or 
reviset,t• Hocking writes. ttBut these possessions are not 
alienable nor directly alterable; they are closely identi-
cal with what I am, and hence appear to me as something 
given,. inevitable."6 Feeling is at the very center of 
life, according to Hocking, and it may be freely said 
1. SIG, 48. 
2. TP ,, 181. 
3. TP ,, 180. 
4. PTP, 53. 
5. P'rP', 53. 
6 .. HNR, 364. 
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that "all life has feeling as its substance.ttl "That 
which in human nature is fundamental, intimate, genuine, 
private, and wholly owned, is feeling: in feeling we 
substantially exist.u2 
The discussion of feeling bulks large in Hock-
ing's great work, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, 
where the principal lines of his position are found. 
This section will consider the concept of feeling in 
terms of the bnmediate experience and knowledge of meta-
physiclal reality, drawing not only from that major source 
but also from appropriate arguments in his later writings. 
i. The Definition of Feeling. Discussing the 
concept of feeling in Types of Philosophy Hocking ac-
knowlE~dges that "feeling is an ambiguous term," and then 
goes on to remark that this ambiguity is expressed in the 
fact that this term "is some times used as an equivalent 
1. Ar i~. {1938), l. Such an emphasis on feeling, and par-
ticularly on the idea that feeling is the "substance" of' 
exist~~nce, is also found in Alfred North Whitehead, who 
was Hc:>Cking' s colleague at Harvard. It should not be 
sugge :sted, however, that Hocking inf'luenced Whitehead, 
or vi ce versa, for Hocking's stress of feeling preceded 
by several years his first _acquainta.nce with ~~itehead 
at whlch time the latter's basic categories were also 
highly developed. Hocking's emphasis on feeling is more 
one of his own unique insights which may have incidental 
orientation in the thought of William James. 
2. MGHE, 44. 
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for emotion and sensibility ••• [and] it is also used 
to indicate a kind of knowledge, belonging to touch 
or akin to touch .tt The source of this ambiguity 1 Hock-
ing observes, is that the two component factors of 
feeling, namely will and intellect, uare developed from 
a more primitive type of mentality in which these two 
f ti t 1 1 t d twl In animal lan-unc ons are no . c ear y separa e • 
guage and behavior feeling is plainly seen to be "undif-
ferentiated mentality" in which action and knowledge are 
hardly distinguishable in the mental life. 'However, in 
the higher reaches of human life the distinctive ele-
ments of will and intellect may be critically observed, 
possibly because the intellect plays a relatively larger 
role in human behavior. It is thereby more capable of 
being observed in an attitude of self-reflection and 
thus of being distinguished from the will-factor. Be 
that a.s it may, however. What is to be emphasized here 
is that both factors--will and intellect, or action and 
idea--·mus t be accounted for in any consideration of the 
definition of feeling. 
The practical nature of feeling, the will or 
action factor, is pretty much taken for granted as an 
1. 'J!P, 175. 
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area of common agreement in definitions of feeling. 
Hocking's preliminary definition of feeling i n The Me.an-
ing of God in Human Experience reflects the common use 
of thE~ term: ••we may agree to use the word feeling for 
the present in a very wide sense--as a name for what-
ever ln consciousness, deeper than explicit thought, is 
able to give bent to conduct.ul In Preface to Philosophy, 
wri ttEm thirty-five years later 1 he speaks in a similar 
vein, remarking that feeling is "the mother of action.n2 
The practical nature of feeling is that it serves as a 
stimulus to certain lines of conduct in any given situa-
tion. Hocking remarks that "one might almost define 
feeling as a perception of quality preparing for doing 
something about it."3 However, such a concept of feel-
ing should not be construed to make feeling the efficient 
cause of activity, for then feeling appears to be sepa-
rate or separable from the activity itself, and this 
schism is rejected by Hocking. 11 But to say that feeling 
is the immediate cause of action is still to put it too 
far away from action,u he declares. "In feeling, action 
1. MGHE, 33. 
2. PTP, 53. 
3. PTP, 53 f. 
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is already begun: .feeling is itself activity.•1 Thus, 
.for Hc•cking, the practical nature o.f .feeling is not so 
much that it causes either general or specific action 
in a ::1elf, but that it is, of itself, that activity be-
ing spelled out. This important point is brought out in 
the opening paragraphs of the discussion o.f feeling in 
his great work. Acknowledging that 11 ,em0tion is a name 
usually reserved .for certain o.f our more complex feel-
ings,'11 Hocking reports that "speaking literally, all 
.feeling is e-motion, a .flight from what is to something 
beyond. And thus all feelings ••• are .forms o.f desire • 
• • and all have at their center a sting of restlessness."'2 
F'eeling, then, is a movement of the self to something 
which is at the moment beyond-self, a movement which 
reachElS out to attain some satisfaction which subsequent-
ly becomes its terminus or end. 
But this idea of .feeling as movement or activi-
ty is only part of Hocking's definition o.f .feeling, and 
the lE~sser part at that, inasmuch as his significant ,; con-
tribution to the understanding o.f .feeling is .found in his 
articulation of the relationship between feeling and idea. 
1. MGHE, 65. 
2. MGHE, 65. 
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It was noted above that both action and idea must be 
accounted for in any definition of feeling. For the 
most part Hocking accepts the customary alignment be-
tween feeling and action, but he goes beyond that to 
bring feeling and idea into a common focus. This is 
concisely stated in a passage from Human Nature and 
Its Remaking . 
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Desire, or more generally, feel-
ing, is not something disparate 
from thought: feeling is a mass 
of idea at work within us. It 
is a thorough fallacy to suppose 
that one can feel or care about 
anything without knowledge, or 
that feeling and knowledge are 
inversely proportional to one 
another •••• Feeling is an ex-
perience of ~making up one's 
mind," ••• If we are right in 
this, feeling, whether in the 
form of uneasiness, desire, as-
piration, or satisfaction,is 
thought, more or less in control 
of things, and will, in the last 
analysis, is thought assuming 
control of reality.! 
Thus it becomes apparent that feeling, action, and idea 
are all bound up together. °Feeling is itself activity," 
yes, but at the same time, "feeling is a mass of idea a·t , .. 
work within us. 0 Is this outright confusion or contra-
diction, or is there some kind of internal resolution of 
action and idea in the concept of feeling? The answer 
1. HNR, 104 f. 
KNOWLEDGE OF NlliTAPHYSICAL REALITY 111 
to this problem will be borne out in a closer considera-
tion of the relation between feeling and idea. 
ii. Feeling and Idea. Hocking's discu~sion of 
the relation between feeling and idea is developed in 
the matrix of the problem of feeling and idea in religion, 
nthe question whether religion belongs to the realm of 
practical and responsible feeling rather than to the 
realm of thought,ul and it constitutes the whole of 
Part II, "Religious Feeling and Religious Theory,n of The 
Meaning of God in Human Experience . Because of its im-
portance, not only for the particular problem here at 
hand but also for an understanding of Hocking's thought 
as a whole, it will be necessary to trace carefully the 
movement of the argument. 
Recent years, says Hocking, have witnessed t•the 
retirement of the intellect" in the realm of religion 
with a corresponding rise in the authority of feeling . 2 
Support of this contention is to be found in all areas. 
In phi losophy Hocking notes a passage from von Hartmann's 
1. Iv1GHE, 34. 
2. It is interesting to observe that although this book 
was written nearly forty years ago the contention in this 
section could also serve as an accurate description of 
the contemporary scene in religious thought. For in the 
last five years in particular t here has been evident a 
strong appeal to feeling in religion, although with a sub-
stantially different orientation in the irrationalsim of 
nee-orthodoxy and certain varieties of Christian existen-
tial:tsm. Both . have emphasized to a cer tain extent the in-
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Die R~~l~~~on des Geistes as expressive of a co~non atti-
tude: 11 Es ist seit Schleiermacher ein anerkanntner 
Grundaatz , dass der innerste und eigentliche Kern der 
Re1iglon im Geftihl zu suchen sei." 1 Hocking also re-
fers to passages from Sabatier, James , HBffding, and 
Pratt as further "typical express ions of the tendency to 
give feeling the primacy in religion." In critical 
studies of religion the conclusion is similar. Investi-
gations in comparative religions declare that while re-
ligious creeds and ideas are many and diverse, "reli-
gious feeling is much the same the world over," and 
studies in the histories of religion affirm that vigor 
and progress are lent to religious movements , not by 
new thoughts or ideas but by great leaders who inspire 
their followers great feelings of devotion and service . 
But even more fundamental than these critical studies of 
religion is the "acquired scientific instinct which 
2. (eont.) adequacy of reason to express the substance 
of religious truth and experience. 11The whole appa-
ratus of reason in religion," Hocking remarks, "has re-
treated in importance. • • 11 ( MGHE , 37 f.) For an ex-
cellent critique of this retirement of reason see L. 
Harold DeWolf, The Religious Revolt Ag~inst Reason . 
1. Clted by Hocking in MGHE , 38 n. , from Edua rd von 
Hartmann , Die Religion des Geistes , p. 28. 
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sends us looking today among the feeling-roots of re-
ligion for its ultimate essence. 111 Hocking then pro-
ceeds to deliver the findings of four strands or cur-
rents of that "scientific instinct." 
113 
The psychological current declares that "noth-
ing is real unless it bel~n£S to conscious experience, 
and passing over the intellect it points to feeling as 
fundamental and as constituting the substantial exist-
ence of conscious life. The biological current, closely 
linked with the psychological current, exhibits the con-
viction that "nothin g is real unless it is aboriginal 
and germinal ," and thereupon designates feeling as a 
more primitive reality than intellect or idea. The 
third current is the pragmat;ic current which holds that 
"nothing is real which does not do work," and as Hock-
ing contends, 11 in proportion as it appears that the 
working element of human nature is value-consciousness, 
not fact-consciousness, pragmatic tendencies assign 
feelin g a hi <~her degree of reality than idea." The crit-
ical current, after the manner of John Locke, maintains 
that it is possible 11 to examine our ideas from the out-
side," and seeks for ''what that greater thing is which 
1. MGHE-, 42. 
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surrounds and subordinates the ideas to itself." And 
further, "that higher authority, the three currents 
above considered have agreed to find in the region of 
feeling." Thus, while Hocking is particularly con-
cerned with the problem of religion in this section, by 
the weight of evidence supplied by this 11 scie.ntific in-
stinct" he is forced to conclude that 11 in every human 
inter.est the rationale, the exposition, is weaker than 
the vital meaning of the thing as retained in feeling 
1 
or instinct." The essential truth regarding the re-
latib~ of feeling and idea to be gained from these con-
siderations would seem to indicate that idea is over-
shadowed and to a certain extent overcome by feeling. 
However, this is not Hocking's interpretation; it is 
necessary to press the matter further. 
The dilemma of religion in the apparent clash 
of feeling and idea within religious experience is 
founded on the wide gulf which seems to separate feeling 
and idea, and the rise of the religion of feeling in the 
recent; past has developed from 11 an artificial conception 
2 
of this cleavage." 
1. MGH.E, 42-48· 
It is Hocking's aim to bring them 
2. MGHE , 63. A similar observation is made by 3. Seelye 
Bixler in his recent book, A Faith That Fulfills. He , 
too, deprecates the current mood of overemphasis ori feel-
ing in religion and the concurrent denial of the rele-
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together in proper perspective, and in reviewing his 
effort to do just that it is necessary to recall to 
mind the discussion given above on the definition of 
feeling where it was noted that feeling is essentially 
a movement of the self from what is to that which is at 
the moment beyond, so that idea is the highest form, or 
fulfillment, of feeling. In any case, feeling is at 
once constituted by two factors, action and idea, or 
will and intellect. 
The place of action in feeling need not be 
further labored here. Suffice it is to say that feel-
ing is activity, and that 11 in the movement of life 
1 feeling is always present." The · clue to the place of 
idea is found in the observation that all activity or 
movement must be toward something, in some direction: 
"A feeling without a direction is as impossible as an 
activity without a direction: and a direction implies 
some objective. 11 Thus, feeling always refers ttto some-
thing beyond the present self and has no existence save 
--'--·--
2. (cont.) vance of reason and idea. 11 I cannot help be-
11eving , 11 he writes, "that our confusion stems from our 
basic inabillty to answer the ancient question of the 
di.fference · between reason and faith~'' (p. 25) On the 
relation between feeling and idea both Bixler and Hock-
ing agree that each must in some sense include the 
other. 
1. MGHE, 65 • 
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in direc ting the self toward that object in whose pres-
ence its own career must end."1 And what is this "some-
thing beyond" which is the objective of feeling'? Noth-
ing other than idea which, as an integral part of feel-
ing possesses the mind with the consciousness of an ob-
ject. Idea, or t he knowledge of an object, is the termi-
nus o.f all feeling; idea is indeed the substance of 
feelin g , and Hocking so defines feelin g in this manner: 
"All f ,eeling means to instate some experience which is 
essentially cognitive: it is idea-apart-from...:-its-object 
tending to become idea -in-presence-of-its-object , which 
is 'cognizance', or experiential knowledge .n2 But fur-
ther, "cognizance and feeling are but different stages 
of the same thing . n3 . Therefore, one must not speak of 
feeling and idea, as though the two could be separated 
in the most facile functions of thought, but rather of 
"idea-feeling couples" which are indeed 11 the working -
forces of consciousness." This conclusion demands a new 
underi3tanding of the pragmatic truth that "nothing is 
real which does not do work" with regard to the relation-
1. MGHE, 66. 
2. MGHE , 68. 
3. MGHE, 68. 
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ship between feelin g and idea . Thus Hocking proposes 
that, 11 it is true that ideas apart from fee lings do not 
it 
work: but/is also true that a feeling does no work apart 
from its guiding idea. 111 
Now what does all this mean in terms of the 
experience of metaphysical reality? Precisely this., 
that t;he self is able to respond to the reality present -
ed in sensation only insofar as it feels the attraction 
of that reality over against itself and seeks to know it 
more adequate ly. The response., stimulated by sensation., 
is a feeling-response. The self experiences Other Mind., 
the ultimate reality, as idea., and it is this idea which 
is at first the primitive beginning and then the ful-
filled ending of the feeling-response. In other words, 
the nature of man's response is best expressed in terms 
of the idea-feeling couple, wherein the Idea of Other 
1\II j_nd, which is the ultimate and objective reality, is 
intimately joined to the local and sul;>jective feeling 
in an inextricable combination which constitutes the im-
mediate experience of ultimate reality. 
However, the concern of this chapter is di-
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rected primarily to the epistemological aspects of the 
metaphysical problem. What , then., is the role of feeling 
1. MGHE, 69. 
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in the structure of metaphysical knowledge·~· To consider 
this question adequately it is necessary to delve into 
the problem of intuition and consider the idea-feeling 
couple as an intuition, or immediate cognitive experience, 
of ultlmate reality. 
2. The Role of Intuition. 
The word''intuition" is a generic term referring 
primar:Lly to immediate perception. Something is seen, 
felt, or known immediately, without mediation; the em-
phasis is on immediacy. Thus, in one respect, sensations 
may legitimately be considered as intuitions. One has a 
sensation, or sensory intuition, of redness . The patch 
of red is known directly; as a sense datmn it is immediate-
ly perc:eived . Or similarly, it is maintained by some that 
there are also moral intuitions, in which the rightness or 
wrongne~ss of a certain ethical situation is immediately 
known, like redness or blueness. This is often the 
mysterlous feeling, or inward attitude, which like Soc-
rates' daemon, counsels a particular path of action under 
certain conditions. Thus, both sensation and feeling can 
be considered intuitions in view of their immediacy. 
But this issue can be probed further to de-
termine just how sensations and feelings are also lntui-
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tiona. It will be remembered from the earlier discus-
sions of sensation and feeling that both found their ful-
fillment, as it were, in idea. In the reference above, 
the patch of red sensed becomes the patch of red known. 
Obviously, it is or must be known as idea, so that in a 
very literal way sensation has become idea. "There is 
nothing in sense," Hocking writes, "which cannot be taken 
1 
up in idea." This common coupling of sensation and idea 
constitutes the preliminary occasion in which reality 
sensed is reality known. As an experience of immediacy, 
sensation-idea can be called an intuition. These sensory 
intuitions reveal to man a world of nature in space-time, 
but the real problem in a metaphysical investigation is 
to go beyond the sense datum and explore all the possi-
bilities of knowledge of ultimate reality. In this con-
nection, Hocking cites the vital question of intuitionism 
as, "Can we human beings have a direct perception of any-
thing beyond what the senses show us: and if so, how 
much? 112 Thus, in the interests of the present problem 
of the knowledge of metaphysical reality sensory intui-
tiona need not be considered further, and the attempt to 
1. MGHE, 563. 
2. TP, 195. 
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define intuition can be carried on primarily in the con-
text of a discussion of the relations between feeling 
and in1iuition. 
120 
However, perhaps it should simply be inter-
jected here in connection with sensation and feeling and 
the definition of intuition, that Hocking speaks of two 
types of intuition. "We ought to distinguish," he writes, 
"between original intuitions ••• and acquired intuitions~l 
Original intuitions are raw and immediate experiences of 
awareness, usually come upon with suddenness, while ac-
quired intuitions are i~nediate awarenesses also, but 
available to one only after an extended period of train-
ing and preparation. These qcquired intuitions , says 
Hocking, are "of the nature of induction: they consist 1-J.i 
being admitted to an inner knowledge of things after what 
Bergson calls a long acquaintance with their superficial 
manifeBtations. They are the winning of simplicity after 
much complexity. " ~ Original intuitions are those of time, 
the self, the presence of meaning in the universe, and so 
forth, while acquired intuitions are tricks of skill, con-
noisseurship, the insights of religious revelation, and 
1. TP, 208 f. 
2. TP, 209. 
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perhaps even the nknack" of predicting the stock market. 
However, all acquired intuitions are based on original 
intuitions; they could not exist without them, warns 
Hoelting. And of course, the concern here must be with 
those prior and more important original intuitions which 
are addressed to fundamental reality, and to the discus-
sion of the relat ion between these intuitions and feel-
ing it is now necessary to return. 
That intuition should properly be considered 
with feeling is made amply clear in Hocking's Types of 
Philosophy where a chapter on uFeeling as an Organ of 
Knowledge" introduces the section on nintuitionism." 
Indeed, intuition cannot be understood apart from the 
nature of feeling. "In order to see what intuition is," 
Hocking remarks, "it will be well to consider the nature 
of feeling. 1 The reason for this procedure is simple: 
nvvnerever there is feeling, there is intui tion.u 2 
Taking this cue, the earlier section on the na-
ture of feeling should be recalled. There it was brought 
out that feeling always involved two factors, action and 
idea. Feeling was described as "a movement of the self 
1. TF', 175. 
2. TP, 212. 
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to something which is at the moment beyond-self.ul Or 
in Hocking's words , previously cited , "All feeling means 
to instate some experience which is essentially cognitive: 
it is-idea-apart-from-its-object tending to become idea-
in-presence-of-its-object ••• n2 Feeling as 11 idea-in-
presence-of-its-object" is intuition. As emotion, de-
sire, aversion, and so forth, feeling is not intuition; 
that is but the initial stage when feeling is purely lo-
cal or subjective. But in its fulfillment, as in the 
idea-feeling couple , fee ling is, or leads to intul ti on. 
The idea-feeling couple, therefore, is the signal of an 
intuitlon, when man confronts directly the ultimate real-
ity of the universe. And further , it is a normal , almost 
commonplace occurrence. Feeling seeks its terminus in 
idea; the union of the two makes possible , or brings a-
bout, t:;he experience of metaphysical reali ty. Thus, the 
meeting of the self and the world may rightful l y be called 
an intuition, when feeling and idea are united in the im-
media te consciousness. The organic coupling of idea and 
fee ling is the common occasion when experience becomes 
"the region of our continuous contact with metaphysical 
reality." 
1. See p.l09a.bove. 
2. MGHE: , 68. 
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Here, in the idea-feeling couple, is found the 
clue to the resolution of the problem of the knowledge 
of metaphysical reality. The previous chapter suggested 
the importance of idea, in particular the idea of Other 
Mind, in the experience of reality, and the present chap-
ter to date has advanced that suggestion a bit further to 
show more carefully the place of feeling, together with 
idea, in that experience. In the statement that intui-
tion (as the idea-feeling couple) is ultimately "the re-
gion of our continuous contact with metaphysical reality," 
the stage is now set to determine more adequately how 
this ultimate reality can be known. 
i. Intuition and metaphysical knowledg~. In-
tuition is intimately related to thought and knowledge, 
according to Rocking, for indeed "wherever tbere is in-
' tuition, there must be thought . 11 1 Further, Ho eking's 
most elementary definition of intuition affirms the au-
thority of this knowledge: "Intuition," he writes, "is 
a feeling of certainty based on a personal experience of 
insight . • • 112 In another work he remarks, 11 intuit ion 
1. TP , 212 . 
2. TP , 15. Italics supplied. 
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ls, after all, a mode of intelligence,--to lack it is, 
1 
so far to be ignorant." A.nd in a more recent work he 
declares that intuition "is certainly a variety of in-
telligence. • • u2 ~t.rP perhaps this is not to meet the 
problem here proposed. It is perfectly well and good 
to associate intuition with intelligence and knowledge, 
but whH.t is here at issue is a certain kind of knowledge, 
knowledge of the metaphysically real. How is intuition 
represented as an organ .of metaphysical knowledge? 
(1) Intuition as method in metaphys ics. In 
addition to asserting that the method Qf intuition is the 
oldest knowledge-winning technique of metaphysicians,3 
Hocking has also indicated that intuition is "the dis-
tincti·ve metaphysical method. 114 In his essays in the 
Husserl memorial volume in 1940 and the Whitehead memor-
ia1 volume in 1941 the function of intuition as a method 
for metaphysics was considered in some detail. In the 
Husserl essay Hocking pointed out that metaphysics "must 
be based on either intuitions or assumptions," and fur-
ther, that "systems of metaphysics based on intuitions 
are 'ways of seeing'; systems based on assumptions only 
1. SWP, 131. 3. TP II 182. 
2. PTF', 48. 4. Art.(l946), 378. 
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are 'ways of groping,' acknowledging an initial blind-
ness.111 It is obvious in this context that 11 seeing11 
means more than visual perception; it is a kind of inner 
perception which carries with it a guarantee of certi-
tude. Unlike an assumption, intuition does not involve 
11 an initial blindness." Hocking goes further to dis -
tinguish between these two procedures in metaphysics . 
"Systems based on seeing would natlli'al ly tend to con-
verge," he says. "Systems based only on assumptions need 
have r.to tendency to converge , and as a rule do not con-
verge. New assumptions, new systems. 112 
The reasons for this convergence among systems 
of metaphysics based on intuition are two. In the f irst 
placei, while intuition is an individual and personal ex-
perience, there are nonetheless certain intuitions which 
Hocking claims are common to the race . Despite wide in-
dividual differences, many people "see things" substa.n-
tially the same way. Such intuitions are shared, and 
can be further shared, and it is the task of metaphysics 
to inerease both the number and range of this common 
I 
store. And even in the absence of agreement, when in-
dividual intuitions are at variance with one another, 
1. Art.(l940)l, 253. 
2. Art.(l940)~ , 254. 
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the task of metaphysics is the same, although more urgent. 
Indeed~ it might be said that it is the disagreement among 
intuitions which calls metaphysics into prominence. In 
Hocking's words, "The circumstance that individual intui-
tions differ is precisely the circumstance that renders 
metaphysics as an objective discipline necessary. If in-
tuitions were identical~ argument would be superiluous. nl 
Thus through the channels of metaphysics do systems based 
on intuitions tend to converge. 
But there is a second~ more fundamental reason 
why "intuitional" systems tend to converge. All intui-
tion ls directed toward metaphysical reality which as an 
object of thought is a public fact. All intuitions, 
therefore, have a common focus; they are all of or about 
metaphysical reality . The different intuitions, individ-
ual and personal as noted above~ simply offer different 
perspectives of a common subject, around which all in-
tuitions can converge. In sum then~ systems of meta.-
physies based on intuition· tend to converge because they 
are a11 concerned with this one public reality. However, 
the objection will be raised that the publicity of the 
objec1~ of intuition is merely assumed, not intuited, and 
that therefore the way of intuition involves the initial 
1 1. Art .(l940) , 256 • 
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blindness which besets all assumptions. To this charge 
Hocking would reply that the publicity of metaphysical 
reality is not assumed, it is known, and known intuitive-
ly. Fior one only knows reality as a public domain. In 
his view, to know reality intuitively is to know it as 
shared with other minds. nour first and most persistent 
intuition," says Ho cking, is that "we, as a group of hu-
man selves , know that we are not alone in the universe." 1 
On the: other hand, the object of an assumption is not 
known to be public. True, it may be assumed to be so, 
but this assumption is only the groping of thought in the 
absenee of certainty. So runs one phase of Hocking's de-
fense of intuition as a method for metaphysics. 
It must also be said that it is the series of 
intuitions which forms the framework for any adequate 
system of metaphysics. For example, in speaking of White-
head's metaphysics Hocking remarks that "the intuitions 
are the important part of the story."2 .And if metaphysics 
is to have any influence in helping people to understand 
the world--nits aim is to understand this actual world, 
so fai' as it can be understood," says Hocking3--these 
1. TP, 500. Cf. TP, 288. 
. 2 2. Art.(l941) , 391. 
3. Art.(l940) 1 , 251. 
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structural intuitions must be capable of being sf\..ared. 
IndeedJ, nthe intuition which cannot be eventually shared 
must bE~ suspected. 111 Hocking suggests that intuitions 
can be shared by conveying their trutn in language which 
avoids ambiguity and unintelligibility. This, of course, 
would J:oequire exact definition and perhaps also the em-
ployment of special terminology or categories to rule 
out mialeading associations with traditional philosophy. 
But there is also another way, and that is "to begin not 
with t he minutest, but with the widest distinctions of-
fered .in experience. For broadly contrasting terms tend 
to clarify one another. 112 
What Hocking means here is that instead of 
t~ying to distinguish between closely associated items 
of experience, as for example the pleasures evoked by 
different types of music, a greater understanding of ex-
perience and of the ultimately real will issue from a 
consideration of two elements not so easily held to-
gether. Several pairs of elements are suggested: body 
and spirit, the one and the many, facts and values , the 
universal and the particular; in this essay Hocking 
demonst rates his thesis with his own analysis of the 
1 1. Art.(l940) , 256. 
2. Art.(l940) 1 , 256. 
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1 
universal and the particular. The outcome of t his pro-
cedure of articulating and relating private intuitions in 
order that they might be generally shared is a system of 
thought which is consistent and coherent, and one which, 
because man's finite apprehensions of reality cs.n never 
be abEIOlute and final, is also suggestive for further 
thought. Hocking summarizes the general characteristics 
of the intuitions of ultimate reality as follows: 
These i ntuitions must be con-
sistent with each other: they 
must cohere, even if they do 
not imply each other. They 
ought to escape old difficult-
ies and provide paths for ex-
periment. They ought not, in 
the long run, to rai se more dif-
ficulties than they allay: 
though at first all new paths 
are more difficult than the old 
road. And they ought to make 
the world more i~telligible 
than before. • • 
(2) The conflict of intuitions. However, it 
is an obvious fact that intuitions are often not con-
sistent or coherent, that they do not always serve to 
make 1~ he world more intelligible. For example, in sev-
era l works including IJ.1ypes of Philosophy i n particular, 
1. Art.(l940)1, 257 ff. 
2. Art.(l941) 2 , 39L. 
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Hocking marks out the intuitions of various metaphysical 
systems, and in many instances the intuitions of one 
system conflict with those of another. In fact, there 
is often · contradiction among intuitions within the same 
metaphysical system. A few illustrations will bear this 
out. On the one hand, the naturalist proclaims 11 the 
common sense or intuition of the reality of physical 
thing::~, 111 while on the other the idealist asserts that 
11 the r•eal things will not be among the obvious and su-
perfieial things. 112 Referring specifically to the in-
tuition of the naturallst that "the physical things--
earth3, air, stars--are real, 11 Hocking remarks that the 
above··na.med intuition of idealism "casts doubt on thi s 
plaus ibility, or rather reverses it: because natural i sm 
is plausible, it is improbable."3 or again, mysticism 
as a philosophy--which is not far removed from t he abso-
lutism of the idealists--holds to the intuition "that 
reali t;y is ineffable (indescribable); whence, all the 
predieates or descriptives which we apply to it are some-
how in need of correction ••• 11 4 However, idealism 
1. TP , 68. 3. TP, 251 f. 
2. TP ., 251. 4. TP, 442. 
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again puts forth the intuition "that at least some 
natural happeni.ngs are purposive. 111 Naturalists and 
others. may see regularity and law in the courses of na-
ture1 but Hoc king rejects any claim that this tells the 
whole story about change in the universe. Man exhibit s 
an "impulsive animism1" says Hocking1 which, whi le it 
"easily runs to excess, and produces a sufficient crop 
of absurdities," is neverthele ss "a universal human 
disposition" which expresses itself in the "prevalent 
intuition that nature is a. manifestation cf will . 11 2 
To a.sc:ribe the quality and properties of purposiveness 
to a.t least some of the processes of the universe is to 
ascribe a kind of regularity and thus to predicate some-
thing about a reality which cannot thereby be called in-
effable. 
What does this mean, then, when intuitions 
contri.bute confusion, if not outright contradiction, to 
one 1 s understanding of metaphysical reality? There are 
several implications of this conflict of intuitions, all 
of whi.ch suggest a certain inadequacy in intuitions in 
the realm of metaphysical knowledge. First, the fact 
1 .. TP, 253. 
2. TP, 253, 254, 255. 
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that intuition as a method in philosophy does not by 
itself establish any one part icular type of metaphysics. 
In T;yp_~_o.f. Phi;J..oso_££:l Hocking frequently refers to t he 
intui t ions of Naturalism, of Idealism, and of Mysticism. 
All t hree metaphysical theories make some kind of appeal 
to int;uition. The conclusion is obvious. In Hocking's 
wordsJ. 11 We can not, there fore, say that intuition , a s a 
way of knowing , carries with it any specific metaphysi-
cal doctrine . 111 Also, in The Meanin<S of God in Human Ex-
perier~~' although the word "intuition" is not specifi-
cally used in this passage , the parallel is clear: "No 
metap~ical hypothes i s is antecedent ly more probable 
than E~ny other. tt 2 Second, t:he contradiction among i n-
tuitions indicates t hat intuit ions alone are not an ade-
quate basis for any philosophy. Hocking speaks directly 
to thls point: "Intuition is not a sufficient foundation 
for any philosophy; but we are not likely to achieve any 
true philosophy without it."3 In Morale and Its E~i~~' 
1. TP ·' 204. This quot a tion may properly be interpre t ed 
to i ndi cate that Hocking , with all his emphasis on in-
tuition and mysticism, is primarily a ratl!.onalist rather 
than an intui t ionist in epistemology, holding firmly to 
the necessity of rational thought concerning i ntuition 
and mystical insights. 
2. MGHE , 214. 
3 . TP, 249. 
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when speaking specifically of moral intuitions, he makes 
a similar point. "But I have no faith that intuition is 
a sufficient reliance under any circumstance," and then 
goes on to add that 11 i f an intuition is valid, there are 
assignable reasons for it."1 This brings up the thir d 
implication of the controversy of intuition~,namely, that 
a conflict of ideas announce s the necessity of thought. 
"When intuition clashes with intuition, 11 writes Hocking , 
"that is the specific occasion for thinking. 11 2 
As an announcement of truth, intuit ion alone 
is weak, and i n the face of other intuition it is con-
trovex•tible. However, even if intuit ion is helpless, it 
is not useless, for when it becomes "the specific occa-
3ion for thinking ," it serves as a valuable source of 
knowledge. As a matter of fact, intuition must be sup-
plemented by rational thought, by intellect, if it is to 
be trusted as a source of truth for metaphysics. While 
intuiti on may be out ahead , as a "scouting faculty," in 
man 1 s quest for knowledge of metaphysical reali t y, it 
must always be followed by intellect, the application of 
reason. 
1. MIR, 183. Italics supplied. 
2. TP J• 288 f. 
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ii . Intuition and intellect . It has been one 
of the: unfoi·tunate characteristics of modern philosophy 
to emphasize the gulf between intuition and intellect, 
with t;he result that the advance of metaphysics has un-
doubtedly been impaired. This emphasis on sharp con-
trast in recent philosophy can in large measure be 
traced to Henri Bergson, whose philosophy Hocking onc e 
descrlbed as " a philosophy of contl,asts.n 1 To overcome 
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this long-standing separation of intuition and intellect 
Hocking suggested in his Scripps Lectures that "what we 
have now to do as a major item in our program is to put 
forward intuition as an ally of reason and not something 
in contrast to it.n2 There needs must be ·, he insists, a 
new pE)riod of emphasis in philosophy, 11 the stage of the 
rational use of intuition." Indeed, perhaps such a 
period has already begun, for in another article written 
about the same time he remarked that philosophy today 
"triefl to invoke the lj:ind of partnership between reason 
and i ntuition which is worth more than either alone, and 
it seeks that reasonableness of' temper which destroys 
prejudice and error."3 It is desirable now to determine 
1. Art .{l914) , 322. 
2. Art.(l941) 1 , 41. 
3. Art .(l937)2, 213 f. 
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just how Hocking in his own thought-system makes pos-
sible that kind of partnership between reason (intel-
lect) and intuition. 
Nearly all readers of Hocking are familiar 
with the welBmown Principle of Alternation advanced 
first in The Meaning of God in Human Experience to des-
cribe the natural rhythm of the religious life, alter-
nating constantly and casually between the activities 
of work and worship. Although Hocking does not partie-
ularly press the issue, this same principle can also be 
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applied to indicate the normal rhythm of the intellectual 
life in which thought alternates between the revealed 
truths of intuition and the studied application of rea-
son or intellect to those truths. This alternation of 
intuit;ion and intellect is mentioned in Types of Philos-
1 
ophy, but it received an earlier and much more thorough 
treatment in an essay on nThe Si gnificance of Bergson," 
written in 19lt1 shortly after the appearance of The Mean-
ing o•" God in Human Experience. 
In appraising the contribution of Bergson to 
modern thought Hocking declares that "the unique signif-
icance of Bergson lies in his view that the province of 
metaphysics is a province of experience which every man 
1. See especia~ly pp • . 2Q8-212. 
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may diBcover if he looks for it in the right place. 111 
This "rlght place" to look is intuition: indeed, it was 
Bergson who emphasized intuition as "our means of entry 
into the world of metaphysics .n 2 However, this emphasis 
on intuition is made at the expense of intellect, so that 
there results an artificial and unreasonable bifurcation 
of experience, and with it, of reality. The separation 
of intuition and intellect to which Hocking objects is 
apparent in this quotation from Bergson's best-~~own 
work. 
Consciousness, in man, is pre-
eminently intellect. I t might 
have been, it ought, so it seems, 
to have been also intuition. In-
tuition and intellect represent 
two opposite directions of the 
work of consciousness: intuition 
goes in the very direction of 
life, intellect goes in the in-
verse direction ••• 3 
Hocking's disagreement with such a statement a.s this 
(which incidentally, was not cited by him) would come at 
two points. Hocking would object to the contention that 
the mental life of man is 11 pre-erninently intellect." 
For Hocking it is not pre-eminently intellect, nor is it 
1. Art.(l914), 311. 
2 . Art; . (1914), 318. 
3. Bergson, CE, 291. 
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pre-eminent ly i ntui tion . It is both. As he states i n 
hi s art i cle on Bergson: 
Thus anal-ysis and intui t ion are 
parts of one mental act. There 
a r e not two faculties here; but 
alternations of attention with-
in one act of knowledge .l 
Hocking would also disagree with the point that while 
i ntuit ion proceeds "in the very direction of life," and 
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thus presumabl-y is a favored source of truth about life, 
intellect "goes in the inverse direction." From the same 
sourcE~ cited above he counters this position in saying : 
And it follows that we cannot regar d 
intuition as a source of superior 
truth while i ntellect is a source 
of illus ion. In respect of veraci-
ty they are on a par.2 
Recognizing that intuition and intellect ~1st 
ult imate ly be taken together as a source of metaphysical 
truth, it is desirable now to consider briefly the dis-
tinctiveness of each in cont1•ibuting to the store of 
knowl·edge about reality. Fol lowing Bergson, Hocking sug -
gests that intuitive knowledge i s knowledge gained "from 
the inside," a kind of i nner meeting between the Self and 
the World.3 Intui t ional knowledge is immediate, organic 
1. Art .(l914), 323. 
2. Art.(l914) , 323. 
3. Cf. Bergson, CE, 334. "In order to advance with the mov-
ing reality, you must replace yours e lf within it. Install 
yourself within change and the successive states in which 
it might at any moment be immobilized." 
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in its interrelatedness, and synoptic in its view of 
the whole. Knowledge gleaned by intellect is "external," 
where Jreality is seen from the outside, as it were. It 
is mediated, mechanical, and analytical. Both however, 
in Hocking's view, tell something about reality. Unlike 
Bergson, Hocking does not maintain that only intuition 
· can reveal the secrets of life, nor does he say that 
metaphy-sical reality is a region into which intellect 
cannot enter. Therefore, to Bergson's statement that 
t'the intellect is characterized by a natural inability 
to_ co:r_~prehend life. 111 Hocking replies that "the intui-
tionist is mistaken in trying to define a region into 
which the intellect cannot come. For in defining that 
region, he makes a concept of it, and the intellect has 
already entered it." 2 Thus, for Hocking, both intuition 
and intellect regard reality: intuition, as a living 
whole, fluid, organic in its unity; intellect, as a man-
ifold of unnumbered units, static, discrete in their in-
dividua.lity. He summarizes the functions of intuition 
and intellect as follows: 
They might be distinguished as 
perception of whole and percep-
tion of parts; perceP-tion of the 
1. Bergson, CE, 182. 
2. TP, 201. 
------
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object for itself and perception 
of its relations; perception of 
the unique in the object, and 
perception of the qualities it 
has in common with others.l 
Because both review the same scene, ~nd be-
cause each has something to report which the other does 
not know , any report of that scene must therefore re-
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spect both authorities. Without reference to both sides 
the information presented by each is subject to serious 
shortcomings. Intuitional knowledge, unsupported by the 
arguments of the intell~ct, is lacking in definiteness, 
and is often represented as some k ind of vague affirma-
tion . Further, it is inco~nunicable in that the lack of 
definition precludes adequate cownunication. It is in-
capable of being defended, lacking in argument, and most 
importa.nt of all, truth cannot be distinguished from 
error. Small wonder then, that "intuition is helpless 
without intellect, ~nd] it must always be accol!!£.anied 
and followed by conceptual thinkin5."2 On the other 
hand, lntellect without benefit of intuition also ex-
hibits weakness. Hocking briefly sums up 11 the defects of 
lntellec t which prevent it from attaining an adequate 
knowledge of these objects." Intellectual knowl edge, 
1. TP, 201 f. 
2. TP, 211. 
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according to Hocking, is external, relative, abstract, 
and partial. Intellect, as applied analysis, falsifies 
its objects, and is unable to convey the truth, and 
thereby the meaning, of reality. 0 In sum, intellect ~-
alyzes, and cannot recompose. It can dismember the or-
ganism, but it cannot from the parts restore the living 
whole. 01 
It is thus with good reason that while Hocking 
would not wish to forfeit the uniqueness of intuition 
and intellect, he would want it constantly clear that 
these two factors are intimately interwoven. Indeed, 
nthese two processes may still be as closely associated 
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as certain other familiar alternations, such as breath-
ing out and breathing in, or as induction and deduction. 112 
Or as in another writing: 
After all the intellect is not 
a separate organ of the mind. 
Both intuition and the intellect 
are the mind in action: intui-
tion recognizing the presence of 
objects, intellect defining what 
they are. They are inseparable. 
They constitute a working-pair.3 
1. TP, 190-193. 
2 • Art • { 1914} " 320 • 
3. TP, 201. 
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But what is it that constitutes the insepara-
bility of intuition and intellect, or that enables them 
to come together as "a working-pair?u Is there a common 
factor which joins them as a single functioning of the 
mind? Once again attent~on is turned to idea, the \tin-
finite residuum" of both intuition and intellect. For 
it is in idea, or as idea, that they find their meeting --
ground.. Hocking compares them to two conversers who 
.might be different in many ways, but who in their dialogue 
share t;hat which is essential to their being as conver-
sers, namely, ideas. In this sharing of ideas intuition 
and int;ellect are "parts of one mental act •111 The "equip-
ment of ideas" with which the Self meets the World, there-
fore, j_s seen to include not only intuition in the coupling 
of sensation and feeling with idea, but also intellect. 
Through both intuition and intellect, but fundamentally 
and at base, through idea, the Self meets the World and 
metaphysical reality is known in experience. 
It will be observed that these two chapters on 
the experience and the knowledge of metaphysical reality 
have both come around to the same general conclusion, 
namely, that in Hocking's thought idea plays a central 
and crucial role. Perhaps it is the single, most im-
1. Art. (1914}, 323,-
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portant concept in his whole metaphysical system be-
cause of its close identification with both the individ-
ual experiencer and knower and also, at the same time, 
with that which is experienced and known. All these sug-
gestions make clear that this is a topic demanding closer 
examination, and the next section in this discussion of 
rtThe Knowledge of Metaphysical healityn will thus be 
directed toward a more adequate understanding of Hocking's 
11 philosophy of idea. nl 
3. The Role of Idea. 
In the earlier discussion of "Metaphysics and 
Human Naturenl it was pointed out that there is among 
men an interest in reality which is basic to human na-
ture. 11What fundamentally interests man, II declares Hock-
ing, 11 is, in truth, just reality--nothing more special, 
nothing less • 11 Furthermore, this interest in reality 
necessarily involves idea, for as he continues, 11 interest 
in reRlity is the idea-making, idea-outlining function 
1. It is Hocking's view that one of the most important 
artie Jles in any philosophical position, whether oriented 
toward idealism or not, is the "philosophy of idea, 11 or 
so he rould have it, rtthe idea of ideas. n His conviction 
ofthis important aspect of the philosophical enterprise 
goes back to his early training with Royce; during his 
graduate study he devoted a great deal of attention to 
this problem. 
2. See pages 54-61 above. 
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of the human mind.1 Because of a native interest in 
reality man is inevitably committed to idea, and es-
pecially to the idea of metaphysical reality. 
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It has been shown how sensation and feeling, 
the common coin of experience, are "taken upn in idea to 
become intuition, and how intuition and intellect, the 
two aspects of the normal functioning of the mind, are 
related to one another in and through idea. It has also 
been emphasized that an idea is not something thought 
about, but something thought with, and that insofar as 
man meelts reality through idea, h e has an idea, or as 
Hocking would say, he thinks with the idea, of metaphysi-
cal reality. 
i. The definition of idea. It is a common and 
perhap~3 necessary habit to think of ideas and attempt 
to defl ne them in terms of spatial figures. Thus one 
speaks of an idea as "a piece of one 1 a mind,~' calls a t -
tention to a "big idea,*' or laments a npassing idea." 
Hocking warns that such imagery as this contains ttenough 
truth t o be exceedingly useful, enough also to be ex-
ceedingly seductive."2 The blunt truth is that "ideas 
1. IVIGIU.:, 122 • 
2. M.GHE, 80. 
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of ideas misrepresent them," and in the face of this 
fact the temptation is to forego all attempts at defi-
nition and assign the word "idea" to the realm of unde-
finabl13s. But this is to frustrate thought on issues 
of crucial importance which the mind demands to under-
stand. Hocking seeks to overcome the dangers of uspa-
tializ:ingt1 the concept of idea 11by enquiring how far 
these spatial symbols ••• are appropriate and valid; 
and where they begin to work false .trl Perhaps by fol-
lowing Hocking here it will be possible to see more 
clearly what he himself means by idea. 
Two important conclusions issue from this in-
quiry. First, like all spatial figures, ideas have their 
boundaries, their ndefinite inclusions and exclusions." 
Some boundaries may be of vague outline, but nonetheless 
all ideas--even the idea of the whole and the idea of 
nothing--involve that which they are and that which they 
are not. Indeed, as Hocking writes, •The essence of the 
idea is known contents, marked off from the infinite un-
known."2 Second, like all spatial figures, ideas have a 
certain degree of permanence which constitutes their own 
nchangeless identity. 0 Ideas do not change, after the 
1. MGHE, 81. 
2. MGHE, 90. 
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manner in which a boy becomes a man, but rather, one 
fixed :l.dea is displaced in the mind by another fixed 
idea. The continuity of thought is maintained, not by 
idea itself but by the thinking mind; it is memory, 
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handling a succession of fairly fixed ideas, which makes 
thought; possible. Thus Hocking remarks that "permanence 
of meaning, taken in total, is but our own mental integ-
rity, our personal identity itself.n1 But the ideas 
themselves, with their boundaries and their changeless-
ness, must be said to possess a certain rigidity. 
Immediately, however, the question is thrus t 
forth, as by Henri Bergson, whether these rigid ideas 
can do justice to a reality that is living, fluid, and 
in con:3 tant flux. There are several relevant replies to 
this problem. First, if reality, whether it be in con~ 
stant ehange or changing not at all, is given in ex-
perience, it can be an "object" of idea. In Hocking 's 
words, 
1. MGHE, 82. 
But whatever can interest in 
experience is already caught 
in idea: there i s nothing in 
experience whic~2cannot become content of idea• 
2. MGHE, 83 f. 
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If change is knowable, and to admit it as a fact is to 
acknowledge that it can be known, the mind can hold it 
in idea. Second, to say that the mind can know change 
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is not to say that the idea in which it is known is also 
changing . · To fall into the error of admitting that the 
idea must also change is to be misled by the spatialized 
figure of idea. Obviously, the idea of change is not a 
changing idea, any more than the idea of ice is a cold 
idea. And third, the difficulty in comprehending a 
changing object with an unchanging idea is caused by the 
limitations of the thinking mind, which by means of mem-
ory is engaged in relating and compounding ~deas, rather 
than by an inherent inadequacy in idea itself. No single 
idea is at fault, but rather the systems of ideas, and 
insof!lr as nsystem-making ••• in part is the life of the 
mind ltself,tt it is the mind which is inadequate to its 
task. In Hocking's words, "It is chiefly our idea-con~ 
nections and systems that threaten to stiffen and falsi-
fy the living thing."' 1 Reality is first known in idea, 
in the immediate experience of intuition; as the mind 
moves from that experience to interpret and communicate, 
the truth about reality becomes farther removed from 
that fact. 
1. MGHE, 87. 
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Now what Hocking has been striving to maintain 
in this position is the authority and validity of ideas, 
which are the very substance of his metaphysics. For if 
ultimate reality were not given in idea, his fundamen t al 
assertton that man meets the world would be seriously 
jeopardized if not wholly invalidated. Idea, insists 
Hocking, is adequate to its role in the meeting. It is 
man· the thinker, or rather, the thinking man, who is in-
adequate to his task of handling the idea. But, one will 
ask, even if idea itself is ad~quate, does not this human 
frailty still defeat Hocking's posit-ion'? What point is 
there . in talking about the adequacy of idea if it cannot 
be used properly? Idea is a kind of tool, and it must be 
used. As with the lawn mower which is useless if one 
does not know how to use it to cut the grass, so with 
idea. True,Hocking would reply, but even as one can 
learn to use the lawn mower, so can he also learn to use 
idea. And, he would add, the desire to learn to use idea 
properly is much more basic to human nature than the de- . 
sire to learn the use of lawn mowers or automobiles, or 
anything else for that matter. For trthe desire to be 
ration.al is inseparable from human nature •111 Indeed, 
1. CNWM, 29. 
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the proper exercise of the thinking mind, in which its 
inadequacies are overcome, is in the rational organizing 
of ideas. Thus it appears that man's native interest in 
reality which occasions the interest in idea, as men-
tioned above, is at the same time an interest in under-
standing and interpreting that reality in a rational 
manner. Ideas are the tools which man must use, for in 
Hocking's view, to be rational is to establish consistent 
and coherent relations among ideas. To this point he de-
clares, l'The general name for this process of making con-
nections among ideas is reasoning.nl In sum then, man, 
idea, reason, and reality are all bound up together in 
experience, so that man, by means of reason operating 
on idEla in the proper functioning of the mind, can un-
derstand reality--and as a matter of fact, perhaps do 
even more than understand ·it, perhaps even become a part 
of it. 
ii. Two classes of ideas. However, all objec-
tions to Hocking's "philosophy of idea" are still not 
put aside, for one can complain that certainly not all 
ideas, no matter how rationally they are dealt with, can 
be the means of contact with metaphysical reality. And 
further, to suggest that in idea--in the idea of a table 
1. MGHE, 88. 
148 
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or a f l a gpole, for example--one can even become a par t 
of reality is to infringe on absurdity. A brief reply 
should suffice here: I t has not been maintained that ~ 
ideas are l'means of contact with metaphysical reality .tt 
Contac t with reality is made in idea, yes, but not in 
all ideas. To suggest that ideas are sources of contact, 
which ls all that has been asserted to this point, is not 
to ind:lcate that all ideas serve this particular function. 
As a matter of fact, different ideas serve different func-
t i ona :in the metaphysical quest, and all ideas are rele-
vant t o this end insofar as they all must "fit together~ 
in a rational pattern if reality is to be fully known and 
explained. The office of some ideas is primarily contact, 
the office of others is primarily explanation. To dis-
t i nguish more carefully between these two classes of ideas 
is the next phase of the problem of this chapter. For 
purposes of convenience these two classes will be desig-
nated as the ontological and empirical ideas.1 
(i} The Ontological Idea. :Man's conscious ex-
perience is an unceasing procession of ideas on which 
1. It should perhaps be pointed out here that Hocking 
does not make clear this distinction in his discussion 
of idea, and these names for the two types are not em-
ployed by Hocking. However, such a distinction is def-
initely implied in his thought and seems to offer the 
most satisfactory lines of solution to the epistemo-
logical problem. 
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reason works, with varying degrees of success, to sys-
temati~~e them in some kind of meaningful pattern that 
will promote understanding of that experience. Obvious-
ly, there are ideas of every size, shape, and color 
( speak:Lng figuratively, of c curse}, but in Hocking ' s 
view there is underlying every single idea, the one, 
all-im:portant idea of metaphysical reality. That idea 
is her'e referred to as the ontological idea. 
Hocking maintains that reality is known 
through idea in the infant's earliest waking moments --
u'l,he infant's first thoughts are metaphysical, that is 
to say, thoughts of Reali ty111--and from birth to death 
one is constantly thinking with the idea of reality. 
Note that of all ideas, the 
idea of reality is most of all 
thought with; as all ideas seek 
their meaning-terminus in real-
ity, so all idea-use is at the 
same time use of the idea of 
reality. With our reality-idea 
we think, not only of reality 
itself, but also, so far as we 
are able, every particular ob-
ject of experience.2 
Thus, not only is the idea of reality the first known, 
but it; is also the most frequently known. All predi-
cates are ultimately predicates of this one idea. The 
1. MGHE, 215. 
2. MGHE, 130. 
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idea of reality is the necessary pre-condition for all 
other thoughts and ideas. The multifarious ideas of ex-
perienc=-e--bicycles, colors, rainy days, triangles --all 
are brought together with the all-pervasive reality-
idea. But these ideas are known only partially and for 
a time ,; they soon pass away. Not so with the idea of 
reality, however, for this, in Hocking's words, "is the 
1 
one th:Lng permanently known.tt 
The reality-idea to which Hocking refers is 
identi f ied variously, and with minor qualifications, as 
the idE~a of the infinite, the idea of substance, the 
idea of God, the idea of the absolute, and most typical-
ly, the idea of Other Mind or Other Knower. It is com-
monly referred to generically as the whole-idea. It is 
h is be:Lief that this whole-idea is the first-known idea 
of com3ciousness, or as he states it, ttthat this same 
infini 1:;e whole-idea is that with which every rational 
existence begins."2 As man increases his understanding 
of experience, the original whole-idea is invested with 
new powers and properties, and thus assigned new names. 
For example, in measuring the · unending expanse of the 
whole of reality, it is charged with infinity. There-
1. Mmm, 97. 
2. MGHE, 99. 
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upon the idea of infinity becomes the whole-idea in a 
slightly different orientation, and as with the whole-
idea, it, too, is the most thought-with of all ideas. 
\5To the question, Can we think the Infinite'?" Hocking 
remarks, "Let me propose the answer, We think nothing 
else .~•1 Similarly, with the idea of substance, Man, 
reflecting on his experience, demands that his ideas and 
values be more than the fictitious creations of his own 
imagination. To give them status in some "non-impulsive 
backgroundu is necessary in order to guarantee their 
meaning and his own sanity. One name for this background 
is Nature; " Nature is the typical region for the feeling-
free anchorage of ideas •02 But a more. adequate designa-
tion for this background is "the mysterious name of Sub-
stance.1•3 Substance is metaphysical reality conceived 
as the abiding source of the meanings of ideas; the idea 
of sub:3tance is the whole-idea perfori11ing this special 
function. And lest one complain that the idea of sub-
stance is a solely subjective product of man's imagina-
tion, of his need and desire for such an idea, Hocking 
counters that the idea of substance is '•in no wise a re-
1. MGHE, 94. 
2. MGHE, 11~. 
3. MGHE, 119. 
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sult o:f development." It is rather ttthe aboriginal fact 
of consciousness, ••1 because it is the whole-idea con-
sidered in a particular context. 
Also related to the whole-idea in Hocking's 
thought is the idea of God, which is brought forth in 
the development of man's moral consciousness and which 
becomes a part of one's mental equipment with which ex-
perience can be interpreted and understood. At root the 
idea o.f God is actually the ever-present whole-idea with 
new-found properties of divinity. In Hocking's words, 
Every one begins with his whole-
idea but it is the function of 
religion to interpret this whole 
as divine; in brief, to make the 
transition from the2whole-idea to the idea of God. 
Similarly with the idea of the Absolute, which is one of 
the most common designations, both in philosophy and re-
ligion, for the fundamental reality. This idea is re-
lated to the whole-idea through the idea of God. "I do 
not say that the Absolute is equivalent to the idea of 
God.,l' Hocking writes. tti say that God, whatever else he 
may be, must needs also be the Absolute.•3 The idea of 
1. MGHE, 120. 
2. MGHE, 142 .• 
3. MGHE, 206. 
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God is the idea of the Absolute with some additional 
characteristic. And what is this additional charac-
teristic? Hocking suggests the answer in the remark 
that 1'in our usual conceptions of God, the One and Ab-
solute is raised to the level or personality and moral 
quality. •• The Absolute, also called the Changeless Ul ti-
mate, God, Substance, Infinity, Other Mind, and a few 
other names not here considered--all designate for Hock-
ing the basic reality of the universe. All are implied 
in the single~ generic concept of the whole-idea. And 
by whatever name, it is the most natural habit in ex-
perience · for man to think with this whole-idea; in fact, 
it is necessary that he do so. 
But what is the source of this whole-idea? 
From whence does it come and what does it mean? These 
important questions now demand attention. 
From all sides it is clear that for Hocking 
the idea of metaphysical reality, initially conceived, 
has all the marks of an intuition. It is given in ex-
perie nce, just as sensations and instinctive feelings 
are given. The patch of red, the fear of a sudden loud 
noise, one's whole-idea--all are immediately present 
with the force of intuition. Hocking has emphasized 
time and again the immediacy of metaphysical reality: 
154 
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t•In i t ;3 full infinity and wholeness it is now before me 
and ha:3 been so from my conscious beginning--the same 
1 from blrth to death," he observes, This reality which 
is immediately given in experience is reality immediate-
ly known in one's whole-idea. However, it is readily 
admitted that much more is present in experience than 
can be adequately conceived in idea, and while reality 
is preaent ttin its full infinity a'nd wholeness, 0 the in-
dividual conception of that reality is inevitably in-
complet;e and distorted. But it is one's idea-systems 
which never fully encompass the ultimate reality; all 
are but; approximations of one vast and mysterious abso-
lute. 
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Despite the inadequacies of these idea-systems 
which seek to describe reality, the significance of ·the 
individual whole-ideas must not be overlooked. For these 
whole-ideas are the very core and center of such under-
standing of reality as the human mind can achieve. Thus 
Hocking remarks that "every one begins with his whole-
idea."2 Insofar as ttnothing can be known until it is 
known intuitively," 3 metaphysical reality must be known 
1. MGHE, 96. 
2. MGHE, 142. 
3. TP, 208. 
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in intuition, and if, as an earlier section indicated, 
knowledge begins in intuition, then all knowledge right-
ly begins with this first and fundamental intuition of 
metaphysical reality. From a primitively conceived, yet 
firmly held whole-idea, knowledge is built up gradually 
through the unending work of the mind in constructing 
its system of idea-connections in what, it is hoped, is 
a rational pattern of organization. Hocking rejects the 
contention that knowledge always and in every detail 
moves from the parts to the whole. The whole-idea, even 
if vaguely conceived, is present from the beginning and 
is the ultimate source of all induction. "The progress 
of knowledge, tt he says, "has rather more in common with 
the development of a germ cell than with the building 
of a t1rick wall; something of the whole present and ac-
1 tive in that cell from the beginning." The important 
whole-·idea is thus necessary to account for the begin-
nings of knowledge and also, because of the organic na-
ture of the knowing process, for the continuing growth 
of knowledge in the intricate couplings between ideas 
which reason effects. First known and ever present, the 
whole-·idea is in constant service. 
1. MGHE, 95· 
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However, despite its primordial nature and 
its continuing presence in the life of the mind, the 
whole-i.dea is not the sole. idea to gain notice. It is 
one class of idea, and a class with a single but very 
complex member at that. Now the other class, of many 
members, must be considered. Because Hocking does not 
furnish any characteristic name for this class, this 
type of ideas will be referred to here as "empirical3 
ideas. 
(2) The Empirical Ideas. Together with the 
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whole-idea in conscious experience are the manifold ideas 
of the passing scene--automobiles, clouds, number five, 
and yellow--as the mind receives the reporting of the 
senses, registers the moods of feeling, and brings ex-
perienct9 to the level of conscious recognition, where it 
can be handled in such a manner as to promote understand-
ing and interpretation. But again it should be noted: 
experience is more than ideas. Indeed, in Hocking's 
words, these so-called empirical ideas are only "selected 
experience, in shape for memory and communication.tt1 In 
order to see more clearly the nature of these empirical 
ideas, it will be helpful to note certain similarities 
and differences in comparison with the whole-idea. 
1. MGHE, 84. 
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First, it mi ght be observed that both the 
whole-·idea and the various empirical ideas are given in 
intuition, that is, they are immediately present in con-
sciousness. One perceives the brightness of a color or 
the throbbing of a toothache with the same kind of im-
mediac.y and vividness as tba.t with which the whole-idea 
is known. But unlike the whole-idea, not all empirical 
ideas are given in intuition; many, if not most of them, 
are the product of the mind's activity of "idea-building." 
Thus the idea of a red book is not given intuitively, but 
rather the mind couples the idea of redness with the idea 
of bookness in a single Gestalt which it knows at once as 
a red book. And so on and on, this nidea-buildingtt de-
velops into knowledge as the idea-couplings are increased, 
and man understands more and more adequately his experi-
i 
ence and the world of which he is a part. This under-
standing, however, is never directly proportional to the 
number of his ideas, for even with a thousand ideas of 
all kinds one might still be lacking in knowledge. Rath-
er, knowledge always varies with the connections between 
ideas which the mind, in the exercise of its reason, is 
able to effect. In Hocking's words: 
The great volume and business of 
what we call the growth of knowl-
edge is growth of connection, 
growth of treaty-making between 
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ideas ••••• The connecting of 
ideas goes on apace: for our lo-
quacious, marketable knowledge 
is in proportion, not immediate-
ly to our ideas, but to the 
couplings1we can make among them ••• 
This process "goes on apace;" it has no end. No idea-
system which the human mind can develop can ever portray 
completely the details of the world which it confronts 
in exp•9rience. Both the whole-idea and these empirical 
ideas function as recorders of that which, in some way, 
is othc:Jr than the perceiving mind, and in this function-
ing th•3 whole-ideas and the empirical ideas are inade-
quate. The inadequacy of the whole-idea, or more ac-
curately, the inadequacy of the idea-systems of which 
the whole-idea is a part, to catch all the facets of 
metaphysical reality has already been mentioned. Fur-
thermore, now it appears that the empirical ideas are al-
so inadequate to the task in their domain, for they too 
fail to exhibit in detail the surface and depth charac-
ters of the world given to the senses. A few words on 
the inadequacy of the empirical ideas is in order here. 
In the first of his Gifford Lectures, Hocking 
discussed the inadequacy of ideas in the context of his 
1. MGHE, 96. 
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definition of experience as (!The Self l'11eeting the World 
More or Less Well. 11 As already established, the Self meets 
its World in and through ideas, ani in this particular 
discussion Hocking does not make any distinction between 
the two classes of ideas as distinguished here. However, 
his remarks actually suffice for both types, end if any-
thing, a bit more appropriately for the so-called empiri-
ceJ. ideas. It is categorically stated that ideas are in-
adequa.te to deal with 11fact, 11 which is defined as 11 the 
- 1 existe~nt object of a single act of attention." Thus, 
this tuexistent object of attention" can be either ul-
timate1 reality, and involve the whole-idea deliberately 
and exclusively, or it can be the grass or a house, or 
any object in space-time, and refer to the empirical 
2 
ide as., In any case, both are inadequate, and both, 
generally speaking, for the same reasons. 
A..fter obserying that 11 it is a mark of the hu-
man s pecies to realize that its idea are not adequate, 11 
1. ~rt.(l951), 325. 
2. It will be remembered, of course, that the whole-idea 
is constantly ttthougbt with, " and it is therefore elways 
present in consciousness together with the empirical 
ideas .. 
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Hocking suggests that "there are three respects in which 
this inadequacy is currently--I might almost say spontan-
1 eously--felt.~ First, all ideas show a certain inade -
quacy with respect to future event. Because the future 
is forever uncertain, one's ideas must also exhibit some 
of that uncertainty, expressed in terms of "the possible 1' 
or "the probable.n What idea can contain the mysterious 
future of ultimate reality Pin its full infinity and 
wholeness?lt Or what idea, or system of ideas, can even 
encompass the future possibilities of this world of 
sense which, despite the impressive advances of science, 
contains unnumbered frontiers of ignorance both great 
and small, and where the f uture is carefully but fallibly 
measured in statistics of probability? But this inaa e-
quacy of idea to contain an unpredictable and unfinished 
future is not wholly a bane on the life of the mind, for 
the uncertainty itself is the occasion for the emotions 
of hope, dread, anticipation, and the like which are so 
much a. part of one's facing an unknown future. Thus 
Hocking asks rhetorically, " Who would give up these 
emotions fo1, the charm of total prophecy?"2 and one 
might also inquire, Who would surrender the adventure of 
1. Art.(l951), 323. 
2. Art.(l951), 323. 
1-
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continuing thought for the finality of certitude? How-
ever, not only is idea inadequate to future fact; nei-
ther can it adequately portray the present. In Hocking 's 
words, "In regard to present fact, ideas show a const i -
tutional feebleness ••• our concepts grasp only an 1 e s -
sence' which we ourselves distinguish from reality. They 
f it loosely over the par t icular occasion.~ 1 
The second inadequacy of ideas, then, is found 
in their inability to catch the whole of present fact. 
One sees a buildfu ng fr om only one side, a nd although the 
mind may 11 fill id' the other corners, it can never ac-
tually portray the building as it is from all perspec-
tives at once. Each person meets the world in his own 
uni que way, Hocking emphasizes so often, and to share 
with others his own view is to increase the stove of 
knowledge about that which is of mutual concern. In-
dividually, the task of knowledge is fruitless; together 
there is at least hope. 
1. Ari; . (1951), 323. It will be observed that both onto-
logical and empirical ideas are suggested in this quota-
tion, for if the empirical ideas grasp "only an 1 essenee' 
which we ourselves distinguish from reality," it is ob-
vious that the judgment of unreality must be based on the 
concept of reality, that is, one's whole-idea. As in a 
passage previously cited, "All this process of judging 
this or that to be unreal or less than real is made pos-
sible simply by that grasp of reality which at any mo-
ment I have. Lt (I'IlGHE , 310.) 
- I 
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The third reason for the inadequacy of ideas 
is foru1d, not so much in the character of the object as 
in the nature of the mind. For minds, as systems of 
ideas, must be rationally ordered, whereas the world ex-
ternal to one's mind seems to contain an element of dis-
order, perhaps of "brute fact." As Hocking puts it, 
"ideas are members of an ordered system, whereas facts 
are inherently irregular.n1 
The similarity, and perhaps the near-identity, 
of theae three explanations for the weakness of idea in 
the prE~sence of fact is apparent. The uncertainty of 
the fut;ure, the complexity of the present 1 the inherent 
irregularity of things--all suggest that there is some-
thing about the nature of things which defies explana-
tion. Hocking points to this common root in remarking 
that, 
these several inadequacies of 
our ideas are an inner aspect 
of that "objectivity" of the 
world whereby it is firmly other-
than-ourselves: it is over a-
gainst us. However much our e-
quipment (of ideas) grows, the 
kernel of the object remains un-
declphered--perhaps undecipher-
able •••• Fact in zts totality is 
above the ideas. 
1. Arto(l951), 323. 
2. Art~(l951), 823 f. 
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Mindful of the earlier emphasis on the ade-
quacy of ideas, when Hocking defended ideas and pointed 
to the inadequacy of idea-systems to convey the facts 
1 before the mind, it is necessary to suggest here that 
what Hocking apparently means in this whole discussion 
of "the1 inadequacy of ideas" is the weakness of idea-
systemfl, rather tb.an tha. t of single ideas. This inter-
polaticm is partie.lly justified by his observations on 
the cor1temporary scene in philosophy, which follow the 
discusaion of ideas cited above. Stated briefly, Hock-
ing obf!erves that "we can take the inadequacy of our 
ideas ln two ways ••• as remediable, in which case the 
pursuit; of adequacy is hopeful ••• or irremediable, in 
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which <:ase the pursuit of higher degrees of adequacy is, 
for thought, a mere palliative." These two ways, Hock-
ing continues, correspond·.: roughly to the two great tradi-
tiona ln Western philosophy. Idealism, on one hand, 
holds 1~hat ideas can eventually become adequate to fact, 
wherea:3 realizm abandons the task of seeking to under-
stand the world because it sees :no hope of ideas ever 
becoming adequate to their objects. Hocking, obviously, 
commits himself to the camp of idealism, and maintains 
tb.at idea is, or can become, "adequate to fact," and 
1. See pp.l46-14Babove. 
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that in the imprevement of idealism's system of ideas 
the wol~ld can be understood more thoroughly. 1 
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From these comments on the inadequacy of ideas 
it is necessary to return briefly to further mention of 
the empirical idea. Again it will be helpful to con-
trast i;he ontological idea. The ontological idea is 
known in and through itself; it has no essential affilia-
tions with other ideas. It is necessary and sufficient 
unto it;self. Not so with empirical ideas, however, which 
must always be known in terms of each other, and most im-
portan1;, in terms of the whole-idea. No "new" empirical 
idea cEm be understood except in the context of ideas 
already known; thus the centaur is recognized only after 
one haH known both man and horse. All new knowledge i s 
"bui lt into" the existing systems of ideas. Furthermore, 
empiri<}al ideas are understood, not only in terms of each 
other, but also in terms of the whole-idea which con-
stantly functions as an arbiter of reality in the j udging 
and int;erpreting activity of the mind. 2 In sum, ·t h e 
whole-i dea is the necessary idea, while the empirical 
ideas, all of them, are contingent. 
1. Art~{l951), 324, 325 . 
2. See n. 1 , p.l62 above. 
KNOWLEDGE OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 166 
4. Hocking's Epistemolog;y: A Summary Statement. 
The fundamental point of the preceding dis-
cussiorl of Hocking's views on the knowledge of meta-
physical reality has been his insistence that the im-
mediatE~ experience of ultimate reality in the idea of 
Other Mind makes possible a limited but nonetheless ex-
tens! VE~ range of knowledge concerning that reality. 
Sensor~r intuitions, and even more important, the feel i ng 
intuit i ons, constitute the primary sources of that knowl-
edge, but these intuitions of fundamental reality, like 
all in1;uitions, must be subjected to the tests of reason 
( intel:Lect) before the experience which they represen t 
can be considered authoritative or true. Thus, while it 
is easy to think of Hocking as an intuitionist in epis-
temological method, the present chapter has endeavored 
to show that reason, rather than untested intuition, is 
the final arbiter of knowledge. This should be amply 
clear f rom the discussion of the relationship between in-
tuition and intellect, and from his emphasis on "idea-
system:3" in the knowledge of reality. 
However, with all of this the question of some 
sort of classification of Hocking's epistemology is still 
pertinent. Briefly, is Hocking an epistemological monist 
or an epistemological dualist? Does he hold that the 
idea of an object and the object itself are one and the 
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same, or is the idea essentially different in kind from 
the object which it represents? Recognizing, of course, 
the difficulty of neatly classifying his thought in any 
single category, the task of this,concluding section of 
the present chapter is to put forth a few brief remarks 
on this problem .• 
Hocking's own answer to the problem is straight-
forward and simple in statement; the interpretation of 
its meaning is somewhat more involved. Writing in Types 
of Philosophy he says, "As on the side of epistemology •• 
• .I believe in a mystical realism, which is the only 
tenable sort of realism."1 He would stress, therefore, 
that he places himself in the camp of epistemological 
realism., or to~ use the designations of the preceding 
paragraph, he wishes to be classified as an epistemo-
logical dualist. This emphasis may be considered part 
of his constant aversion to any suggestion of subjective 
idealism, wherein it might be said that the world of 
physics.! things is the product of a thinking mind whose 
ideas c:reate and/or constitute the basic metaphysical 
reality. However, his epistemology is not as simple as 
that, for it is the conclusion of the present bhapter 
that Hocking is both an epistemological monist and an 
1. TP I 504. 
I 
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epistemological dualist, that his epistemology must be 
viewed on two levels and thus cannot be assigned as a 
whole to a single category. This, it is maintained, i s 
the implication of the whole argument of this chapter, 
and alfsO the meaning of his own characterization of hi s 
episteiJlOlogy as "mystical realism." The earlier dis-
tinction between the ontological idea and empirical 
ideas vJill prove helpful in demonstrating this fact. 
In considering the experience and knowledge 
of metaphysical reality Hocking's constant emphasis is 
on imme~diacy. This .is where his mysticism comes into 
strongest play, a mysticism which teaches "the absolute 
unit;y ofrealitz." Thus, as he continues, "if reality 
is one J• we can only know it truly when we merge with i t; 
that is, when Knowing, in the 'objective• sense of Know-
ing something not myself, ceases.nl In the intuitional 
.. 
experiemce of ultimate reality the emphasis is thorough-
b: y monlstic. The idea, experience, and reality itself 
are all bound up together in that the whole-idea is at 
once the experience of Other Mind and the awareness of 
the knowing self as a part of that reality. From the 
point of view of the ontological idea, Hocking is an 
epistemological monist. 
1. TP, 438. 
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However, that cannot be the whole story, for 
while the ontological idea is always a part of cognitive 
experience one must also recognize the fact of empirical 
ideas which, in contrast to the emphasis on the unity of 
reality in one's whole-idea, bring out the many different 
and un1.que facets of experience, and thereupon, the many-
sidedne:ss of ultimate reality. In the empirical ideas 
the distinction between knower and object is constant · and 
pervasi.ve, so that from the point of view of these ideas, 
Hocking is an epistemological dualist. 
Thus, on the level of the immediate intuition 
of reality monism is paramount; on the level of' the 
tested knowledge of that immediate experience, dualism 
prevails. Knowledge of the wholeness and unity of real-
ity is monistic; knowledge of its parts and details is 
dualistiic. Both types of knowledge are necessary to any 
adequat:e view of metaphysical reality, for in Hocking's 
words, 
the Real cannot be either the 
absolute One of t pe mystics or 
the absolute Many revealed by 
realistic analysis •••• Each 
grasps half of the truth about 
the world. Each therefore sup-
plements the other •••• The One 
which we can believe in must be 
a One which needs1and is able to produce the Many. 
1. TP, 478, 479. 
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This, then, is the impact of what Hocking calls his 
.
1
.lmystic:al realism," a view which needs must be both 
monistlc and dualistic in its bearing in order to cap-
ture the truth about a reality which is both simple and 
complex .• 
This must conclude the consideration of Hock-
ing' a f~pistemology and the "philosophy of idea" which~ 
it is hoped~ has prepared the way for the vital question 
which now looms large on the horizon~ namely~ the ques-
tion of the nature of metaphysical reality. This real-
ity is experienced and known in and through idea. What, 
then~ .must be the nature of that reality? This is the 
important problem of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Nature of Metaphysical Reality 
Attention in the preceding chapters has been 
centered largely on the self, or individual person, 
which as an active a gent confronts an active and ex-
ternal reality. It is this confrontation of reality 
which Hocking calls t•experience,t• and from which issues 
such }mowledge as is available to man of the nature of 
that reality. The present chapter will address itself 
primai•ily to that external, metaphysical reality in an 
effor t to discern its character and its worth. 
It has been shown that Hocking is by no means 
inclined to take lightly the physical wor•ld, and that 
unlike some idealists he is anxious to give it a place 
of prominence in his metaphysical system. The physical 
world given to man in sensation, he says, provides the 
initial impulse which causes man to seek to know and 
understand that reality set over against himself. The 
space ·-time order, therefore, initiates the metaphysical 
quest, and for this reason it is not amiss that any at-
1?1 
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tempt to understand the nature of metaphysical reality 
should begin with an investigation or at least some kind 
of reconciliation of the physical world with basic meta-
physical categories. But the investigation of the physi-
cal wo:rld is the honored province of the physical sci-
ences, and it is certainly beyond the scope of Hocking 
or of this chapter to imitate the work which they have 
performed so well. Thus, it will simply be acknowledged 
that these sciences provide the metaphysician with data 
for his categories, and that any metaphysical system 
which aims at truth must be cognizant of, and more, must 
accommodate to large degree, these important data. Sci-
ence, therefore, steps forth as a partner in the meta-
physical quest. Because of its cardinal importance in 
this whole undertaking, it is necessary to articulate 
more clearly the intimate relationship between metaphys-
ics an.d science. That, then, will be the first order 
of business in this chapter. 
1. Metaphysics and Science. No one would deny 
the recognition due the several physical sciences for the 
great advances in knowledge of the external world which 
they have made possible in the last four centuries. As 
a matter of fact, the race's vast store of detail con-
cerning the physical universe, produced by the men of 
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science through experiment in the field and the labora-
tory, has increased a thousandfold in the past century 
alone, for scientific knowledge, like all knowledge, 
represents a cumulative advance which multiplies pro-
1 gressively as it advances. It may be worthwhile to 
cite briefly certain basic reasons for the rapid ad-
vancernent of scientific knowledge in the modern world. 
i. The Rapid Rise of Modern Science. Two rea-
sons i.n particular may be put forth for the great prog -
ress of modern science. First, the development of sci-
entiflc method for the controlled observation and study 
of phemomena under investigation and for the systematic 
formu l ation of laws or theorems concerning the activity 
of thE~ se phenomena. Be cause of the many varia tiona of 
scieni~ific method, based often on the nat ure of the 
problem, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of scien-
tific methods, using the term collectively to refer to 
1. This progressive advance of scientific knowledge is, 
of course, an affirmation of the principle of the growth 
of knowledge in terms of increasing idea-connections, as 
discussed in the preceding chapter (page 148). The pres-
ent d:lscussion of the growth of knowledge will be con-
fi ned principally to the rise of modern science, but 
this emphasis should not be taken as an example of the 
often repeated denial of the scientific (or philosophi-
cal) merit of earlier scientists, particularly among 
the Greeks. For an understanding of the scientific at-
titudes and achievements of the early Greeks, Cohen and 
Drabkin's recently published A Source Book in Early 
Greek Science is recommended.F'or the modern period 
Dampier's History of Science is superior. 
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the different, but fundamentally similar, procedural 
techniques employed by the scientists in their research-
es. P.S.C. Northrop emphasizes this point time and 
again in The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, 
and in a typical vein he declares: 
And further: 
Even the scientific methods of 
solving problems of fact are 
much more diverse than is usual-
ly supposed, varying in the 
natural sciences from one stage 
of inquiry to another and being 
different in the deductive theo-
ry of modern economic science 
from what they are in modern 
mathematical physics ••• 1 
There is no one scientific method 
•.••• To talk about scientific 
method apart from the specifica-
tion of the specific stage of in-
quiry for a given type of problem 
is as meaningless as to talk about 
either space or time by itself, 
apart from the specification of 
the frame of reference from which 
each is determined.2 
However, these assertions should not obscure the fact 
that there are certain basic activities common to all 
scientific methods, which may be briefly Genumerated as 
follows: (1) general observation of phenomena, includ-
ing experimental and/or analytical procedures under 
1. Northrop, LSH, viii. 
2. Northrop, LSH, ix. 
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carefully controlled conditions; (2) accurate measure-
ment and classification of data; and (3} inductive (and 
occasionally deductive) inference of verifiable laws or 
hypotheses. 
Developed in the first half of the sixteenth 
century, widely employed by Copernicus, Bruno, Kepler, 
Galileo, and others in their revolt against Aristotelian 
cosmology and deductive logic, and popularized in the 
following century by Sir Isaac Newton, this general type 
of method ushered in the great triumph of science in 
Western Civilization. And having first been applied to 
the mysterious depths of the cosmos, this method has 
vaulted more and more into the public scene in its sub-
sequent application to the organic universe, including 
man as a biological specimen, the social universe, and 
more reeently in its application to art and letters. As 
a matter of fact, it is now making vigorous claim to take 
mter the realms of philosophy for itself; Hans Reichen-
bach's recently published The Rise of Modern Philosophy 
pretends to show ttthat philosophy has proceeded from 
speculation to science."1 Not so for Hocking, however, 
for he unequivocally declares that "we need remind our-
selves time and again that science does not of itself 
1. Reichenbach, RSP, vii. 
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constitute philosophy.t•l vVhether or not one wishes to 
contest the merits of these respec t ive claims, it can-
not be denied that the development of modern scientific 
method has made possible great advances in the knowledge 
of man and his world. 
Two subordinate points i n connection with the 
rise of scientific method need also be mentioned. First, 
that the highly developed mechanisms of measurement, 
which are themselves a product of this method, have given 
more and more weight to the claim that l'To measure is to 
know.n 2 This, of course, is relevant to point (2) of 
general scientific method as noted above. And further, 
the growth of idea-connections, as typical of the advance 
of knowledge, has also multiplied immeasurably the oppor-
tunities to construct verifiable laws and hypotheses as 
cited in point (g) in a preceding paragraph. Each of 
these subordinate points is of sufficient significance 
as to merit this special mention. 
The second principal reason for the advance of 
scientific knowledge is found in the necessary applica-
tion of scientific methods to a determinedly restricted 
field of inquiry. In his investigations of the physical 
1. TP, 92. 
2. This phrase is attributed to Kepler by Carl B. Boyer 
in his article on "Aristotle's Physics.n (Scientific 
American, May 1950). 
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universe the scientist of today does not attempt to 
take on the vast complexities of the world of space-
time, but rather he has become a ge ologist or a chemist, 
a physicist or an astronomer, and has concentrated his 
attention and experiment on a small corner of nature. 
Indeed, that small corner becomes even smaller with each 
succeeding generation, so that now the scientific di-
rectory is peopled with bio~chemists and physical chem-
ists, astro-physicists and nuclear physicists, and all 
the retst. Such compartmentalization is, of course, to 
a large degree artificial, but it is today an even more 
necessary discipline for the acquisition of modern 
knowletdge than ever before. 
That the great advances of scientific knowl-
edge <~an and do contribute heavily to metaphysics is a 
point almost beyond question, and yet it is a point of 
suffieient significance to inquire why this should be 
so. A closer look at the relationship between science 
and me~taphysics may furnish the answer. 
ii. The Interdependence of Science and Meta-
physics. 
The relationship between science and meta-
physies is one of independence and mutual dependence, 
insofar as both endeavor to discover something about the 
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physical world which is man's native habitat. The 
world of space-time in its various manifestations is 
the primary object of study for the scientist, and for 
the philosopher an adequate account of that world must 
necessarily be a part of any comprehensive metaphysics: 
Indeed, in the statement of the t'general problemtt of 
his first series of Gifford Lectures Hocking remarke d 
that none test of every philosophy, perhaps the chief 
1 test today, lies in what it does with 'fact r,tt mean-
ing by trfactn the physical world in its particularity 
and its obduracy. The specialized knowledge of the 
scientist can and should prove a valuable asset to the 
metaphysician in his labors, for uthe work of science 
is thus an approach to the real, and in a sense the 
work of metaphysics is continuous with it."2 Science 
reports experimentally verifiable details of the physi-
cal world and formulates laws concerning its processes; 
metaphysics must take cognizance of these data insofar 
as they may reveal something about the nature and struc-
ture of fundamental reality. At the very least, every 
1. Art.(l938), 1. 
2. Art.(l946), 370. 
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system of metaphysics must make its peace with the 
findings of science. 
1'?'9 
Insofar as complete and final knowledge is 
impossible for finite minds, both metaphysics and sci-
ence are engaged in an infinite search for more and 
more adequate knowledge of the respective objects of 
their investigations. However, the fact that the sci-
entific knowledge which is taken up by the metaphysi-
cian is necessarily incomplete as science does not mean 
that rr~taphysics is without justification in assuming 
its o~n task, part of which, at least, lies beyond the 
field of science. And this for two reasons: First, be-
cause scientific data alone are insufficient evidence 
for the confirmation or refutation of any particular 
metaphysical position, inasmuch as science reports only 
on the physical world which is a single aspect of the 
wholeness of metaphysical reality. The assertion that 
the physical world is but a '"single aspect of the whole-
ness of metaphysical realityn is, of course, a metaphys-
ical, or non-scientific, proposition (to be discussed 
below} which is at the very core of Hocking's metaphys-
ics. But Hocking would go further to say that not only 
is the physical world merely a part of reality, but also 
that science itself is unable to cope with that world in 
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its totality. t•Nature as a whole,u he remarks, nnever 
enters into a scientific equation.ul Ferhaps this is 
tantamount to saying there is no science, but only sci-
ences, as most scientists insist, and that these sci-
ences deal with different aspects of a whole which is 
beyond scientific investigation as a whole. Science, 
then, would consist of innumerable divisions, each of 
which addresses itself to a closed and independent field 
by means of an artificial simplification or isolation 
of an extremely heterogeneous subject. This considera-
tion, however, is a side issue which need not be pressed 
further here. 
The second reas.on why metaphysics can and 
should proceed with its task despite the incompleteness 
of scientific knowledge is that completeness of detail 
about each of the parts is not essential for a satis-
factory account of the relationship between the various 
aspects of reality and a coherent account of the whole. 
Hocking puts it this way:: t•For just as a person may be 
known without knowing everything that constitutes a per-
son, so there are totalities in the world which may be 
i. Art .. (l946), 369. It may be that very recent develop-
ments in science will call this statement into question, 
particularly because of Einstein's efforts to work out a 
uniffied theory which will co-ordinate cosmic and nuclear 
processes. But even this would not adequately meet Hock-
ing's position inasmuch as it fails to account for a de-
pendence of the physical world upon the more fundamental, 
non-physical reality which is Other Mind. 
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regarded in their total character without finishing the 
exploration of their detail. 1 The physical world, in 
Hocking's words, is only one of the "regional wholestt 
which constitute the totality of metaphysical reality, 
and me1taphysics depends upon the sciences for their re-
port of this single aspect. of a total reality. Thus it 
may be1 summarized that both science and metaphysics are 
concerned to interpret the physical world, and that meta-
physics looks to science for specific details regarding 
that world to aid in its larger task of the interpreta-
tion of the whole. 
However, while both claim the physical world 
as an object of study it is important to distinguish fur-
ther between their attitudes toward that world. Science 
occup:tes itself exclusively with the physical world and 
with accurately measurable phenomena; for the purposes 
of its investigations it refuses to consider the possi-
bility of any extra-physical and thus extra-scienti~ic 
realm . For science the world of space-time is the only 
legitimate object of study because it alone can be re-
liably observed, accurately measured, and experimentally 
verif:Led. Further, the question of its metaphysical 
reali t y is not a scientific question. Science need not, 
1. Ar t .(l946), 376. 
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and usually does not, face this particular question, 
although it is true that scientists from time to time 
have endeavored to pass metaphysical judgment on the 
problem. Occasionally they have made bold to assert 
that the space-time order is the only reality, that the 
physical world is all that is, but it is important for 
the philosopher to emphasize here with vigor that such 
an assertion does not and cannot rest on the same kind 
of evidence which is put forth in support of strictly 
scientific observations. For to say that the space-
time world is all there is, is to utter a metaphysical 
proposition for which scientific evidence, by the sci-
entist's own criteria, is unavailable. By the same to-
ken,of' course, science is equally unable to say that 
the physical world is not all there is, for this state-
ment likewise requires extra-scientific evidence. Thus, 
if sc:i.ence as science does address itself to the question 
of the reality or unreality of the physical world, it is 
confronted with two contradictory propositions, only one 
of which can be true, and it has no scientific procedure 
with which to resolve the dilemma. Here, then, is the 
opening for philosophy, and particularly metaphysics, 
which enters where science on its own terms is unable 
to tread. In this vein Hocking declares, "There is no 
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sense-·datum and no measurement which e ither confirms or 
deni es any metaphysical position , ul and thus on the 
question of the reality or unreality of the space-time 
order J' "it is the business of metaphysics to enquire 
2 
which is true." 
In its approach to the question of the auton -
omy or dependence of the physical world metaphysics in 
a sense goes beyond the physical sciences, insofar as 
"the metaphysical problem begins with the relation be-
t ween the whole sphere of physical measurement and other 
pos s ible spheres of reality. " 3 If the physical world is 
:judged to be dependent, then metaphysics must move on to 
find other reality, to find the real which is independ-
ent, for metaphysics is in Hocking's words the search 
nfor independent being on which other being depends." 4 
On thE~ other hand, if it is judged to be autonomous, 
that :Ls, as the fundamental reality independent of other 
f'orces or substance, then metaphysics would do well to 
give over to science its own mant l e and content itself 
with being little more than the unifier or co-ordinator 
of sc:Lentific data. Perhaps, however, even this lesser 
l. Art~(l946), 376. 3. Art.(l946), 369 . 
2. Ar t .(l946), 373. 4. Art.(l946) , 369 . 
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task should not be dismissed too lightly; modern sci-
ence, for all its rapid developments, is indeed in need 
of a greater sense of unity, as men of science and phil-
osophy both recognize. That particular facet of the 
problem need not be a-rguedL here save to remark that 
whatever be the case, philosophy can and should always 
press through to the whole, for only in a total-view 
can tr•u th make claims to reality. 
Metaphysics and science, despite their common 
interest in the physical world, also differ in the kind 
of knowledge they would seek concerning it. This dif-
ferenc:e may be expressed briefly in terms of description 
1 
and explanation, as discussed in an earlier chapter. 
The seientist seeks a complete description of the phe-
nomena under his investigation, a nd description here 
means solely the accurate reporting of empirical data, 
nothing more. Description is the unswerving obedience 
to steady observation and the faithful recording of de-
tails which that observation make s known. But meta-
physics goes a step further to demand not only descrip-
tion, but also explanation, which is the currency of un-
derstanding. Hocking made this point in a recent arti-
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cle in his remark that metaphysics seeks not only ade-
quate description but also understanding, which is for 
him, uthe perception of meaning: it is a Wesenschau, 
in which Wesen is not alone factual 'essence' but also 
1 
significance.n It is not an uncommon habit of thought 
to allow description to stand for explanation or under-
stand:Lng, but to do so is merely to rephrase the prob-
lem rather than to establish a solution. Description 
is the necessary prolegomenon to explanation and the 
occaslon when metaphysics can gain most heavily from 
scienee, but more important is it that metaphysics ttmust 
take its task of careful analytic description--essen-
tlal as it is--as a basis for the further task of under-
standing the world.tt2 The issue, therefore, returns 
again to Hocldng 's definition of metaphysics cited 
earlit9r as ttthe most general account we can give of man 
and his world in rational terms • • • in terms of 'prin-
3 
ciples and causes.'tt 
Thus far it has been shown that science con~ 
tributes substantially to the philosophical enterprise, 
1. Art.(l940J, 252. 
2. Art.(l946), 364. Italics supplied. 
3. Art.(l946}, 366. 
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and that metaphysics essentially must go be8lond to 
probe the more fundamental issues. However~ it should 
also be said that metaphysics contributes to science, 
although perhaps in a less formal or dramatic way. For 
all sc.ientific investigation is of necessity predica te.d 
an certain metaphysical assertions which, like the un-
proved postulates of the mathematician, are a prerequi-
site to progress. With little difficulty it can be 
shown that some of the greatest discoveries in the 
history of science have been made possible by an a pri-
ori pl~ejudice, , intuition, or imaginative insight which 
indicated a certain course of investigation that the 
scientist in his laboratory or worksh6p set out to prove 
(or disprove}. This fact is particularly observable 
during that great period of little more than one hundred 
years which saw the rise of modern science in the six-
1 teenth and sevent~enth centuries. 
For example~ the conviction that nature t'workst' 
in a simpler rather than a more complicated way first 
directed Copernicus to consider t he possibility of a 
1. For a brief~ but very informative account of there-
lationship between metaphysics~ or more properly the 
idea of God; and science during this critical period~ 
see Hugh S. Taylor, t•Religious Pers~ecti ves of College 
Teaching: in the Physical Sciences, (The Hazen Founda-
tion, 1951)~ pp. 6-11. 
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solarcentric universe. The mathematical equations 
based on the sun as the center of the universe were sim-
pler i:n form and structure than those which posited the 
earth as the center, and in one fe l l swoop the brilliant 
Polish atronomer literally turned the universe inside 
out. Kepler, following Copernicus , studied the plane-
tary orders and motions with the conviction that they 
were directed in their courses by God. Believing that 
God must have ordered the planets in the most beautiful 
geometric figure, which he held to be an ellipse rather 
then a circle, he held that t h e tr averses of the planets 
were elliptical instead of circular. And with this com-
pound aesthetic and theological judgment he commenced to 
work out his proof in a series of mathematical equations. 
In these two cases great achievement was made possible 
through the combination of an a priori prejudice, which 
stimulated the investigations, and the empirical obser-
vation and the formulation of mathematical sequences 
which confirmed them.l That the famed scientist, Sir 
Isaac Newton, was also a man of great religious faith 
vmose belief in God became a part of his scientific 
theorizing is indicated in the following quotation: 
1. Hoc.king presented this view of Copernicus and Kepler 
in a lecture at Dartmouth College during the spring 
of 194,9. 
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It is quite impossible to give 
a clear idea of Newton's theism 
because of his distaste for any 
public expression of his personal 
beliefs; it is certain, however, 
that he was a theist; believing 
in a personal and spiritual God, 
and that he thought God was best 
revealed in the laws of nature. 
He even doubted whether the cos-
mic system could continue to op-
erate without at least divine 
control and adjustment--a control 
'not blind or fortuitous but very 
well skilled in mechanics and ge-
ometry.tl · 
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It should further be mentioned, althoughthis is more 
obvious., that metaphysical propositions not only stimu-
late investigation, but also that they underwrite it. 
For all science must be based on the assumptions of the 
order and regularity in the universe, the reliability 
of the human mind and the laws of mathematics and logic, 
and of the relatively undisturbing intrusion of the ob-
server •. 2 In any case, the fact remains that these meta-
physical presuppositions are helpful aids, even necessary 
aids, ln the formulation of scientific knowledge. 
1. CitE~d by Hughs. Taylor, Art.(l951), 10, from Louis 
Trenchard More, The Life and Works of . the Honourable 
Robert Boyle. 
2. It is interesting to note that even in modern ( exper-
imenta~physics the reliability of experiments is con-
stantly restricted by the fact that observation of high 
speed particles such as mesons alters considerably the 
behavior of those particulars due to the interference of 
photons, or light waves. 
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Thus it is seen that not only is science nec-
essary to metaphysics, but that meta physics is also nec-
essary to science. Fundamentally these two disciplines 
of thought are interdependent; each is essential to the 
other i.n certain ways for the proper performance of 
their respective functions. 
iii. Modern Science and Hocking's Metaphysics. 
It should be clear that Hocking maintai.ns respect for 
modern science, a respect which is grounded in his own 
academl<? training and interests. As the son of a physi-
cian he1 perused the books on his father's shelves so 
that me:dicine became 1 in his words, "my first independent 
' 1 
field of curiosity." Later his college work was devoted 
almost exclusively to scientific studies. As he mentions 
briefly in one of his few autobiographical summaries: 
My interests for a number of years 
were dominantly scientific and 
mathematical. I entered training 
for a career in engineering. I 
spent four years in field- and 
map-work connected with surveying 
and the civil engineering depart-
ment of a Western railroad. In 
the Iowa State College at Ames I 
studied physics, chemistry, and 
economics, worked in the labora-
tor~es, and became absorbed in the 
calculus. In the earlier routine 
1. Art.(l930) 1 , 386. 
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of the schools I had taken par-
ticular pleasure in geometry, and 
I continued for a number of years 
to read1independently i n mathe-matics. 
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Two factors, one negative, the other positive, served to 
turn him from science to philosophy. On the one hand he 
became dissatisfied with the philosophy of Herbert Spen-
cer, who earlier had been his primary source of truth 
concerning the uncharted mysteries of life and the uni-
verse. Speaking of the influence of Spencer, Hocking re-
markedJ, "At the moment when reflection came upon me, I 
fell under his spell •••• Thoroughly against my will, and 
with a sense of unmeasured inner tragedy, Spencer con-
vinced me •••• Spencer had the truth--such modest truth 
as was to be had. 112 Events in his own life, particularly 
on occasion of unpretentious alturism, brought home to 
Hocking the inadequacy of Spencer's materialistic evolu-
1. Art.(1930) 1 , 387. Hocking makes a very similar state-
ment i.n a more recent article (1942), "Science in its Re-
lation to Value and Religion," 192 f. 
2. Art.(l930) 1 , 387. It is of interest to observe that 
Borden Parker Bowne was greatly inf luenced by Spencer in 
his early student days, and that he too found dissatis-
faction with Spencer. Bowne's first book, published in 
1874 and entitled The Philoso~hf of Herbert Spencer was 
a criticism of Spencerian doc r nes, and in his last 
book, which was entitled Kant and Spencer and published 
posthumously in 1912, he renewed his objections to that 
philosophy. Another great idealist, Josiah Royce, also 
beg~n with an anti-Spencerian reaction. 
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tionism. The other factor which tur ned him in the di-
rections of philosophy was the readi ng of William James's 
Principles of Psychologz, which began to fill the vacuum 
left by the rejection of Spencer, or which in Hocking's 
figure, "irrigated certain tracts t hat had become desert 
~o that) I began to regain confidence that the mystic's 
sense of the universe is in substance a true sense." 
And thus, as he continues, "I was .sure that the real 
world is more like the world of James's imagination than 
like that of Spencer's, and from that time it became my 
first business to define the difference and to capture 
some rational account of it."l 
Hocking's early interest in philosophical is-
sues, therefore, was grounded in a keen appreciation of 
science and in dissatisfaction with the Spencerian treat-
ment of scientific knowledge. As a matter of fact, his 
earliest published writing, outside of his Ph.D. disser-
tation and two lesser monographs, is entitled "The Func-
tion of Science in Shaping Philosophic Method." His 
early interest in mathematics and natural science is fur-
ther apparent in other early articles, whereas more re-
cently he has discussed in some detail the implications 
of science for the fields of philosophy and religion. 
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Two titles are particularly relevant here: First, the 
McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina in 
1940, published as Science and the Idea of God, and the 
Rockwell Lectures at the Rice Institute in 1942, en-
titled "Science in its Relation to Value and Religion.'' 
The former of these last-named is especially revealing 
in indi cating where and how modern physical science can 
aid the metaphysician in his search for the nature of 
reality, and to that source it is n ow necessary to dir ect 
attentlon. 
As a philosopher, Hocking 's primary concern 
with the physical world is the con s ideration of it as the 
environment where the experience of man must inevitably 
run its course. The nature of that world, insofar as it 
is given in sensation, has already been shown to suggest 
the existence of Other Mind with which the individual 
self is in constant interaction. 1 It is but one further 
step to admit that this Other Mind must exhibit purpose , 
or conscious self-determination whi ch is the native mark 
of consciousness, and this is to say in the larger frame 
that the external world does show s igns of purposes, man-
ifest in the very nature of Other Mind. Hocking seeks 
out the findings of the physical sciences to determine 
1. See pages 91-94 above. 
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whether or not such an hypothesis is compatible with 
their pronouncements, and he reaches the very definite 
conclusion that it is. He writes as follows: 
What interests us is not that every-
thing shall be living and of a men-
tal kind, but rather that the uni-
verse should offer itself as an 
arena for life and purpose, an 
arena whose very wildness, waste, 
vastness, unspanned gulfs of distance, 
offer incentives without. limit to an 
ever-growing mentality. Seen in this 
way there is a purpose in the purpose-
less aspects of the world •••• If the 
world is definable as an environment 
for purpose, then by this definition 
it has a purpose, and is referred to 
a purposing being for its ultimate 
account.! 
Thus it is Hocking's firm conviction that mod-
ern science can shed light on problems which are tradi-
193 
tionally considered the exclusive domain of philosophy. 
Specifically, in the problem of purpose in the world 
which is here under consideration, he declares that "phys-
ical science has something new to say about the plans of 
purpose in the world-process."2 Hocking then goes on to 
demonstrate that while physics, which he calls "the most 
fundamental and characteristic branch of modern science,n3 
is primarily concerned with quantitative factors capable 
1. SIG, 108. 
2. S!G, 86. 
3. SIG, 96. 
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of pre<)ise measurement, it does nonetheless have an im-
portan1i interest in rhythms or patterns of regular move-
ments which it can describe in terms of physical law. 
Speaking of this "strong vested interest ,in pattern," 
Hocking remarks that "it has a concern for the repeat-
able just because it has a concern for law." And fur-
ther, this "vested interest in pattern" is the very 
basis for physics, and indeed for all science. "It 
would not be too much to say that physics survives as a 
science only because it is successful in seeing the 
world <:>f events as a scene of innumerable repetitions."! 
However, it must also be noted that no science 
can be concerned with the totality of thin gs, and t hat 
as a consequence "all talk of repetition or rhythm is a 
simplification: no exact recurrences are known. When 
science perceives and formulates a 11aw,• it does so by 
singling out a facet of a process which is in actuality 
endlessly complex."2 Possibly, then, according to sci-
ence i t self, the argument for an impersonal determinism 
in the order of things is not complete; simply because 
purpose is banished from scientific laws and equations 
does not mean it must thereby be absent from the universe. 
1. SIG, 97 f. 
2. SIG, 99 f. 
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This, however, is not the only point where science can 
at least justify the metaphysician's interest in pur-
pose. 
Hocking observes that according to the most 
recent agreements among scientists on the relativity of 
space-time, certain of the natural processes of the uni-
verse are irreversible, or unidirect ional, in the sense 
that they cannot be exactly repeated. Thus, "the sci-
entific picture of world-change allows one-way proces-
ses a certain likelihood, and that where they are pres-
ent, cycles cannot recur." Support for this view in 
physics is found also in mathematics, and particularly 
"from the mathematics of infinite collections (where) 
it plans to show that our existing system belongs to a 
class of patterns which cannot recur." This evidence 
from the purest of the sciences is summarized as fol-
lows: 
1. SIG, 102. 
Roughly stated, it cons i sts in 
showing that the number of pat-
terns which can be taken by a 
collection of electrons in space 
is in general far greater than 
the number of moments in an in-
finite time series. The possible 
patterns for even a smal l group 
of bodies moving independently 
are too many to be run through in 
a continuous series of movements.! 
195 
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What shall be said, then, if the physical universe is 
one in which exact repetition and precise patterns are 
nowher•:l to be found'? Does this mean complete chaos and 
confusion? Not necessarily, for it has not been said 
that there is no pattern or regularity whatsoever. Rath-
er, only that this regularity is not final or complete. 
And this very fact, says Hocking, is the basis for be-
lief in purpose or meaning in the universe, and even 
more, lt is the basis for human history. He puts it 
this way: 
It is only the irregular config-
urations that are endlessly fertile 
in new forms. For the same reason, 
it is only an irregular world which 
can support a histort. History is 
more than a series o happenings, it 
is a series with a meaning •••• In 
such a series there is no repetition 
•••• Thus, the present outlook of 
astrophysics favors the application 
to such stages of cosmic history as 
we can discern of the much-abused 
term 1unique. 1 •••• Via the unique-
ness of pattern-phases the astrophys-
ics of the twentieth century does 
something to re s tore a geocentric 
picture which ·in the seventeenth 
century it destroyed.! 
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However, not only from physics and mathematics, 
but also from biology and psychology Hocking finds help-
ful hints to guide him in the metaphysical quest for an 
understanding of the nature of reality. These specific 
1. SIG, 103 f. 
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contributions need not be further detailed here; a cur-
sory survey of his bibliography will indicate many 
ti tle~1 which discuss these points. Above all it should 
be remembered that Hocking is no ni vory tower''' philoso-
pher who refuses to admit the possibility of truth out-
side his own field , particularly in the physical sci-
ences .. He is anxious to know and use that truth, and 
to frELme a system of thought about the external world 
that will be acceptable to men of science, as Alfred 
North Whitehead has so ably done. Hocking commends 
Whitehead for his pres.entation of a metaphysical hy-
pothesis "which other scientists cannot reject,ul but 
he does not presume to pass judgment on his own success 
in thi.s endeavor. He puts forth his metaphysical state-
ment which he hopes will account for both the verifiable 
findings of the sci.entist and the fertile insights of 
the mystic. In this higher synthesis, he believes, 
truth will ultimately be found. 
2. The l?.hysical World and Metaphysica.l Reality. 
From this discussion of the interdependence of metaphys-
an 
ics and the physical sciences it is/easy transition to a 
consideration of the relation between the physical world 
and metaphysical reality. As already pointed out, Hock-
1. SIG, 110. 
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ing ha.s maintained that the vi tal test of any phi1oso-
phy is found in how it treats, or accounts for 1 the 
physieal world.1 All idealistic metaphysics, in par-
ticular, with their emphasis on mind and non-physical 
reality, are in an especially critical position in this 
regard insofar as idealism sometimes tends to dismiss 
too l:l.ghtly the world of physical things. Hocking com-
menta .on this as follows: 
Idealism has wavered much in its judgment regarding the reality of 
Nature; and of 0 material sub-
stance.n It has said that we have 
no .idea of matter; and again it 
has said that matter does not ex-
ist, which implies that we have an 
idea of it. Some meaning, however, 
we do attribute to the word matter; 
and without enquiring what that de-
finable meaning may be, we may say 
in advance that whatever idea is 
framable corresponds to reality as 
experienced. We need not fear 
that this realism of Nature2will detach Nature from God ••. • 
Thus, ultimate reality is in some way inseparable from 
the physical world, or in Hocking's words, "Reality 
cannot detach itself from the experience of Nature.n 3 
This section will attempt to set forth Hocking's views 
1. See pages 164 f. above. 
2 . MGBE, 314. 
3. MGHE , 260. 
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on the relationship between metaphysical reality and 
the world of Nature . At least three points are rele-
vant: First, the physical world as an object of knowl-
edge; Second, as the body of God ; and Third, as the en-
vironment of purpose and value. Each will be considered 
in turn. 
i. Nature as an object of knowledge. This as -
pect of the relationship between the physical world and 
metaphysical reality has already been considered in 
some detail in the discussion of sensation and meta-
physical knowledge, 1 and the principal emphases of that 
discussion need be only briefly cited here. Man's ex-
perience in large measure, it was pointed out, is the 
experience of a physical world set over against himself, 
a physical world known in and through sensation. An 
examination of experience reveals vividly that this 
world is necessary not only to man's physical existence, 
but also his mental existence insofar as it provides 
ttraw-material"' for thought. That man 's body is depend-
ent upon Nature there can be little doubt or disagree-
ment. However, concerning the dependency of the mind 
there may be some uncertainty. Hocking accepts the 
first statement, of course, and with it dependence on 
1. See pages 86-:-94, 157.-165 -aoove. 
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the brain as a physical organ .for thought. But he also 
goes further on the second proposition to admit that 
mind , as the thinking, willing, .feeling activity of the 
self, is dependent upon Nature .for those things (ideas, 
emotions, etc.} which are aspects of the activity of 
mind. 11 Nature is the object of our knowledge,t• he re-
marks l• and in this .fact nthe ultimate object of knowl-
1 
edge has its independence of us. \t On this independence, 
says Hocking, hangs the whole argument for the objectiv-
ity of Nature. 
Now it is important to note here that Hock-
ing is standing only .for the independence of Nature a-
mong finite minds, or individual selves. The objectiv-
ity of the physical world is neither final nor ultimate, 
for it in turn is dependent to a certain degree upon 
Other Mind or the Absolute. That problem, however, will 
be considered later. 
It is Hocking's view that as an object of com-
mon knowledge among finite minds the physical world .fur-
nishes the occasion for the merging and eventual identi-
fication of many finite minds together with Other Mind 
which is the ultimate reality. In this regard he writes 
as follows: 
1. MGHE, 283. 
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Nature 1 we may say 1 i s the region 
where this system of minds does ac-
tually coalesce •••• In space and 
time and their contents we have not 
merely common objects 1 we have1a region of literal common Mind. 
Thus 1 the fact that several persons in a room are sim-
ultaneously perceiving the same table means for Hock-
ing that many individual minds have literally become 
one 1 at least as far as that table is concerned. The 
table is the common object of thought 1 and at the same 
time it is the occasion of "literal common Mind .t1 The 
fact that the individual viewers see that table from 
different angles, that some may see it in one frame of 
reference and others in a very different context, does 
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not deter Hocking from maintaining that at least as far 
as that table is concerned, there is represented a com-
mon Mind. Similarly, regarding the physical world as a 
whole, finite minds all perceive the same planet in the 
same universe, so that Nature is somehow the occasion 
of a single mind. 
Space, here is my space,--also 
everybody's space; and is known 
as such. Energy is everybody's 
energy; Nature as a whole is 
everybody's Nature. Even now, 
space, and the rest, are integral 
parts of everybody's mind--are 
idea and experience at the same 
1. MGHE, 298 f. 
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time; are the activity of each 
finite thinker,--but an activi-
ty held empirically in place by 
the active decisiveness of Outer 
Reality.l 
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In order that there be any communication between minds, 
including both finite minds and Other Mind, there mus t 
be some common point of reference in which these sev-
eral 1ninds actually meet in acts of attention. Nature, 
or the physical world, furnishes the opportunity for 
this meeting, and so for the mergmg; of minds in a com-
mon focus. In fact, says Hocking , the physical world 
is known only as common property with other individual 
minds, and above all, with Other Mind. Thus Hocking 
writes: 
And further: 
For as it seems to me, this 
present World of Nature is 
known by me as being, in just 
this sense, a common World: it 
seems to me, indeed, that it 
is not otherwise known--that is, 
that a knowledge of Other Knower 
is an integral part of the knowl-
edge of Nature itself.2 
My knowledge of Nature and of 
Other Mind are in their whole 
history interlocked, and in-
separable. If Nature is ever 
1. MGHE , 287. 
2. MGHE, 268 f. 
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common object, it has always been 
common object.l 
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Here, then, is the clue to the relationship between the 
physic~al world and metaphysical reality. Man the knower, 
in his experience of Nature , knows that experience as a 
shared experience with Other Mind , and in that cogni-
tive experience of a common object man actually becomes 
a part; of Other Mind , or ultimate reality. 
This initial awareness of the physical world 
as a eornrnon object is only the very beginning of t he 
process of identificati on for that process in a contin-
uing one, and the initial awareness is "a minimal core 
of communication" which "may grow intense and varied, 
develop its ups and downs, its relative presences and 
absenees." 2 It presents the individual self with its 
own distinctive opportunity, namely, the occasion to 
participate in uan apprenticeship in creativity."3 
where:Ln the individual realizes more fully both his own 
selfhood and his identity with Other Mind. He is lit-
erally called to become more and more a part of that 
metaphysical reality through a gr eater understanding of 
1. MGHE , 271. 
2. MGHE, 273. 
3. MGT-IE, 299 
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himself and his relationship to Nature and Other Mind. 
Hocking would want it made clear here that the 
. :tndiv:tdual self does not create either Nature or Other 
Mind by his acts of attention to them. It is amply 
clear., without argument, that Nature is already there 
as Given independent of one's contemplation of it. This 
is one argument of a "natural realism11 which Hocking is 
quick to accept: "I find Nature ready made, and so do 
you. The world, in its constitution, is not my doing, 
nor i ;s it the doing of any one else situated as I am, 
nor any assemblage of such. 01 But "natural realismtt 
does not go far enough for Hocking;. it fails to acknowl-
edge, for example, the presence of Other Mind in that 
physical world, upon which all communication is predi-
cated. Hocking remarks as follows: 
In failing to penetrate through 
the blank otherness of Nature to 
the spirit that is its support, 
natural Realism falls short of 
the truth.2 
Idealism in Hocking's view has tried to correct this in-
adequacy by referring the experience of Nature as a 
spirit, but all too often idealism is in error because 
1. MGHE, 283. 
2. MGHE, 289. 
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this spirit "turns out to be only the solitary finite 
self.111 Instead of appealing to the moral conscious-
ness to resolve the problem as Kant and others have 
done, Hocking suggests an appeal to na realism of so-
2 
cial •sxperience," which would maintain that one's 
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knowledge of other finite minds is based first and fore-
most on the prior knowledge of God, or Other Mind. As 
he states it: 
My current social experience, the 
finding of any fellow finite mind, 
is an application of my prior idea 
of an Other; in a sense, an appli-
cation of my idea of God. It is 
through the knowledge of God that 
I am able to know men; not first 
through the knowledge of men that 
I am able to know or imagine God.3 
This position, for Hocking, is made possible only through 
lt a non-Realism in regard to the surface of Nature, tt and 
it may properly be called "a super-natural Realism, or 
a Social Realism, or more truly a Realism of the Abso-
lute Idealism." 4 
1. M:CtHE, 290. This point, of course, is similar to one 
made earlier in the discussion of the subjectivity of 
experience (pages 67JfJ:) where Hocking criticizes"sub-
jective idealism." 
2. MGHE, 290. 
3. MGHE, 297 f. 
4. MGHE, 290. 
NATURE OF ~lliTAPh~SICAL REALITY 
~fuat Hocking is saying here is that Nature 
is more than it appears to be, or better, that it in-
vol ve:3 more than appearance. The physical world offers 
more ·than phenomena to the mind of' man. Literally it 
offer::~ Other Mind, the ultimate reality, and the mind 
of man must 1'penetrate through the blank otherness of 
Nature to the spirit that is its support.tt Such an 
endeavor is possible--and Hocking would say it is man's 
most natural inclination--because of a logically prior 
idea of that spirit which is common to all. Hocking, 
howev.;;,r, does not say that this idea is innate among 
all m•3n, in Cartesian fashion, bu t more, after the man-
ner o:f F..ant, t'that the idea is a native and necessary 
form by which the Self orders the material of its ex-
perience, as otherwise given." 1 But this idea is not 
derived from previous experience, as Hume would have 
it; there is nothing backward-looking about it. Rath-
er, the idea of Other Mind is at the very same time an 
experience of Other Mind; the idea and the experience 
are one and inseparable. This is the conviction which 
stands as ~!a firm ground" for the whole of Hocking 's 
metaphysics: "that we should have no idea of Other 
1. MGF...E, 276. 
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1 Mind ••• unless we had the experience itself." Thus, 
the idea of Other Mind is not temporally prior to ex-
perience but is coincident with it, with the experience 
of Nai;ure and all further social experience. To say 
that man is a social creature, in Hocking 's sense, takes 
on this added significance: that all social experience ~ 
is social in the sense that it is a manifestation of 
the community between the individual mind and Other 
Mind, made possible through the mediation of Nature, 
and this initial social experience is the predicate of 
all experience of other finite minds. Community is pos-
sible only with some means of comm~nication among minds, 
both finite and infinite. 
Nature is experienced as known by Other Mind; 
it is from the first a social experience. In the knowl-
edge of a common object, which Hocking calls "concrete 
2 
a priori knowledge," finite minds are metaphysically 
part of, or included in, Other Mind. 
The Self includes, and is with, 
its objects, in so far as it com-
prehends them, or is creating 
them. God, then, does actually 
include me, in so far as I am de-
pendent upon him; does include 
1. MGHE, 278 f. 
2. MGHE, 278. 
NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 
those fellow Others, i n so far 
as th~y also are his created 
work. 1 
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The experience of Nature, therefore, regarded 
cognitively, is the experience of ultimate reality. The 
physical world and ultimate reality are inseparably con-
joined, and to a certain degree identical, in the individ-
ual person's awareness of Nature as also known by Other 
Mind. 
This point must stand as the initial conclu-
sion on the relationship between the physical world and 
metaphysical reality, but it raises the problem of wheth-
er the physical world is in every way identical with God 
or Other lVIind. The perplexing relationship between Na-
ture and Other Mind must be pressed further. 
ii. Nature as the Body of God. Hocking com-
monly e~presses the relationship between the physical 
world and metaphysical reality in terms of the relation-
ship between mind and body. In briefest form, then, 
Nature is the body of God: ttother Mind presents itself 
2 in the guise of a body in the midst of Na t ure. • .. n 
Man ~'finds 11 God as Other Mind, as active Subject, which 
1. 11/IGHE , 298 . 
2. MGHE, 264. 
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knows the individual self and is known by that self 
simultaneously in cognitive experience. But the in-
quisitive mind presses for a more adequate, and one 
might say a more concrete knowledge of God, just as one 
needs a more substantial identification of one's fel-
lows than the knowledge that they, too, are subjects 
and 1mowers of a common object. Thus, as one readily 
identifies a friend by certain physical characterisitcs, 
so also is God identified by his body. And t hat body, 
whi ch is the touchstone of more adequate knowle dge, is 
Na tu:J:>e, or the physical world. In Hocking's words, nNa-
ture is God's announcement of his presence and individ-
uality.n1 It is at once the sign and the immediate ex-
perience of the personality of God. 
It may be pointed out that this conception 
of the relationship between mind and body in the idea 
of God and the physical world is similar to Hocking's 
answer on the mind-body problem in human experience. 
That answer has been expounded and criticized in some 
dets.i l by Dr. N. Bond Fleming in his dissertation on 
Hocking's Philosophy of the Human Self~ and need not be 
developed here except as a brief notice may clarify the 
1. MGHE, 336. 
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problem of this section 
The nature of the self or mind--and this ap-
plies to both finite minds and the infinite Other Mind--
is consciousness, but consciousness cannot be regarded 
in abstracto apart from the objects r a~ ~-. attention 
which it lthandlestt in thinking, willing, and feeling. 
In other words, mind can be known only through those 
physical objects in which it expresses itself. As 
Hocking puts it: 
The mind to be known is, we say, 
a concrete being~ worthless even 
to itself apart from the material 
in which it operates. It is the 
Mind-in-union-with-Nature that we 
want to know. But the mind is 
still that which deals with this 
materiali and we concern ourselves 
with the material onl.y for the 
sake of that which it manifests.1 
It is therefore empirically impossible, Hocking main-
tains, to know other minds directly, at least at the 
first, without recourse to physical symbols which are 
commonly shared; it is fallacious to say nthat thoughts 
might be known without reference to Nature.lt 2 For in 
Hocking 's view, no idea presents itself to the mind 
fully developed as pure or non-sensuous thought. In 
his words: 
1. MGHE, 256. 
2. 1iGHE, 258. 
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An idea shares the history of 
the body; it needs to ri pen and 
mature; it must find its way by 
gradual processes to the surface 
where it will show itself in 
language and in action ••• Idea 
as well as Matter must be "mixed 
with labor" before it can become 
property. And perhaps also there 
are no ideas which are mature at 
birth; but they, like t he young 
of h i gher species, must pass a 
certain time in the open under 
friendly protection, before they 
can pass current among other ideas, 
the 1?ols and properties of all 
men. · 
And further, "It thus requires t i me and Nature in order 
that a mind shall exist; must it not also require time 
and Nature in order that a mind shall be known?lt Mind, 
therefore, can be known only uin terms of its ovm traf-
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fie with Nature , both in acting and in thinking; in poe -
sassing its own character, and in possessing its own 
ideas .tt 2 
To know other minds, and Other Mind, through 
Utraffic with Nature," however, does not reveal them in 
the:Lr fullness and totality. Indeed, Nature furnishes 
only the all-important beginning: uwe begin our ac-
1. MGHE, 258, 259. What Hocking means here is that an 
idea is nfully developed" only as it becomes part of a 
system of beliefs which, if rat i onally coherent, is 
true, and which t hereupon issue in action. The spell-
ing-out of rationally coherent ideas in human activity 
is the work of the full development. 
2. MGHE , 259. 
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quaintances with our fellow-men at their periphery--at 
the poi nt of their visible encounter with -N~ture ••• n1 
And from this realistic beginning one must press on to 
higher and more adequate knowledge which, as pointed out 
earlier,2 comes from the development of a coherent sys-
tem of ideas from many sources concerning a common ob-
ject. Thus it may be said that the higher knowledge is 
not directly the product of the encounter with Nature, 
but more the product of the activit y of mind in thinking 
through the implications of this continuing interplay. 
Hocking puts it this way: 
It is not indeed sufficient to 
know the objects; we should have 
further to know those objects as 
being known bt the Other Mind;-
we must find he idea at work; 
we must verify in experience our 
simplest definition of the Other 
Mind--as Other-Knower-of-physical-
Nature. We want the center as 
well as the periphery ; and Nature 
certainly cannot give the center 
of personality, the idea itself. 
But Nature can give a symbol of 
the center .3 
Nature, then, is the symbol or body of Other Mind. But 
even these words do not convey the exact meaning of Hock-
ing's view, for he finds in the word "metaphor" a closer 
1. MGHE, 259. 
2. See page 164 above. 
3. MGHE, 261. 
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approximation to his understanding. Thus, "the body is 
an incredibly intricate and exact metaphor of every in-
ner movement of that Other Mind. To every shade of 
thought and motive, there corresponds some change in t he 
body, reflecting in its own different sphere each type 
of varlation to which the inner state is subject."1 And 
furthe:r: 
The body has no independent re-
ality, but only exists as a bul-
letin of an inner process; being 
but that process itself, report-
ing itself to us in such terms 2 
as we can physically comprehend. 
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In incalculable immediacy the body "present s ext erna lly 
what the mi nd i nterna l l y i s, and not in its passing pha-
ses alone, but in its most rooted habits, its oldest mem-
orles, its most permanent wills and purposes. The body 
is a complete metaphor of the idea.3 
It should be reiterated again that despite the 
completeness of detail in which Other Mind is revealed in 
and through Nature, man's mind cannot grasp the full mean-
ing of this metaphor. Hocking makes this clear in a foot-
note to the passage cited above. "I do not mean that this 
. . 
metaphor can be read by simple inspection," he adds, for 
in part the body is "the shore-line where outgoing and 
incoming purposes meet, conflict and cross; and one tale 
1. MGHE, 262. 3. MGHE, 263. 
2. MGEE, 263. 
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con.fus 1~s the clarity of the other. • But the essen-
tial truth of the metaphor remains e 
With all our inability to gain 
the exact key to the c i pher; and 
with all our inadequacy in observ-
ing these subtle physical changes; 
it remains true that t he body, if 
we will take it so, is little else 
than the soul made visible.2 
Hocking does not have much to say about the 
personality of God; in fact he remarks b l untly, 11 I do 
not love the word personality."3 And yet, it is clear 
that whatever one can mean by this term, it must include 
some a.ccount of the physical world, which is the symbol 
of the personality of God. That the phenomenal appear-
ance gives some indication of the internal quality is 
exhib.tted in the .fact, .for example, that as any psychol-
ogist or analyst would testify, a person's inner att i -
tudes~ preferences, and .frustrations are often revealed 
in the manner of his dress. There is more to the choice 
of a necktie than meets the eye! Hocking calls a t tention 
to the vagueness and artificiality which would prevail if 
one could not at least refer to some readily identif'iable 
1. MGHE, 263 n. 
2 • MGHE, 2 62 f. 
3. MGHE 1 335. Hocking's objection to the word "personal-
ity" is not entirely a verbal phobia, for he thinks the 
term too vague, too often charged with misleading conno-
tations, and also too often assoc i ated (at least in the 
public eye) with inadequate conceptions of the human self'. 
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·charactieristics. 
our body is that through which 
we are acted upon as well as that 
through which we act. But our 
body is also that through which 
we are found and become personal-
ly present to other persons. The 
abolition of the body is the ab-
olition of the recognizable and 
the understandable in a ll person-
al relations.! 
In the matter of God, and in particular the disparity be-
tween t he knowledge of God and other persons, one is con-
sta.ntly beset by the question How shall we think of him? 
"We arc~ baffled and not foolishly," Hocking writes 1 "by 
the absence of a body that we can attribute to God. • • 
But the inquisitive mind drives forward for an answer, 
and thus Hocking writes: 
Our conceptions of disembodied 
spirit, or of an Other whose 
body we cannot locate or imagine, 
tend to lose just these qualities 
of individuality and particularity • 
•••• • we find ourselves impelled 
to assign them deliberately a 
place or seat in Nature, or else 
in some o~ nature accessible to 
us in imagination, in order to save 
their personality from obliteration 
before our minda.3 
1. MGHE, 333. 
2. MGEE, 332. 
3. MGHE, 264. 
n2 
215 
NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 
In a sense the natural world clothes the per-
sonality of God--"The Word made flesh"--but at the same 
-
time it does not preclude the possibility of other es-
sential characteristics of God. It is not the task of 
this section to consider the personality of God in Hock-
ing's view~ but it may suffice to say that in addition 
to being considered as a person--i.e • ., the personality 
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of God--the detty is also considered impersonally, usual-
ly in terms of substance, energy, arid more often~ law. 
And further~ Hocking remarks that "the advance of re-
ligion has been very largely from personality to imper-
sonality."! But at the same time, despite the fact that 
the concept of personality is often "accidental and ar-
bitrary and atomic and limited and case-hardened~" he ad-
mits that "personality is a stron ger idea than law; and 
has promise of mutuality and intercourse that laws, even 
if living, cannot afford. I see further that personality 
2 
can include law." Thus, in his view God is both person-
ality and law: 
Until I can perfectly conceive 
personality, God must be for me 
alternately person and law; with 
the knowledge that these two at-
tributes of one being are not, 
1. MGHE~ 333. 
2. MGHE, 335. 
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in truth, inconsistent, and that 
their mode of union is also some-
thing that I shall verify in some 
moment of present knowledge, as 
by antici~ation of an ultimate at-
tainment. 
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The physical universe, therefore, becomes that unique em-
bodiment of the personality of ult i mate reality and at 
the same time demonstrates the orderliness and dependa-
bility of the law which also is God. 
What Hocking means by ref erring to the physical 
universe as the body of God, the symbol or metaphor of 
Other Mind, is brought out more clearly in his critical 
discussion of Whitehead's views in two recent works, 
Science and the Idea of God .and "Whitehead on Mind and 
Nature," Hocking's contribution in the memorial volume 
2 
to that great thinker. 
It is Hocking's belief that Whitehead's great 
and lasting contribution to philosophy, and to science as 
well, is his effective reconciliation of a metaphysical 
hypothesis that is at once comprehensive and scientifical-
ly sound with a theory of value that does adequate justice 
11 to the infinitude of the world's qualitative wealth. 11 3 
1. The relationship between Hocking and Whitehead is dis-
cussed in some detail in the next chapter. See pp. 282-289. 
2. SIG, 110. For an authoritative and detailed treatment 
of Whitehead's value-theory and its metaphysical orienta-
tion, see Millard, The Place of Value in Whitehead's 
Thougl1t. 
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However, despite this fact Hocking seems to suggest that 
Whitehead ascribes too much unity to the physical uni-
verse. He agrees that the universe does exhibit a "sig-
nificant togetherness," but he goes on to say, "Yet I 
cannot follow this logic with Whitehead to the point of 
calling the whole an organism." 1 Hocking appeals to em-
pirical data to assert that "there is more looseness 
among the parts of the world, more waste, more wider-
flung oceans of emptiness, more relative independence 
than is compatible with organic unity." What Hocking 
prefers is to regard the universe as "a true system of 
interdependent motions within which organic groupings 
take place and run their life course--the whole present-
i ng the character of a single envi ronment for the living 
fragments rather than being itself a total organism with 
no environment.n 2 Whitehead comes under further criti-
cism from Hocking for postulating "that every integral 
.. 
unit of physical being has its mental as well as its 
physical aspect," for in Hocking 's view "this hypothesis 
errs by excess in animating the world."3 Hocking, there-
1. SIG, 108. 
2. SIG, 108. 
3. T:P, 256. 
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fore, is unwilling to consider the physical universe as 
a whole as a living organism, and he is further unwilling 
to attribute to that universe as a whole mental as well 
as physical characteristics. 
What is evident here is that Hocking is anxious 
to take a "realistic" view of the physical world. He is 
perfectly ready to admit that there is much in the uni-
verse that is without purpose, that there are vast as-
pects of the world that are impersonal and mechanical, 
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that there is further an "infinitely expansive unconscious-
ness of mass and energy-fields." Thus in the face of 
this excess of purposelessness and impersonality in parts 
of Nature, the universe cannot fairly be regarded as an 
organic body of life. There may be purpose manifest in 
"organic groupings" of Nature, together with unconscious 
mass, but to say with Whitehead that all is reality in 
process, is to blur over a fundamental distinction be-
tween the organic and the inorganic which Hocking seeks 
to maintain. In any case, as regards the physical world, 
attention must be fixed on the whole, and this for Hock-
ing is "an environment for purpose" which is not final in 
and of itself, as if it were a self-sufficient organism, 
but _which must be referred to something over and above it, 
namely God or Other Mind, wherein is found "its ultimate 
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account." As an environment--or body or symbol, the 
meaning is essentially the same here--it is an arena 
where Other Mind can express itsel~ and its purpose in 
a manner recognizable by all rationa l minds. "Charac-
ter comes out chie~ly in dealing with Nature," writes 
2 Hocking. The character o~ Other Mind, the ultimate 
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reality, is revealed chie~ly in the way it "handles" 
that physical world which serves jointly as the symbol 
o~ its inner li~e and the locus in which that inner li~e 
is played out before the minds of other knowers. 
iii. Nature, Purpose, and Values. There are 
two other aspects of the relation between the physical 
world and metaphysical reality which demand further at-
tention, although both have been mentioned incidentally 
before. The first is the problem of purpose in the uni-
verse, the second the place of values. 
(1) Nature and Purpose. The earlier discussion 
o~ "Modern S~ie~ce and Hocking's Metaphysics 113 pointed to 
the fact that Hocking sees in the discoveries of modern 
astro-physics support ~or the view that purpose and goal-
seeking are manifest in the physical universe. But ft is 
important to emphasize here that Hocking is referring to 
1. SIG, 108 • 
2. MGHE, 255 • 
3. see pages 189-197. 
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the universe as a whole, for significant meaning is to 
be found only in the whole. He admits, as cited in the 
preceding section, that certain parts of the whole may 
not have meaning or purpose in and of themselves--un-
conscious mass or energy can never itself be said to be 
purposeful--but they do have purpose in relation to the 
whole of which they are a part. Thus, in the Whitehead 
essay Hocking writes, "It has a definite meaning that 
whole aspects of nature shall be devoid of self-felt 
meaning, and thus be open to exploit without compunction. ttl 
The purpose of these purposeless aspects of nature, then, 
is that they can and do serve as dependable and steady 
environment wherein the purpose of the whole can be 
worked out. Again in a comment on Whitehead, Hocking 
writes, "The strength of Whitehead's view is to show that 
this goal-quality pervading everything may coexist with 
the causal scheme: wherever there is consciousness, there 
purpose rides along with the causal flood. n • • However, 
this view goes too far for Hocking, for as he continues; 
The weakness of his view is his 
attempt to make everything at 
once goal and seeker, to con-
ceive all "actual entities" on 
the mental ,pattern, and thus to 
ruin his noble picture of the 
1. Art.(l941) 2 , 399. 
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ingressive goal-qualities which 
lure and guide the striving of 
the r~latively few foci of pur-
pose. 
wnile Whitehead, by his great learning and the magnif-
icent power of his thought, nhas made it impossible--
one would like to believe for all time--to forget that 
goal-qualities and their responding processes are an 
integral part of the concrete on-going of the world 
2 process," he has at the same time literally conferred 
too much purpose on the world by characterizing every 
unit of reality with purposiveness. Purpose in the 
physical universe for Hocking is more to be found in 
"organic groupings" of more-or-less local interdepend-
ent motions and in the relations of these groupings to 
the whole. 
Nevertheless, whatever be the details of this 
difference with Whitehead, the fact is clear for Hock -
ing that the physical universe as a whole does have a 
purpose, a purpos e in its relationship to Other Mind. 
That purpose.is ?- -: further . evidence of its intimate link 
with metaphysical reality. 
(2} Nature and Valuee. Paraphrasing the title 
of K~hler's well-known work, it ca n be said with conf i-
1. SIG, 109. 
2. SIG, 110• 
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dence that for Hocking values have an extremely im-
portant place in t'the world of fact.n Ultimat e reali-
ty as a whole , and with it the physical world, is fully 
charged with value and meaning from which the member -
parts draw their own meaning and significance. One of 
Hocking 's most frequent declarations is that uif the 
whole has no meaning, the parts cannot preserve signif-
icance.111 Or again, uHuman life has a meaning :1:f (and 
only if) there is a total meaning in the world in which 
it can participate.n2 This is not to say that all val-
ues are somehow grounded in the physical universe. In-
deed, Hocking specifically r ejects such a proposal: 
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••• Human ends can only retain their validity by be-
ing given a locus in an objective nund not identical 
with Nature . 113 Neverthe less, values are intimately as-
sociated with the physical world as the body of God and 
the environment for purpose. It may be worthwhile to 
point out how one specific value, namely truth, is bound 
up with Nature , and in this regard two points may be 
made . 
First, truth, and the conununication of truth 
among different minds, is made possible in and through 
1. Art .(l942), 193. Cf. 211. 
2 . TDL, 158. 
3. TDL, 255. 
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a readily identifiable world of physical things. The 
physical world serves as a "non-impulsive backgroundtt 
in which the meanirg of ideas is literally ltpinned down.n 
Because this background is "non-impulsive," it is un-
wavering in its report, that is, it remains relatively 
constant and is unaffected by the varying attitudes of 
different minds. Thus Hocking writes: 
'l'o lodge meanings somewhere in 
Nature seems to guarantee their 
genuineness; as if al l meanings 
must be made to touch base in a 
region of indifference before 
they may spin lawful alliances 
with feeling and action •••• 
Whatever the impulsive foreground 
of idea, there will thus neces-
sarily be a non-impulsive back-
ground,and in this our idea-mean-
ings will rest.l 
Remembering the close connection between ideas and ac-
tion (as in the discussion of idea-feeling couples), it 
will thus be seen that a third factor is always present, 
namely Nature, which in its particular function as '·'the 
feeling-free anchorage of the meanings of ideas 11 is 
called by Hocking, Substance. He writes: 
In such external World-fact do 
our idea-meanings seek lodgment; 
as if, I repeat, it were neces-
sary to touch the passionless 
ground of things, before affil-
l. MGHE , 118. 
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iating with any particular ac-
tions and feelings. The struc-
ture of the whole system of 
ideas and actions becomes in-
direct, triangular: there may 
be no direct passage from per-
ception to action, but percep-
tion must first be related to. 
substance, and from substance 
pass on to action--with free-
dom of will.l 
It may be . that Nature is only the "immediate clothing 
of Substance" which is given to the individual in per-
ception,2 but in any case it is the physical world 
which makes possible among the var•ieties of feeling and 
action na unlty, coherence, relatedness, (anci] intelli-
gibility, which on their own ground they lack."' 3 In-
sofar as these are necessary prolegomena to truth in any 
view, it may be said that trutn-value is ttfixedl' in this 
way in the physical world. 
However, there is something more to be said in 
this relation between truth-value and the physical world. 
There is native to all men an interest in ultimate reali-
ty--nothing more special, nothing less." 4 This native 
interest is closely linked with the physical world, which 
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seems to invite men to take up the quest for truth, and which 
1. MGHE , 119• 3. MGHE, 122. 
2. MGHE, 120• 4. MGHE, 122· 
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can actual ly take on the f orce of passion, of passion 
for truth . nsome passion for objectivity, for reality, 
for Substance, quite prior to other passions, there is 
at the bottom of all idea; a passi.on not wholly of an 
unreligious nature, not wholly un-akin to the love of 
God.ul 
Hocking discusses this "passion for objectiv-
ityn most adequately in the context of the relationship 
between science and val~e . The scientist in his labora-
tory directs his entire effort in a quest for truth a-
bout the physical world; that, indeed , is his passion 
for objectivity. And in this quest he deliberately ex-
eludes values from his perspective. nThe most vital 
reason which leads science to keep cl ear of questions 
of value,n writes Hocking, nlies in its carefully-built 
method of procedure . The glory of science is in its 
method . n2 Nonetheless, science does encounter values 
at several points in its quest. First of all, science 
assumes the values of knowledge , of truth, which in and 
of themselves are not part of the contents of science--
they are values which gather round the activity of the 
1. MGHE, 123 . 
3 2 . Art.(l942) ,152 · 
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. 1 
scientific worker and sustain his toil and sacrifice." 
Speaking of science in this connection, Hocking writes: 
It assumed the value of knowl-
edge. It lives on that preju-
dice ••• that it is better to 
know than not to know •••• It 
also assumes that its own re-
sults will be helpful to ooher 
men in the pursuit of their 
ends •••• It assumes that many 
of these ends will be common 
goods for all mankind, such as 
the achievements of all the use-
ful arts, medecine, engineering, 
and the like. And then, further, 
it sees its own labors as having 
an incidental value in uniting 
scientific workers the world 
over in a common front dealing 
with the common problems of man-
kind.2 
Science also encounters value in another way, 
tta more concrete way," when it encounters .man as a goal-
seeking creature.3 Science, it is true, functions pri-
marily as a reporter in this connection~ but in any case 
1. Art .(l942)3, 155. 
2. Art.(l942)3, 154 f. 
3. Parenthetically it might be observed that for Hock-
ing this fact of man as a goal-seeking creature is the 
11 one general principle of value that holds for every so-
ciety. • .Its substance is the value of valuers .t• Art. 
(1937)1, 262. A similar ~oint is made in another writ-
ing where he discusses a value-certainty" similar to 
Descartes theoretical epistemological certainty. none 
can doubt t he value of everything in the universe ex-
cept the valuer, for with his disappearance the whole 
world of values collapses .n TDL, 252. 
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it must deal with the presence of values in human life. 
While the world of physics and astronomy may itself be 
devoid of value, man's presence in that world introduces 
the problems of valuation which it is impossible for the 
scientist to avoid. 
These are two points on the relationship be-
tween science and value on which most observers would 
readily agree. Hocking, however, goes further, to main-
tain that there is value at the very heart of ;the physi-
cal universe, and that moreover this value is what moves 
the scientist, as well as the theologian and the phil-
osopher, to take up the quest for truth. Hocking speaks 
of the emotion which Nature seems to stir in all men: 
(It is] an emotional response 
t oward infinitude and mystery, 
which is extra-scientific, 
though it lies at the root of 
many a scientist's choice of 
vocation. The physical uni-
verse is capable of evoking--
not when we grasp it least, 
but when we grasp it most ade-
quately--a response of almost 
personal devotion toward its 
majesty, its vastness, its beau-
ty, its marvelous perfection, 
its unfathomed depths of intri-
cate harmony, its stupendous and 
moving equilibria. This cosmic 
emotion is indeed religious and 
no religion is complete without 
it. But emotion is prophetic of1 thought; it is incipient idea. 
l. SIG, 17 f. 
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In another place Hocking writes along the same line, 
although perhaps a little more cautiously: 
For Science alone, Nature has no 
intention and no ethical admoni-
tion; for a more intuitive concep-
tion, the total fact of Nature 
does seem to convey a dim "ought"--
a summons to man to be himself •••• 
It is as though Nature were saying, 
11 If you could know me as I am, you 
would find in me something not alone 
to wonder at, but something also to 
be loyal to." This is not much, 
but it leaves ~ope of a passage from 
fact to value. 
For Hocking, therefore, there is at the heart 
of Nature a source of ncosmic emotion" which makes t he 
physical universe more than a mere space-time continuum, 
which makes it a source of religious experience: 
Such experience of Nature as arouses 
a fear with supersensible reverber-
ations, suggestions of unseen pres-
ences; such social experience of 
human crises as arouses an awe,like-
wise reaching int o the supersensible • 
• • • It is such experience2as this •• 
• that is called religious. 
And as a source of religious exper i ence, with the figure 
of God now present on the scene, Nature becomes by that 
fact a fountainhead of aesthetic and ethical values, t'for 
t he term God implies a concern for moral relations among 
1. Art.(l942) 3 , 182. 
2. MGHE , 233. 
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events, an element of justice in the long-time strands 
of conscious history, in brief a moral order as well 
as a causal order. 91 Inevitably, then, "the spirit of 
God moved upon the face of the waters," as in Hocking's 
view the idea of God, or ultimate reality, becomes in-
extricable bound up with physical nature. And the join9 
ing link between the physical world and metaphysical 
reality in this case is the presence of' values in human 
experience. God is here thought of' as "the element of' 
objectivity in the order of values. • • and Nature, 
thus enlarged~ carries within it a standard of validi ty 
for our appreciations, and t he cosmic emotion we were 
speaking of appears justified in its object."2 In f'ine, 
ltGod is the absolute argume:rllt for rightness, embedded 
in the nature of the living universe. 03 
It might fairly be observed that this conclu-
s ion brings t~is discussion of Nature , Purpose, and 
Values round again to its starting point and to the 
principal theme of this section, viz., that the physical 
universe and metaphysical reality are intimately as-
sociated with one another in Hocking's thought . Three 
1. BIG, 15. 
2. SIG, 19. 
3. SIG, 21. 
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marks of association have been pointed out: as the 
knowledge of God , as the body of ~od , and now finally, 
as the common ground of purpose and values. The next 
step in this investi.gation of the Nature of Metaphysi -
cal Reality is clear: Granting this close relationship, 
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what is to be said about God, or Other Mind, as ultimate 
metaphysical reality~ 
3. The Nature of Othe r Mind. It has already 
been asserted on numerous occasions in the preceding 
discussion that the basic metaphysical reality is com-
monly designated by Hocking as Other Mind , and now at 
long last it is necessary to attempt to describe care-
fully just what Hocking means by this fundamental con-
cept. Rather than launch immediately into a descrip-
tion of this Abs olute, it is desirable to examine first 
what Ho cking means by mind, or more particularly fimLte 
mind , and t his understanding will mark more clearly the 
nature of Other Mind. 
i. The Concept of Finite ~· The most 
straightforward and systematic account of what Hocking 
means by mind is to be found in his paper on ttMind and 
Near-Mindn for the Sixth International Congress of 
Philosophy in 1926. 1 The re Hocking addresses himself 
1. This important article is published in the Proceedings 
of that Congress, and is also reprinted in full in 
Muelder and Sears, The Development of American Philoso-
~' PP• 491 - 499 . 
NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 232 
"to the question whether mind can successfully be made 
a theme of science, and what the status of such a sci-
ence among other sciences may be." Continuing, he sets 
forth as his thesis the following contention: 
The effort to create g science of 
mind is a necessary effort: we 
cannot give it up, and on the 
whole it has not been unfruitful. 
But the extant science or sciences 
of mind have presented us not the 
mind itself, but substitutes for 
mind,--systems of objects which 
are ~quivalent to mind only for 
certain restricted purpoaes,-i 
Near-minds, we may call them. 
The major portion of this paper is devoted to a criticism 
of prevailing views of mind. Behaviorism, empirical psy-
cho-physics, or caus_al psychology--by whatever name it 
would pass--is roundly rejected, and that for several 
reasons. In the first place, "causes are not reasons, 
and reasons are not causes. And since mental process 
is at least partly rational, no system of causes such as 
a physical-psychology aims to establish can be equiva-
lent to mind ••• ·A causal system can at best be but a 
Near-mind."2 Secondly, "however true a causal law of hu-
man behavior may have been at the time of its discovery, 
the discovery and statement of a causal principle in psy-
1. Art.{l927)1, 203. 
2. Art.{l927) 1 , 205~ 
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chology has a certain tendency to make itself untrue. 111 
- .. 
And further, causal psychology defeats itself in its 
proposed 'application,' because it falsifies itself in 
becoming known. The causal management of men must al-
ways proceed in secret: that is to say, it must ulti-
2 
mately be given up." However, all these arguments not-
withstanding, it is interesting to note that Hocking re-
gards the rejection of causal psychology as in large 
part intuitive. In fact, the foregoing arguments may be 
regarded as part of "the intuitive repudiation of causal 
psychology .n3 Thus Hocking concludes: 
The psychophysical scheme of stim-
ulus and response, after being 
given a respectful, even deferen-
tial viewing, is soberly judged 
to be a cariacature of the human 
mind. The rejection, in common 
judgment, is intuitive, but de-
cisive.4 
The "logical essence" of these "common judg-
ments" against psycho-physics, Hocking holds to be "that 
the causal order of events becomes abstract as it be-
comes a part of the mental order." He continues as fol-
l ows: 
1. Art.(l927) 1 , 206. 
. 1 
2. Art.(l927) , 206 f. 
3. Art.(l927) 1 , 206. 
4. Art.(l927) 1 , 204. 
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In the field of life entitles 1 a 
physical force is not an abstrac-
tion ••• But when a physical se-
quence becomes an ingredient of a 
mental process the calculus of 
vectors is no longer sufficient 
to describe the event. It has be-
come abstract. It can neither ae-
termine nor describe what happens 1 
for the what of what happens is 
fixed bylili:'e judging mind.l 
Hocking also considers briefly Bernard Bosan-
quet's concept of mind and that of the neo-realists, 
citing certain inadequacies to both views. Both attempt 
"to assemble the mind, by selection or otherwise 1 from a 
world of independent logical or neutral entities ~nd] 
must be pronounced and unqualified failure, if only be-
cause the world from which it is assembled is devoid of 
meaning. 2 By hesitating to "ascribe mental process to 
an activity of the mind's own, the process becomes a 
grouping of contents according to laws of their own 
realm." All conceptions of mind must account for "the 
activity and unity of the finite self. 11 Failing that, 
they deserve to be characterized only as "mural concep-
tions1 a variety of Near-mind, decorative but lifeless 
substitutes for the reality." 3 What is needed, thinks 
Hocking, is a theory of mind which will adequately por-
1 1. Art.(1927} , 207. 1 3. Art.(l927) , 210. 
2. Art.{1927} 1 , 210. 
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tray the activity of mind in its local applications in 
the experience of finite selves. Turning from his criti-
cisms of inadequate conceptions, he presents his own 
view "of what the mind, in contrast to these Near-minds, 
is." 1 Hocking thinks of mind primarily in terms of its 
activity as it functions in bringing disparate elements 
of experience together in an intelligible unity. Mind, 
thereby, is a synthesizer which organizes experience. 
But just what does it synthesize? Simply to speak of 
mind as a synthesizing activity is vague and not espec-
ially conducive to further thought. "Put in this indis-
criminate way," Hocking declares, "it leaves the mind un-
characterized, a small and unemployable version of the 
absolute." 2 Thus he suggests that "we consider not syn-
theses," and continues as follows: 
The mind holds together, for ex-
ample, past, present, and future; 
it holds together fact and value; 
it holds together the actual and 
the possible.3 
Pointing out that objects of nature belong to only one 
side of these pairs, that is, to actual, present, fact, 
is at the same time also cognizant of possible future 
value. Hocking puts it this way: 
1. Art.{l927) 1 , 211. 3. Art.{l927) 1 , 211. 
2. Art.(1927) 1 , 211. 
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The mind, then, differs from 
every object of nature in being 
in addition a hold upon the pos-
sible 1 the future 1 the valuable--
or, to put these together, upon 
possible future value. Its es-
sential activity ls to bring 
possible future value into con-
nection with actual present 
fact; and my proposition is that 
lt ls the only agency for doing 
this. Mind ls the only _organ for 
making future possibility actual.l 
Hocking continues briefly to distinguish between the pos-
sible and the necessary, showing that strictly speaking 
there is no category of possibility in nature, but rath-
er only necessity. "The possible," he writes, "is sim-
ply a genus of happening not excluded by any known law • 
• • It always has reference to either human action or to 
human ignorance." 2 Thus, nin the strict natural order, 
only one set of events is possible, namely, that which 
is going to happen. In brief, only the necessary is 
possible, and the category of the possible has no ob-
jective actuality.n3 
The category of possibility in the mental order 
is another story. Without becoming involved in myster-
ious realms of essence~, it can be said that the possible 
tends to become actual when it is conceived in a mind • 
• 
1. Art.(1927) 1 , 211. 3. Art.(l927) 1 , 2ll . 
2. Art.(l927) 1 , 211. 
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Mind, then, brings possibility to actuality. 
When some mind conceives an essence 
as desirable, it becomes an actual 
possibility; it not only has a foot-
hold in actuality as an actually 
conceived element of being, but it 
has a veritable nisus toward being, 
such as the world of essences can-
not claim. As a mere universal, 
nothing is possible. As a promise 
of value to an actual self, any-
thing may be possible. The veritable 
possibility of any idea depends u~­
on its actually being thought of. 
In this synthesizing activity the mind is seen to be es-
sentially a creative agent--" conceiving a possibilit y 
and bringing it to birth. 112 From wish or desire to hope 
to attainment, that is the course of the mind in its na-
ti ve activity. 
Hocking holds that this creative activity of 
the mind is thoroughly genuine: "In the free action of 
the mind there is a genuine addition to being •••• The 
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mind adds to the actual by first adding to the possible .l•3 
However, unfortunately or not, this activity of the mind 
is impossible of scientific verification because it is 
not confined to the realm of nature (the actual} alone, 
but "plies between nature and the world of actual possi-
bility.u4 Hocking finds adequate verification of this 
1. Art.(l927) 1 , 212. 
2. Art.(l927} 1 , 212. 
3. Art.(l927)1 , 213. 
1 4. Art.(l927} , 213. 
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truth in the insights of the mystic, and with t hem he 
would say that ttto regard the mind as the creative 
principle ••• is not an hypothesis among others in meta-
physics, but the primary certitude of experience.n1 For 
that very reason, therefore, to center the attention on 
mind in this way is not to engage in abstract specula-
tion, but to focus on the most concrete fact of all. 
"Mind is the most concrete entity we can discover,tt he 
observes, »for the discovery of an entity supposedly 
more concrete would revea l the discoverer as one stage 
more concrete still."2 The metaphysical quest returns 
again and again to the certitude of experience. 
In a very brief article written some fifteen 
years after the presentation of the above-named paper 
to the International Congress Hocking again offered 
certain ideas concerning the nature of mind , this time 
grounded in an analysis of the idea of plural spaces 
implied in the non-Euc lidean geometries. It may well 
be that this article foreshadows a new or modified line 
of development in his doctrine of human freedom, but in 
this form it embodies only 11 the pivots of an argument 
1. Ar t. (l92~1~~ , 214. 
1 2. Art.(l927) , 214. 
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which I expect to develop in more intelligible form.tt 1 
Entitled ttTheses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysics 
by a New Route 7 " it must be considered as one of his 
most important papers in metaphysics, even though it is 
scarcely two pages in length. 
In this article Hocking points out that "any 
event has an infinite possibility of relatedness ex-
pressed in the space-time field; but it is not in gen-
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eral necessary to the being of the event tha t all, or 
anyone of these possibilities of relation be realized." 2 
Now if none of these relations need be realized it is 
possible to have independent events, and if there be 
independent events, there can also be independent f ields. 
But how can independent fields 7 or event-systems 7 be re-
lated? Certainly not through any third event or field 1 
for this, in linking the others, would thereby negate 
their independence. Independent events and independent 
event-systems can be related only through the mind, or 
self, which serves as the unifying agent in this regard. 
In Hocking's words: 
1. Art.(l941)4 , 688. This more adequate formulation has 
s till not appeared, but portions of it are in MS . form. 
Incidentally, there is a rather general discussion of 
this same problem in TDL, 90-92, and £§:.SSim. 
2. Art.{l941} 4 , 688. 
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There is, however, one entity, and 
perhaps only one, by way of which 
all independent systems are indirect-
ly related. The self which con-
siders the independsnt systems ••• 
is the region of transition from one 
to the other. The self is the vin-
culum be tween various possible spa-
ces, possible nature-systems, pos-
sible histories. These alternative 
possibilities , whether developed or 
not, are infinitely many . '11he self 
may therefore be considered as a 
ufield11 in which the members are to- 1 tal fields: it is the field of fields. 
In bringing these independent events or systems togeth-
er the mind performs its distinctively cr eative func-
tion. This is another expression of the earlier-stated 
reference to the mind's ability to bring possibilities 
to actuality. 
The self at each moment stands be-
tween a n actual nature system and 
its continuation not yet actual. 
For this continuation, the self 
considers plural possibilities as 
independent events ••• and its 
practical intention is to set one 
of these into the same field with 
the actual nature sys t em.2 
The mind, Hocking makes clear, is not to be 
identified with any particular event or system, not 
even the "actual nature system." "The mind, as a vin-
culum between possible nature systems,n he writes, "can 
1. Art.(l941)4, 689. 
2. Art.(l941} 4 , 690. 
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not be a function of events within any one nature sys-
tem. tr Thus, mind must be a unique entity, different 
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from nature and the world of physical things, and in 
this fact Hocking sees his ttnew route" for establishing 
an idealistic metaphysics. He concludes: 
Naturalism is thus cancelled as a 
possible description of fact. 
Metaphysical idealism remains, 
inasmuch as the self is not mere-
ly a field of fields, but a con-
crete event determining the field 
of fielda.l 
This is what Hocking means by mind , a· unique 
entity, the most concrete of all, whose unique function 
it is to sit in judgment on the various facts of ex-
perience, bringing them together in a coherent way. 
Mindful of the earlier discussion of the place of rea-
son, it will be obvious that the n~king of intelligible 
connections among various ideas is the most adequate 
way of achieving the coherent synthesis. Mind is the 
property, indeed the distinctive characteristic , of all 
persons; Hocking uses the terms mi.nd and self synony-
mously. Each individual is a unique and particular mind, 
and all minds, individually and collectively, are a part 
of the supreme Other Mind which functions over all. It 
is necessary now to see what Hocking means by Other Min.d. 
Art.(l941)4, 690. 
NATURE OF METAPh~SICAL REALITY 
ii. The Concept of Other Mind . This concept 
has been cited repeatedly as the central concept of 
Hocking's metaphysics, despite the fact that Hocking 
frequently uses other names to designate ultimate re-
ality.l As a matter of fact, in hi s more recent writ-
ings he has preferred the word God, which more ade-
quately carries with it the idea of the natural feel-
ing-response or devotional attitude that man displays 
toward the fundamental reality. The term Other Mind 
was first used by Hocking in his Harvard Ph.D. disserta-
tion, but in his magnum opus which issued from that dis-
sertation, namely, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, 
Other Mind and God were used almost interchangeably. The 
term worl d-mind was widely used in Types of Philosophy, 
while .nearly all his later writings commonly employ the 
word God . Neither term is perfect; in fact, no single 
term or even sustained argument can adequately express 
the nature of reality. The term Other Mind is more ade-
quate for epistemological and metaphysical purposes; the 
term God serves better in considerations of religious 
and ethical characteristics. However, while the con-
1. The various shades of meaning attached to the sev-
eral designations of ultimate reality were discussed 
on pages 151-154 above. 
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cern here is primarily metaphysical, the term God will 
more frequently be used since it is this word which 
Hocking employs in most of the quotations and refer-
ences to be cited. 
Hocking sets.the stage for this discussion 
with an emphasis which has already been cited in an-
other context: 
God is known as that of which I 
am primarily certain; and being 
certain, am certain of self and 
of my world of men and men's ob-
jects. I shall always be more 
certain that God is, than what 
he is •• --.--.God then is immed-
iately known, and permanently 
known; as the Other Mind which 
in creating Nature is also cre-
ating me. Of this knowledge 
nothing can despoil us; this 
knowledge has never been want-
ing to the self-knowing mind 
of man.l 
This immediate knowledge that God or Other Mind exists, 
that it (or He) is, is the fundamental certainty of ex-
perience and the basis of all further knowledge. It is 
~concrete a priori knowledge," based not on abstract 
speculation but on all experience. This knowledge, in 
Hocking 's view, is thoroughly empirical. 
From this fundamental fact of experience the 
reasoning mind of man develops fur ther his knowledge of 
1. MGHE , 296, 297. 
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r.eality. Hocking puts it this way: 
What a man begins with in know-
ing God is truth. He adds to 
this, further truth and an ad-
mixture of error and earth. The 
elimination of this error by fur-
ther experience does at the s ame 
time develop the truth still far-
ther. The growth of the knowl-
edge of God is a gr.owth of pred-
icates.l 
The task of the present section is to deter-
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mine tho~predicates which Hocking attaches to his idea 
of fundamental reality, and taking the cue from the 
previous discussion of the concept of mind as an inte-
grating or synthesizing activity, it will be shown here 
that Other Mind serves to reconcile various relevant 
antitheses in a way typical of no other activity or en-
tity. Hocking counsels time and again that in the 
presence of a dilemma one need not settle for one side 
at the loss of the other, but r ather that one should 
choose both. It is here maintained that in choosing 
both a ntitheses one will arrive at a more adequate pre-
sentation of the fact to be explained, and while Hock-
ing himself does not employ this device in the extent 
that it is demonstrated here , it will not falsify his 
concept of God or Other Mind . 
1. MGHE, 321. 
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(1} God is many; God is one. Hocking calls 
this common antithesis of the one and the many in his 
thought about God 1'1a primary antithesis, but also a 
permanent one, 11 the peculiar importance of which lies 
in the fact t hat nevery other antithesis has some bear-
ing on this one.n1 While the development of religion 
has generally been a movement from many gods to a single 
deity, supreme and solitary, there is also always pres-
ent an opposite current of thought toward individual 
and local manifestations. This fact suggests flatly 
that the whole truth is not to be found on one side of 
the antithesis alone. 
Hocking's principal discussion of the unity 
of ultimate reality is found in a chapter entitled nThe 
Need of Unity," and the subtitle of that chapter, "Mon-
ism as Bearing upon Optimism," announces the fact that 
he bases this argument for unity, not on metaphysical 
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or epistemological grounds, but on ethical considera-
tions.2 However, the significance of this argument can-
not be appreciated apart from an understanding of the 
philosophical dispute prominent during the period. in 
1. IVlGHE, 324. 
2. MGHE, 166-182. 
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which this chapter was written. Idealism early in the 
present century was under severe attack by the prag-
matists and the realists who numbered William James 
among their most vigorous leaders. James had called 
for a world-view that provide adequate recognition of 
the perils and pluralities of existence, and claimed 
that the idealist, with his emphasis on unity and es-
sential goodness, was blind to the fact of error and 
frustration in human life. Idealism offered only a 
"block universe,'-• bound up with monism, rationalism, 
and optimism; such a view was, for James, "tender-
minded.n Accepting this challenge of being tender -
minded, Hocking attempts to set forth a view of ulti-
mate reality that will meet this attack, and his first 
move is to affirm the link between monism and optimism. 
ttNo optimism is possible without some kind of monism," 
he declares . 1 And further: 
Optlmism, I say, requires this 
degree of monism;--belief in an 
individual Reality not-ourselves 
which makes for rightness, and 
which actually accomplishes ri ght-2 ness when left to its own working. 
1 . MGHE, 167. 
2. MGHE, 177. 
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But Hocking denies vigorously that such a view need 
necessarily be tender-minded or guilty of offering t too 
little scope for freedom and adventure ••• or enough 
leeway for risk and radical disaster.wl The monism of 
ultimate reality which he would sponsor is one which 
nleaves a degree of pluralism in the universe," 2 and 
further, one where 11 the monism of t he world is such 
only as to give meaning to its pluralism."3 Admittedly, 
t hi s may not be a complete and unrrltigated monism, but 
at least it is a "concrete conscious monismu which 
stands firmly against the unchecked pluralism of the 
so-called empiricists. 
There are certain kinds of monism which HoclGng 
rejects as inadequate. The unity of ultimate reality 
is not a formal unity, one which is simply imposed by a 
mind from without on all the objects of its experience . 
Such a unity is too vague and indiscriminate. Nor can 
the unity of reality be established by attributing to 
it "Lifett or nPurpose, 11 and assigning everything to 
such a category. Finally, the unity of reality sug-
1. MGHE , 166,.• 
2. MGHE,. 179. 
3. MGF..E , 181. 
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gested by the sciences is inadequate~ partially because 
it fails to get beneath the surface of things. All 
these proposals for the unity of ultimate reality are 
spurious , because they fail to account adequately for 
the tensions of human living. In Hocking's view the 
recognition of "effort and resistance is the necessary 
beginning of any concretely significant monism." 1 Now 
although the arguments have not been here traced in 
full, it is apparent that Hocking criticizes these at-
tempts to unify reality on ethical grounds; his argu-
ment for oneness is inextricably bound up with an etth-
ical judgment. Thus~ not only is ultimate reality one, 
but it is also good. For Hocking it is necessary t'that 
the Real is the good, and not the evil: i.e., that evil 
is an essentially conquerable thing, not a reality co-
ordinate with the purpose that is against it . t~ 2 It is 
only consciousness , or mind, that is able to combine 
unity and goodness in such a unique way: the mind is 
one in the sense of being a process working towards an 
achievable goal; the mind is good in the sense of con-
taining within itself its own powers of t•self-rightingtt 
1. MGHE, 173 . 
2 . lVlGHE, 174· 
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or self -control (one might say, self-criticism} by 
which it can continue in the direction of that goal. 
The view that "Reality is akin to conscious-
nessn is an affirmation of the unity of ultimate real-
ity which at the same time provides for tta degree of 
1 pluralism in the uni ver•se . u For if mind is a unity-
in-process, it is a process made up of many discrete 
units or single (finite) minds with their own discon-
tinuities and distractions which are able to affect the 
whole of which they are a part. Some of these units 
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are of little account , and while they do affect the whole, 
they must ultimately fade away. There is both genuine 
creation and genuine extinction tn the effect of the 
parts on the whole , and thus there can be t•no scrupu-
lous monism in which every item is an equally valid 
sqme 2 member of the Whole, by quite;umaeasurable amount.u 
Hocking continues as follows: 
The only hope of finding the Real 
to· be one and good is in such 
sifting-right , in the circumstance 
that the universe is not utterly 
organic, and that we are not com-
pelled to absorb into our struc-
ture all the false scaffolding we 
have raised. Unless our monism 
1. MGF..E, 179. 
2. MGHE , 180 . 
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were thus saturated with plural-
ism and absolute death, we should 
have no power to move under the 
burden of our past.l 
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To say that "Reality is akin to conscious-
nessn therefore provides for both sides of the antithe -
sis of the many and the one. ThE over-arching oneness 
of ultimate reality is grounded in the all-embracing 
Abs olute, or Other Mind , while the discrete manyness 
of reality is manifest in the unmumbered individual 
minds. Realit~ for Hocking, encompasses both classes. 
(2} God is near; God is remote. This im-
portant antithesis is, of course, as Hocking acknowledges, 
one ltwhich has technical shape as that between the trani'!' ·-
scende.nce and immanence of God,n 2 and one which is con-
1. MGHE, 181. Werkmeister is incorrect when he summar-
izes Hocking's views at this point in saying, uBut the 
monism here demanded must not destroy human individual-
ity. An Absolute which crushes the human soul would be 
intolerable .aw (Werkmeister, HPIA, 298.) The fact is 
that human minds can be extinguished, together with the 
body, for Hocking believes in a ttconditional immortalityu 
whi ch is achieved by individual minds in the creative ex-
ercise of their personal freedom. Thus Hocking writes, 
~n any event, the quality of the human self, as I con-
ceive it, is not immortality, but immortability~ the con-
ditional possibility of survival." (TDL, 107 f.; Death 
is not inevitable, and neither is it universal. But the 
fact remains that for finite mindsi death gives meaning 
to life. Page 181 of MGHE seems c early to contradict 
Werkmeister's interpretation, and passages from other 
writings bear out t his contradiction. For a fuller ex-
posi.tion of Hocking's views on death see Thoughts on 
Death and Life, expecially pages 106-11~. 
2. MGHE, 326. 
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stantly in the forefront of theological speculation. 
As with the first antithesis 1 Hocking observes that it 
is closely related to other antitheses concerning the 
nature of reality 1 and also that here too "the direc-
tion of religious progress is not single 1 but twofold.nl 
Both sides of the antithesis must receive adequate 
recognition if the true nature of r eality ia to be ex-
posed. What there is 1 in fact, is an "immediate unity 
2 between the ineffable without and t he ineffable withi n," 
a unity which thought can discover and worship can enact. 
But the reconciliation between these opposites can come 
only through a prior recognition of the "ineffable with-
out" which thereupon bee omes the " i neffable within." In 
Hocking's words 1 "Only the transcendent God can be truly 
immanent. This is the report of experience.n3 
The immanence, or nearness 1 of ultimate reality 
has repeatedly been stressed in Hocking's claims for the 
immediacy of reality1 but at the same time reference is 
made to the sense of mystery at the core of all metaphysi-
cal experience. The sense of mystery is indeed an aware-
1. MGHEI 326. 
2. MGHEI 329. 
3. MGHE, 330. 
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ness of the transcendence, or remoteness, of that real-
ity from human knowledge. The nearness of reality af-
fords only a partial view of the whole, but nonetheless 
reality is manifest in the part as in the whole. The 
Other Mind that is the fundamental reality is known in 
part, intimately and thoroughly; as the whole of reality 
it is known ambiguously and vaguely, but still with the 
certitude of immediate experience. The nearness of that 
reality which is "akin to consciousness" is discovered 
in the individual self; the remoteness of that reality 
is its expression in other minds and in the wide ex-
panses of the universe. 
(3) God is moral; God is amoral. Hocking ob-
serves that "one of the most striking stages in the de-
velopment of religion is the epoch when religion adopts 
morals as its own province, and when the gods of religion 
take on ethical character.nl This would suggest that 
there were "pre-ethical stages of religion" in the time 
-. ..... 
when the gods were regarded as amoral. Hocking, however, 
does not accept this position, holding that from the 
first the very existence of God has been a matter of 
moral, or ethical, concern. Although there may have 
1. MGHE, 330. 
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been "pre-legalistic stages," "there is no moment at 
which God in his totality begins to be thought of as 
good, though there are great moments in religious de-
velopment when specific characters of God's goodness 
become clear, as of 'mercy' and 'loving-kindness' •• nl • 
For Hocking, therefore, the very fact of God's exist-
ence, which is a metaphysical assertion, is rele.vant to 
human morality. In his words: 
It is pertinent to call attention 
to the fact that the God who merely 
is, · as our Absolute Other, is by 
~t fact both promotive of our 
weal and of our morality ••• The 
mere presence of a companion Mind, 
standing outside the arena of hu-
man effort with its contrasts of 
good and evil, may be found, in ex-
istence, to transmute evil into 
good. • • .In finding God as simply 
existent we find him, I say, both 
good and righteous in his activity; 
and the condition for finding him 
is that he himself remain above the 
contrasts of good and evil.2 
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Ultimate reality, then, is beyond the definitions of good 
and evil, and by that very fact promotes h~an morality 
insofar as it is the object and fulfillment of human liv-
ing. "For what is the essential morality of man if not 
this, that he make himself universal, escaping in thought 
and act from his self-enclosedaess?"3 The morality of 
1~ MGHE,· 332. 3. MGHE, 331. 
2. MGHE, 331, 332. 
NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL REALITY 254 
God is founded on the relationship of finite selves to 
him. While the ultimate reality, taken as the Absolute 
by itself, may be amoral, seen in relations to individ-
ual minds it is thoroughly moral. Here again, both sides 
of the antithesis are recognized, and thought common and 
necessarily must move "from the moral to the amoral, as 
. 1 
well as in the reve1~se direction." Ultimate reality is 
·-
the only fact which can contain the two opposites in this 
way. 
(4) God is active; God is inactive. In Science 
and the Idea of God Hocking observes that "the dilemma for 
the modern mind in the idea of God" centers on the problem 
of divine activity. This dilemma is neatly stated as fol-
lows: 
(1) God must not intrude in the 
causal sequences which _concern 
the natural sciences. Neither 
the observer in the laboratory 
nor the maker of hypotheses must 
be called on to refer any effect 
to his activity. 
(2) God must act. It is a per-
suasion. _of our time amounting to 
a fundamental insight that what-
ever is real is active: if God 
were not active~ we co~ld not 
think him real.~ 
1. MGHE, 332. 
2. SIG, 22. On the necessitY. that reality be active see 
above pages 66, 71, and passlm. 
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The common way of resolving these antitheses is to take 
one side of the dilemma and defend it against all com-
plaint. Thus there are some who hold to the principle 
that reality is active, and assign that activity to a 
non-causal realm. Now even that realm, Hocking suggests, 
is under attack by modern psychology. The other alterna-
tive, perhaps even more common in this scientific age, 
is that of "getting along without God." But this alterna-
tive is not without difficulties, particularly insofar as 
it denies any adequate object "beyond and outside man 
which can serve as a focus for his affection.nl 
Hocking presses his resolution of this dilemma 
along the lines of the first alternative, but still he 
accommodates both sides of the antithesis by maintaining 
that God acts by purposely willing not to interfere in 
the causal realm of physical things. God or ultimate re-
ality, therefore, is "noncompeting." Hocking cites ori-
-
ental wisdom in this connection: 11Tao acts by nonasser-
tion."2 The noncompetitive activity of ultimate reality 
is seen clearly in the analogy of light which projects a 
1. SIG, 52. Hocking here defines God as "the real as 
an object of affection." (SIG, 48.} 
2. MGHE, 118. 
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a picture onto a screen. 
The activity of the figures and 
objects on the screen is causal. 
The light does not interfere 
with that action; it does not 
contend with any of the powers 
there active. It sustains the 
whole panorama of events. If 
it ceases there are no causes 
and no agents at all on the 
screen. They all depend on it, 
and it is not one of them.l 
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In the everyday activity of men sensation affords an im-
mediate example of the activity of ultimate reality, par-
ticipating in a non-causal dimension. Thus Hocking 
writes: 
For experience, sensation is re-
ceived; It is a datum in the ITt-
era! sense of somethin g given; it 
is there as a result of an activ-
ity from without. That activity 
is not causal, for causality plies 
between sense-objects. The pri-
mary and universal and incessant 
presentation of ~he stuff of be-
ing is an activity of God.2 
This is the manner in which Hocking resolves 
the dilemma concerning the activity of God in one of his 
most recent publications. God is active, but that ac-
tivity is not directly manifest in the space-time rea~. 
However, in a slightly but not essentially different way 
he approached the same problem in The Meaning of God in 
1. SIG, 118. 
2. SIG, 118. 
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Human Experience, and it may be seen that his treatment of 
this problem in that work is a bit more appropriate to 
this section. 
In his discussion of "The Need of an Absolute," 1 
Hocking considers the problem of the significance of the 
~bsolute, which principle was at that general time under 
serious attack, expecially by James and the pragmatists. 
Confronting the charge that the Absolute was useless for 
practical purposes, Hocking agrees that it must be more 
than a normal or abstract principle. "Must not Reality 
be a Real Force, a Real Mover, and no Eternal Fact of 
changeless order?" he asks. "Whether .for wobship, or for 
theory, or for common practice, we need to reach an ulti-
mate which is no ultimate indifference. 112 However, the 
Absolute as a principle of Changelessness (or in this 
discussion, of Inactivity) is still necessary as "the 
frame of change." "It is the presence of a Changeless 
Absolute that alone could set us wholly free to grow •• 
• we cannot dispense with a Changeless Ultimate."3 But to 
regard ultimate reality as changeless only is insuffi-
1. This is the title of Chapter XIV of MGHE. 
2. MGHE, 186, 
3. MGHE, 187, 188. 
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cient: "Our Ultimate Reality must have qualities of both 
changelessness and change.•1 Here again, in slightly 
different wording, is the dilemma of this section. Ulti-
mate reality is both changing (active) and changeless 
(inactive). How does Hocking solve the problem? 
The Absolute, that Changeless Ultimate, ac-
counts for the inactive aspect of fundamental reality, 
and the individual selves account for the active phase 
of reality. Setting up a kind of syllogism, Hocking sug-
gests that the Absolute as Changeless is the major prem-
ise, but because no conclusion can be drawn from a single 
premise, the minor premise is found in the self. Thus he 
says: 
The Absolute, whatever else it 
may be, is the quintessence of 
Eternal Fact. May it be that 
the minor premise which makes 
that object significant for ac-
tion is--the Self? ••• Besides 
the Absolute, my Self is neces~ 
sary to account for my motion. 
Now it is apparent that such a conjunction of Absolute and 
Self is possible only when they are of common stuff. again 
one returns to the frequent assertion that ultimate real-
ity is of the nature of mind; the Absolute and the individ-
1. MGHE, 188. 
2. MGHE, 189 f. 
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ual selves are obviously that reality which is "akin 
to consciousness." Mind and mind alone can be the com-
mon ground in this unique way, and what is actually 
described here is a "pair of Absolutes, or Absolute-
pair. • • which is well capable of producing practi-
cal differences. nl There is always present i•the Abso-
lute within in conjunction with the Absolute without.n2 
Both Absolutes are of the nature of mind, and mind can 
in such a way be considered both active and inactive at 
once. 
(5) Summary Statement. It has been shown that 
the unique activity of mind, whether absolute or finite, 
has been the bringing together of disparate elements of 
experience and the joining of apparently irreconcilable 
opposites or antitheses. In this consideration of "The 
Concept of Other Mind" various antitheses were selected~ 
of 
and in each case they were resolved by the concept/mind-
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activity. The several pairs of opposites considered above 
by no means exhausts the relevant antitheses which might 
be considered, and two further pairs at least deserve pass-
ing mention. First, the antithesis of the personality and 
1. MGHE, 203. 
2. MGHE, 202. Of. the statement, "the ineffable without 
and the ineffable within," page . .251 - . above. 
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impersonality of ultimate reality, which was briefly 
1 
considered in an earlier section, is of particular im-
portance, and Hocking in several instances points out 
that it is related to other antitheses which were men-
tioned above.2 Second, the antithesis of the complete-
ness and the incompleteness of ultimate reality is also 
especially relevant. The larger lines of ultimate reali-
ty are complete and final, but at the same time reality 
is unfinished in all its details. Rules of thought and 
the destiny of the ultimate victory of good over evil , 
at least that much is fixed and final. The working out 
of that destiny is the creative opportunity of individ-
ual minds. Ultimate reality is mind in the process of 
being "made up." However, more than the specific con-
sideration of certain pairs of opposites, the importan t 
thing to remember is that all these oppos i tes are inter-
rel~ted, and the ultimate reality i s of one fabric, a 
single, multi-colored fabric in which some of the hues 
may clash but all of which are a part of a common cloth. 
Ulti.mate reality is mind in all its unity and diversity, 
at once both the simplest and most complex entity in the 
1. See pages 214 .f. above. 
2. E.g., MGHE, 324, 326, 331. 
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universe. But what of the relation between Other Mind 
and the many finite minds of the :ws1verse? That criti-
cal problem will be considered in the next section. 
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iii. Other Mind and Finite Minds. Ultimate 
reality is constituted by Other Mind and the countless 
finite minds of individual selves, for if reality is 
"akin to consciousness" it obvious l y must include all 
consciousness, finite as well as infinite. Just how this 
can be so is made more clear by reference again to the 
several pairs of opposites discussed above. Can it not 
be said that in each case the first-named opposite refers 
primarily to individual minds, the second-named to the 
Other Mind or Infinite Knower? The manyness, the near-
ness, the moral qualities and activity, the vital person-
ality, and the incompleteness--all these characteristics 
of ultimate reality are most vividly expressed in the 
finite selves. But the vast oneness, the remoteness, the 
loftiness above the tensions of good and evil, the inac-
tivity or nonassertiveness, the mysterious impersonality, 
and the completeness--all these belong primarily to the 
Absolute~ But ultimate reality is one, that infinite 
mind which includes all. 
The following table may serve to summarize 
these characteristics and their primary locus: 
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Finite Minds Other Mind 
Many 
Near 
Moral 
Active 
Personal 
Unfinished 
One 
Remote 
Amoral 
Inactive (non-assertive) 
Impersonal 
Finished 
From a metaphysical point of view, Other Mind 
includes all finite minds but as i n any organic unity, 
it is more than the simple sum of its members. This 
metaphysical unity is described by Hocking in an exposi-
tion of the basic tenets of Absolute Idealism: 
The world-self is to us an 'ob-
ject,' other than ourselves. It 
is to me 'another self': ••• I 
must fall within its being as it 
does not fall within mine; it must 
have the whole extent of my other-
ness within itself. In the Real, 
subject and object must be united, 
both being contained in the abso-
lute unity. For the Absolute, we 
finite persons would constitute a 
society of minds with whom it 
could maintain quasi-social rela-
tionships; yet it would include 
that society.l 
From an epistemological point of view, Other 
Mind includes individual minds insofar as it has created 
them and with them comprehends common objects of knowl-
edge. This fundamental principle was first won during his 
graduate work under Royce at Harvard, and he speaks of it 
as follows: 
1. TP, 372. 
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It is impossible now to trace 
the sources of convictions that 
grew during this time, some of 
which have remained. On such, 
which came to me with the force 
of an intuition, was that the 
supposed isolation of minds is 
an illusion; that we share identi-
cal objects, and in so doing ac-
tually merge or coalesce in our 
being; that whatever me aning can 
be attached to the phrase, to be 
within tbe mind of another, is 
realized in the actual situation. 
For Nature is veritabl y a common 
object; there is but one Nature--
not one for each person; and while 
for every self or communicating 
minds perspectives and qualities 
differ, space itself i s identical, 
and continuously identical.l 
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From an ethical point of view, Other Mind in-
eludes all individual minds insofar as it is the ulti-
mate goal of all things and to them gives meaning and 
purpose. Ultimate reality is Other Mind., all that is, 
all that knows, and all that strives to know the good 
and to do it. Created by that Other Mind and partially 
set apart from it, as in a kind of subject-obGect rela-
tionship, individual minds constant ly seek to become 
more and more a part of the Wbole. As previously cited 
above, nFor what is the essential morality of man if not 
this, that he make himself universal, escaping in 
\ 2 
thought and act from his self-enclosednessf" Here is 
Hocking's basic ethical maxim--So know and will and do 
1. Art.(l930)l, 391 f. 2. MGHE, 331 . 
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that which will enable you more and more to become one 
with that which is. Or in Hocking's words: 
And finally: 
Universalize thyself; that is, Con-
sider thyself a unique being, hav-
ing a view of reality granted to 
no other, which it is thy destiny 
to express: express this latent 
idea, make thy private feeling or 
intuition of the world the uni -
versal sense; incorporate it in 
action; build it into the ongoing 
common life.l 
The life of each individual is at 
first a summary and unsharable 
intuition of reality: it becomes 
his business to find out what 
that intuition means, and then to 
convey or e.:xpress so much of it 
as he can . This is at once his 
duty and his happiness .2 · 
The conclusions of these three approaches to 
the problem of the relationship between Other Mind and 
finite minds is substantially the same: the finite mind 
is a part of the Absolute . The ethical insight rein-
forces this position in the asser t ion that it is at 
once the task and the 4nique opportunity of finitude 
to partake more and more of infin:tty. Ultimate reality, 
then, is of the nature of consciousness: the reality 
1. TP, 335. 
2. TP, 493. 
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of the multitude of finite minds is both a present fact 
and an eternal hope. 
CHAPTER V 
An Evaluation of Hocking's Metaphysics 
The three central chapters of this disserta-
tion have been directed almost entirely to an exposition 
of the main linea of Hocking's metaphysical position, 
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and to such incidental interpretation · of that position 
as seemed necessary for clarity and organization. No 
serious attempt has yet been made to criticize and eval-
uate his principal conclusions. That effort has been re-
served for this concluding chapter, for it seemed the 
wiser course to state in a more or less comprehensive 
manner the general outlines of his metaphysical theory 
before attempting the critical enterprise. This brings 
to mind two general comments on this procedure. 
First, this writer, as well as the reader, can-
not help but be aware of large areas of Hocking's general 
metaphysical thought which have not received adequate 
treatment in the foregoing exposition. The most obvious 
omission, perhaps, is in regard to the place of value in 
his metaphysical schema, for it is plain that one of 
EVALUATION 
Hocking's most telling arguments for the existence and 
nature of Other Mind as the basic metaphysical reality 
is grounded heavily in the nature of personal experience, 
and particularly in the fact that man is a val11ing crea-
ture, one who seeks and must find meaning or significance 
in his existence. In his quest for meaning man almost 
instinctively reaches out beyond hi mself to associate his 
own being with that which is the source of all being, and 
with that, of all meaning. Ultimat e reality is a source 
of value; indeed, it is the source of value. It alone is 
intrinsically valuable, and man shares in that intrinsic 
value in direct proportion to the extent to which he be-
comes a part of that ultimate reality. This axiological 
aspect of Hocking's metaphysics receives considerable 
attention in The Meaning of G~d in Human Experience, par-
ticularly in two of the appended articles, and in several 
more recent essays. Above all, however, it forms the 
basic structure of his Thoughts on Death and Life, pub-
lished in 1937. 
Another noticeable omission is a more exten-
sive treatment of Hocking's view of the human self. 
This, as has already b~en ·~ noted,was the subject of a 
dissertat ion by Dr. N. Bond Fleming written a little more 
than a decade ago, but that work was primarily oriented 
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to the psychological nature o~ sel~hood and in the re-
lationship between the sel~ and the body. Vfuat is still 
needed in this area is a more adequate treatment o~ the 
individual self in its relation to, and as a part o~, 
ultimate metaphysical reality--what Hocking might call 
the "cosmic significance o~ selfhood." The fact that 
Hocking's view o~ the sel~ has been developed further 
since the appearance o~ Fleming's dissertation ,. ·a.1~o. ,-":' 
calls ~or more attention to this problem. 
The second comment to be raised in this intro-
duction to an evaluation o~ Hocking's metaphysics is 
that any ~air-minded and e~~ective criticism o~ his 
thought must be predicated on an understanding o~ its to-
tality and its interrelatedness. Hocking's metaphysical 
system is something like the Absolute or Other Mind o~ 
which he speaks so freely and ~ully. It is vast in ex-
tent, and organic in structure. It lends itself readily 
to an embarrassing variety of interpretations; this is a 
source at once o~ strength and o~ weakness. But Hocking 
would say that li~e, or reality, is like that, and li~e 
is thought. At base it is ~ar too complex to be precise-
ly packaged in the neat little categories o~ ~inite under-
standing. There is always an element o~ mystery to the 
cosmos, the mystery which calls ~orth the human quest ~or 
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truth and which at the same time precludes the possibility 
of achieving final truth. This is not to say that Hock-
ing's thought is beyond criticism, that all error or inad-
equacy can be charged to this "sense of mystery." It is, 
however, to warn against premature judgments which fail 
to acknowledge the length and breadth of his position. 
It is often the first step in any evaluation 
and criticism of a philosophical system or thinker to af-
fix one or more of the traditional labels to the thought, 
thus outlining a kind of target to shoot at. It should 
be evident, however, that with Hocking's thought this 
procedure is extremely difficult; it resists containment. 
Of course, there is no question that he should be classi-
fled among the idealists in metaphysics, but it has been 
shown that he gives extraordinary prominence to the facts 
of Nature. In his epistemology also there are both 
monistic and dualistic elements. To place his thought in 
one category usually tends to reduce the significance of 
~ 
the other. Confronted by such a dilemma, Hocking in-
variably counsels the choice of both in a kind of alter-
nation, and that seems to be necessary and desirable here. 
For both in metaphysics and epistemology Hocking is al-
ternately monistic and dualistic within the three-fold 
conception of reality as Other Mind, the i ndividual self 
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as it becomes a part of Other Mind, and the space-time 
world of Nature as it functions as the body of Other 
Mind. Thus, as suggested in the concluding section of 
1 
an earlier chapter, Hocking's epistemology is monistic 
in its emphasis on the identity of the ontological, or 
2'70 
whole-idea with the experience and reality of Glther Mind, 
and it is dualistic in its constant effort to make clear 
that one's ideas of the 11 facts" of experience (i.e., 
chairs, tables, red books, and the like) neither create 
nor constitute the reality of those objects which, to a 
certain extent, are independent of finite, knowing minds. 
Hocking's metaphysics is monistic in the sense that the 
reality of the finite self can and does become an inte-
gral part of the ultimate reality which is Other Mind. 
The reality of the self is of the same "stuff" as the 
ultimate; both are "akin to consciousness." His meta-
physics is dualistic in two senses: in the present fact 
of distinction between finite minds and Other Mind in a 
subject-object relationship, and in the fundamental dis-
tinction between the mind and Nature, which is evident 
on the level of finite selfhood and on the all-inclusive 
level of the cosmic consciousness. This last-named du-
alism will come in for further attention in a later sec-
1. 1. See . p.l66 .·above. 
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tlob of this chapter. 
In his elementary textbook in philosophy Hock-
ing characterizes the various "types" of philosophy, and 
in the closing chapter, which is entitled "Confessio 
Fidel," he summarized his own distinctive "type" as both 
idealistic and realistic.l His metaphysics he prefers to 
call "objective idealism;'' in epistemology he is a "mysti-
cal realist." Mindful of all the ambiguities of labels, 
he would characterize his own position in that fashion. 
In this concluding chapter Hocking's general 
met~physical thought will be evaluated by marking what 
seem to this writer to be the points of greatest strength 
and the points of greatest weakness. First the points of 
strength. 
1. Points of Strength. 
It would not be 'difficult to set forth six or 
eight different strong points in Hocking's metaphysics 
because of the catholicity and wide range of his thought-
which itself is a point of strength. For greater empha-
sis, however, attention will be here confined to two, 
each related to the other. 
i. The Definition of Idea. It has often been 
repeated that the central idea of Hocking's metaphysics 
is the concept of Other :Mind, which for him is ultimate 
1. TP, 494-508. 
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reality. But the concept of Other Mind is both sterile 
and helpless without a philosophy of idea, for idea is 
essential to mind from a metaphysical as well as an 
epistemological point of view. Hocking's philosophy of 
idea has been developed at some length in Chapter III 
above, and it is not necessary to restate it here. What 
can be pointed out, however, is the relationship between 
idea and experience. 
Hocking is emphatic in his insistence that an 
idea is not something one thinks of, but rather, that it 
is something one thinks with. Ideas are inseparable 
from the thinking process; they are the tools of thought. 
And when Hocking's concept of idea is seen in its widest 
view (i.e., in its ultimate connection with feeling), it 
is obvious that idea is the Urgrund of all experience. 
Thus , for him idea and experience are one. And when one 
is thinking with his whole-idea, idea and experience are 
irrevocably joined with the ultimate reality, whereas 
the thoughts of physical objects in the space-time con-
tinuum, while still constituting tl~ experience of those 
objects, are not so joined or identical with that which 
is exterior to self. However, insofar as one must con-
stantly be thinking with his whole-idea, even in the ex-
perience of physical objects, the monistic element in 
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both metaphysics and epistemology is always present. 
This is Hocking's monism in the broadest sense. 
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In his philosophy of idea Hocking runs close 
to the pragmatists in their conception of idea as "a 
plan of action," for if one thinks with ideas, and ideas 
are so closely linked to action, it is not in error in 
Hocking's view to say that one acts with, or on the basis 
of, his ideas. Ideas, therefore, are the most important 
ingredient of all overt action. This does not mean, how-
ever, that Hocking accepts the pragmatic doctrine of 
truth. Far from it, he specifically repudiates it for 
its inadequacies, although he does admit to a kind of 
"negative pragmatism" in his own view wherein he holds 
that "That which does not work is not true."l Speaking 
of pragmatism and the criterion of truth he remarks, 
"The positive argument is unsafe; the negative argument 
is safe, for it does not pretend to usurp constructive 
functions; it merely warns that we must think again." 2 
Hocking's pragmatism does not actually furnish a cri-
terion of truth, although it does partially provide a 
criterion of error. Not withstanding this, however, it 
1. MGHE, xiii. See pp. xiii-xv. 
2. SIG, vii. 
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~ust be admitted that in his writings Hocking does not 
make abundant use of his "negative pragmatism;" it is 
hardly a principle which he uses extensively in the de-
velopment of his system. The positive side of the tests 
of truth, namely, the evidence of consistency and co-
herence in any idea-system, is for him the point of at-
tention. 
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All human knowledge begins with the funda-
mental fact of existence, the idea-experience of an Other 
set over against the self. The knowledge that there is 
an Other is, for Hocking, the basic truth on which all 
further truth is predicated. Ernor, it is admitted, also 
clusters around this basic truth, but experience is such 
as to provide within itself the means for eliminating 
error. The principal means of correction is based on the 
fact that one's ideas refer beyond themselves and par-
tially at least beyond the thinking self to find. an ob-
jective independence in Nature and/or Other Mind. Sensa-
tion can correct ideas by furnishing further sensory evi-
dence to controvert a prior impression, as for example a 
second, closer look will reveal that what was thought to 
be a cow on the far side of the meadow is "in reality" 
only an outcropping of rocks close to the trees. Logic, 
the laws of correct thinking, also corrects ideas in a 
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way that demonstrates the essential order of Other Mind. 
As a matter of fact, sensation and logic are intimately 
bound up together in the very nature of reality, not be-
cause logic controls Nature, but ftbecause logic !! Na-
ture, in the only form in which Nature can now be ap-
proached by human consciousness." 1 Ultimately what is 
being said here is that one's ideas are corrected by the 
same reality ~hich called them forth; only the objectiv-
ity or independence of idea-referents can guarantee their 
truth. 
Thus, from the point of view of ideas, human 
life begins in the one fundamental intuitive truth that 
there is a not-myself, and continues, possibly infinite-
ly, to add to that truth further truth and also, inev-
itably, an admixture of error. And furthe~ from the 
point of view of ideas, human life consists in constant 
experimentation and elimination whereby additional truth 
is supplied and error is cast away. This experimentation 
is the essential activity of the mind itself, and as it 
gains new truth it becomes more and more a part of the 
whole truth, which is Other Mind. The independence of 
Nature and Other Mind, which makes possible experiment 
1. MGHE, 573. What Hocking means here in identifying log-
ic and Nature is that logic, in the sense of a rationally 
intelligible order, is an essential characteristic of the 
physical world. 
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and the test for truth~ is at once the beginning and the 
end of idea. 
Seen in this way~ with idea at the very core 
of existence human life is essentially a dialectical 
process in the continuing quest for absolute truth~ or 
Other Mind. It has been shown above that the fact of 
their independence furnishes ideas with the power of self-
correction; Hocking in one passage defines dialectic as 
"the process of self-correction of erroneous ideas in liv-
ing minds.n1 Dialectic is also called an "experience of 
cognitive ~estlessness,"2 and indeed that is exactly 
what human life amounts to-constant curiosity which im-
pels the quest for further truth. It is !!.a progressive 
thinking process"3 which becomes more and more inclusive~ 
and thus more adequate, as it advances. The advance, in 
Hocking's view~ is not made along the lines of the Hegel-
ian triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, but more 
as a constant alternation between the alleged certainties 
of mystical insight and the idea-connecting achievements 
of rational reflection. The ultimate test of truth is 
1. SIG, viii. 
2. MGHE, 309. 
3. TP, 490. 
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not the "accuracy", or absolute certainties of the mys-
tic, but the adequacies of a rational system of ideas. 
This is the dogma of both metaphysics and epistemology 
that short of absolute truth which is the exclusive 
province of Other Mind, finite knowledge is a more or 
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less correct representation of reality as it "really" is. 
Beginning as a small, but nonetheless essential part of 
reality in the initial awareness of Other Mind, human 
knowledge and with it human life advances dialectically 
to seek its ultimate fulfillment in that reality with 
which it increasingly becomes identified and eventually 
perhaps, identical. From metaphysical pluralism and 
epistemological dualism, the dialectic wends its inex-
orable way to the monism of Absolute Idealism. It is a 
movement from ideas to Idea; around his philosophy of 
idea, then, Hocking's whole system of thought can b e ori-
ented. Such a philosophy of idea, it is maintained, is a 
source of great strength in Hocking's general metaphysical 
thought. Indeed, it is the very substance of his metaphys-
ics, and from that the clue to his epistemology and his 
ethics. 
However, taken by themselves, the foregoing 
arguments draw too intellectualistic a picture of human 
life. Minding the maxim that Hocking's thought can be 
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seriously misrepresented by too excessive compartmental-
ization, it is necessary to move to what is here held to 
be the second strong point of his thought, specifically, 
the concept of the idea-feeling couple. 
ii. The Idea-feeling Couple. Hocking 's theory 
of the intimate association of ideas with feelings in 
human experience, which he designates by the phrase idea-
feeling couple, has already been discussed at consider-
able length, and need not be further described here save 
to remark that it stands forth as one of his most sig-
nificant contributions to metaphysics and epistemology. 
It functions adequately to remove the taint of exces-
sive intellectualism from his view of the mental life. 
In his assignment of an integral place to 
feeling in cognitive experience and in his description 
of this experience as essentially dialectical, as artic-
ulated in the preceding section, Hocking is seen to be 
forthri ghtly empirical, not in the sense-bound manner 
of contemporary logical positivism, but in the wider 
sense, as with Brightman, giving reason a prominent 
role as the guide and arbiter of confusing sense data 
and emotions. If one can be permitted to resort to la-
bels in this connection, despite the earlier caveat, 
Hocking may be designated as an "empirical rationalist" 
or contrarily, a "rational empiricist." Even in his em-
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phasis on mysticism, which in one way might be called 
the height of intellectualism, feeling cannot be totally 
banished from experience, for the mystical experience is 
but one pole of the total experience of man, as human 
life is seen to be a pursuit of truth in the alternation 
of work and worship. 
However, apart from the highly specialized 
achievements of the prominent mystics wherein the feel-
ing element is nonetheless present, one might ask wheth-
er this element is also present in the cognition of 
highly abstract mathematical symobls 1 such as H , or 
in the statement of basic laws of logic, as in A = A. 
The reply here is the same: the element of feeling def-
initely is present as they are conceived in their wider 
sense or application. And Hocking would firmly assert 
that to regard them truthfully, that is, adequately, they 
must be seen as integral to a wider system of which they 
are parts. Thus, taken by itself and seen abstractly, it 
may be difficult if not impossible to discover the core 
of feeling in the concept of ~. But as part of a sys-
tem it becomes, as it were, a plan of action, something 
to be used, and all action, from the execution of a high-
ly "artificial" problem in mathematics to the giving of 
one's life in a noble cause, is accompanied by feeling. 
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Indeed, feeling is its motive force. 
Perhaps the obvious point should be made here 
that human life is compounded of various levels of feel-
ing. Certain human activities demonstrate a low feel-
ing in~ensity; others are highly, even excessively, emo-
tional. And this intensity, of course, further varies 
with individuals performing similar activities. So it is 
with ideas in their relationship to feeling. Certain 
ideas _ possess low feeling intensity; others, expressed 
in what the semanticists call "bias words," are just the 
opposite. A_nd whereas a mathematician may be highly ex-
cited by a system of negative numbers and be unmoved by 
a piece of lyric poetry, an aesthete would reac.t :in a 
diametrically opposite manner. In any case, feeling can-
not be severed from idea. Hocking does well to emphasize 
this inescapable connection, and further, to articulate 
its details and conditions. 
So much for what are here held to be two strong 
points in Hocking's general metaphysical thoL~ht. Now 
for a consideration of certain weak points. 
2. Points of Weakness. 
This evaluation of what appear to be weaknesses 
in Hocking's general metaphysical thought will be predi-
cated on the view of his system as a whole. Admittedly, 
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if one approaches Hocking's position with certain closely 
defined presuppositions or b:tases , it is possible to fer-
ret out the most diverse views which may seem to stand as 
weaknesses, but it is here reaffirmed that Hocking's 
thought must be viewed in its totality to do justice to 
both its author and to truth itself. Attempting to ap-
proach Hocking's whole thought as fairly as possible, two 
particular points of weakness present themselves for com-
ment. 
i. The Tendency toward Metaphysical Dualism. 
It is perhaps not unnatural that in his effort to give ad-
equate recognition to the ever-present empirical fact of 
the physical world and at the same time to assert his firm 
belief in the logical and ethical (and also aesthetic) 
priority of non-physical reality, Hocking at times seems 
to offer, not a metaphysical idealism but a dualism in 
which both the mental and the physical lay effective 
claim to the title of ultimate reality. The relationship 
between Other Mind and Nature in Hocking's thought was 
discussed in full in the preceding chapter, and the aware-
ness of tendencies toward dualism, or a certain ambiguity 
at the very least, is difficult to dispel. Hocking's 
leanings to a metaphysical dualism are exhibited particu-
larly in his criticisms of Whitehead , and although they 
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were mentioned briefly in Chapter IV they deserve fuller 
attention at this point. 
Through their close association for about fif-
teen years while teaching together in the Department of 
Philosophy at Harvard, Hocking came to have warm respect 
for the views of Alfred North Whitehead, and his appre-
ciation of Whitehead is concisely expressed at the close 
of his essay on "Wfu.i tehead on Mind and Nature" in the 
Schllpp volume where he refers to his "renewed gratitude 
for the content and spirit of Whitehead's knightly ad-
ventures of ideas," and then concludes: "From no man have 
I received so wide a sense of the dignity of the human 
calling to think the world; from no man have I learned so 
much." 1 As already noted, Hocking admires particularly 
Whitehead's unique exposition of the interdependence of 
metaphysics and value-theory, or better, of the insepar-
able connection between metaphysical reality and values. 
"The strength of Whitehead.'·s view," says Hocking, "is to 
show that this goal-quality pervading everything may ~-
exist with the causal scheme: wherever there is conscious-
ness, there purpose rides along with the causal flood, and 
the movement of events becomes a 'creative advance.'"2 
2 1. Art.(l941) , 404. 
2. SIG, 109. 
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In Whitehead, then, Hocking sees one who, like himselr, 
strives to preserve the authority of values in the facts 
of nature, and one whose singular merit lies in the fact 
that in his metaphysics or "creativity" he has set rorth 
"an hypothesis ••• which other scientists cannot re-
ject."1 
However, despite the vast adequacy of Whitehead's 
metaphysics on purely intellectual and scientific grounds, 
Hocking sees a certain deficiency in its appeal to the hu-
man mind, or perhaps more accurately, in its appeal to the 
heart which is the original seat of feeli ng. As a theoret-
ical description it is superior, but as a practical ex-
planation it is weak. Thus Hocking writes, "It is still 
a description of something other than and distant from 
ourselves. The very sweep and majesty of its world-view 
lirts its object away from the immediacy of our living 
and our problems. 2 At one and the same time the great 
merit of Whitehead's system is also a disadvantage in that 
its "immensities and infinitudes" deprive the universe of 
its ttdomesticity11 without which it remains "hollow at 
heart. n3 What is here sorely needed, Hocking thinks, is 
"a cure for the illusion of vastness," and this cure he 
1. SIG, 110. 3. SIG, 111. 
2. SIG, 110 f. 
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proposes to find i n the experience of the mys t ics who 
feel and know the wideness of the universe in the certi-
tude of an immediate presence. Man may view his world 
with rightful awe and wonder, but he must also be able 
to feel a sense of intimacy with the whole of things, 
"We can have no confirmations of that of which we are in 
sear ch," he writes, "until the mystic's directness, im-
mediacy, and assurance can be recovered in the common 
exper ience of men with the facts of nature. 111 A mysti-
cism of the common life, then, must become available as 
a necessary supplement to the cosmographies of modern 
metaphysics. 
Now apart from the fact that it may well be 
that in this comment Hocking has over-impersonalized 
Whitehead's metaphysics by failing to give due recogni-
tion to the function of prehensions as the core of cog -
nitive life, it might be said that to a certain measure 
Hocking's own philosophy is vulnerable to the same crit-
icism. For to designate ultimate realit y as the Abso-
lute or as Other Mind and to dwell at considerable length 
on the arduous via ne~a~ive of the mystic as the consum-
mate path to the undefiled experience of that reality is 
also to dwell in "immensities and infinitudes" which 
1. SIG~ 112. 
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1 largely lie beyond the pale of ordinary achievement. 
True, this is but one side of Hocking's emphasis, but it 
is nonetheless an important one, and one which bespeaks 
more of intellectualism and impersonality than creative 
selfhood and co-operative love. As Hocking avers in ~ 
Meanins of God in Human Experience, the problem of the 
religious availability of the Absolute is indeed a crit-
ical problem for metaphysics and the philosophy of re-
2 ligion. However, that is only a side issue in this con-
sideration of tendencies toward dualism in Hocking's 
thought, and to the discussion of the major problem it is 
now necessary to return. 
1. It is true that the phrase "immensities and infini-
tudes" is here applied to Hocking's thought in a slight-
ly different sense from that in which it is applicable 
to Whitehead's position. For when Hocking speaks of 
"immensities and infinitudes" in Whitehead he seems to 
refer primarily to the fact that the vastness of the 
universe in detail and spatial extension reduces man to 
an almost infiritiBsimal speck in a manner which transcends 
human imagination and experience. Hocking attempts to 
overcome this vastness by stressing the immediate certi-
tude of the mystical experience, but the way of the mys-
tic also belies its own "immensities and infinitudes" 
which in turn must be overcome. In Whitehead it is a 
spatial infinitude; in Hocking the infinitude is in 
method. 
2. Chapter XIV of MGHE discusses this problem under the 
title, "The Need of the A.bsolutle: Reflections on its 
Practical Worth." 
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The brief statement of Hocking's criticism 
of Whitehead in the preceding chapter emphasized two 
points, both of which bring out Hocking's tendencies 
toward metaphysical dualism. 1 First, his contention 
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that vVhitehead fails to provide adequately for the ·~oose­
ness," obduracy, waste, and '·'.relative independence" in 
the universe by calling the whole an organism. "Signif-
icant togetherness" there is, but one must guard against 
pushing it too far. Second, Hocking' maintains that vVhite-
head actually attributes too much mentality or spirit-
uality to the universe in the doctrine of actual occa-
sions which postulates both a mental and a physical pole 
to every object or event of the organic whole. Although 
it is probably true that Hocking's polemic here is di-
rected primarily against the suggestion of panpsychism, 
it nonetheless demonstrates that he wants due recogni-
tion given to the purely physical and inanimate in human 
experience. In the Whiteheadian view that all is organism 
in process Hocking maintains that there is fundamental 
error in blurring over the distinction between the organic 
and the inorganic. The inorganic, the distinctly inani-
mate, does have a certain value or function in serving 
as a steady and dependable environment for purpose in 
1. See pp. 217-20 above. 
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which the organic must work its way. Thus, Hocking seeks 
to main t ain the distinction between the organic and the 
inorganic, and sees the physical universe as "an arena 
for life and purpose" in which the manifold experiences 
of conscious subjects have their play. 1 It is "the val-
id message of \_Whitehead'~ philosophy" that he dis-
covers in the physical universe such an abundance of 
qualitative meaning, but at the same time it is in Hock-
ing's view an error to conceive of the entire cosmos in 
mental terms. "The weakness of his view," Hocking as-
serts, 11 is his attempt to make everything at once goal 
and seeker, to conceive all 'actual entitles' on the men-
tal pattern, and thus to ruin his noble picture o~ the 
ingressive goal-qualities which lure and guide the striv-
ing of a relatively few foci of purpose."2 
Of course, one can reply to Hocking and say that 
his view of physical nature as "the body of God" also con-
ceives of the entire cosmos in mental terms, but Hocking 
would probably quickly point out that its "mentality" so-
called is a derivative or incidental fact of its objectiv-
ity. His characterization of the world in this sense as 
mental is based on the prior fact of the reality of Other 
1. SIG, 108. 
2. SIG, 109. 
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Mind. Further, one might say that Hocking's doctrine 
of finite selves as discrete units of Other Mind is sim-
ilar in kind to Whitehead's idea of the mental poles of 
actual occasions. However, while similar in kind Hock-
ing does not attribute mentality to every item of the 
cosmos, and that is what Whitehead seems to do in his 
"hypothesis of pervasive animation," as Hocking calls 
the doctrine of actual occasions. Again it appears true 
that what Hocking is really objecting to is panpsychism 
as an adequate account of the physical universe. 
Hocking also attacks the concept of actual oc-
casions on epistemological grounds. Presumably the oc-
casions are able to prehend directly and without media-
tion the qualities of nature as they are "there," but 
the fact is that they are perceived as qualities and not 
as qualities-as-enjoyed. Thus, they are not perceived 
"as they are" (i.e., as enjoyed}, and "the scandal of 
bifurcation" creeps onto the scene. Hocking carefully 
points out that: 
Bifurcation arises solely from the 
view that perception results from 
conditions which are nonperceptual, 
whether this view takes the form of 
a transmiss i ve theory in which (as 
for Galileo) the activity emanates 
from the object, or the form of a 
prehensive theory in which the ac-
tivity emanates from the subject. 
And further: 
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For in either case, nature as per-
ceived cannot be identical with na-
ture as the totality of the con-
dition of perception. 
For while we perceive the qualities, 
presumed there, we do not perceive 
those external occasions which are 
(or were) entertaining them. If we 
only perceive the qualities and not 
the qualities-as-enjoyed, we are 
not , according to the theory, · per-
ceiving them as they are;--the ap-
pearance lifts away from the real-
ity.l 
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On this basis Hocking is forced to conclude that 11 if then 
the theory of occasions cannot save the world of nature 
from that double aspect called bifurcation, it becomes 
a live question whether it can hold its own as a theory. 112 
He goes on to pronounce it unnecessary--"wlthout it we 
have a simpler situation"--for in truth it is "a pi ece-
meal duplication which complicates Whitehead's picture 
and yet does not save the principle of objectivity.n3 
Now it is extremely unfortunate that in this 
essay on Whitehead, Hocking does not make clear just what 
he means by bifurcation, particularly in connection with 
the epistemological problem. The foregoing passages and 
comments seem to indicate that Hocking actually wants a 
1. Art.(l941)2, 397. 
2. Art.(l941)2, 397. 
3. Art.(l941) 2 , 398. 
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metaphysical bifurcation, which Whitehead refuses to ac-
knowledge, and that he revolts against an epistemologi-
cal bifurcation, or dualism, which Whitehead maintains 
to be necessary. Such an interpretation would certainly 
be in keeping with Hocking's metaphysics and ~pistemol­
ogy as a whole, as they are here presented, and in terms 
of which it should be evaluated. 
Perhaps what it comes down to is this: that as 
the ultimate reality Other Mind includes the physical 
universe as part of its Self, even as in Hocking's view 
the individual self in its totality incl~des the body 
which is the visible expression, the "exact metaphor" of 
its conscious strivings. To say that Nature is the body 
of Other :Mind is to give adequate recognition to the dis-
tinctiveness of the inanimate and at the same time to 
maintain the authority of consciousness as ultimate meta-
physical reality . There are two factors in the whole, 
Nature and Other Mind, physical body and consciousness, 
but from beginning to end it is always Other Mind which 
stands superior and independent. And thus~ even as 
Fleming has criticized Hocking's doctrine of the human 
self on substantially these same grounds, 1 so also can 
this tendency toward dualism be accounted a weakness in 
1. Fleming, DISS, 241-242. 
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his general me t~physical thought. For on Hocking's own 
grounds dualism is inadequate. In his words, "Dualism 
is everywhere recognized as a preliminary and unfinished 
world-view. It gives us a rough approximation to truth. 
But it always points beyond itself to a unity which is 
1 deeper and more difficult to grasp . " Dualism must be 
overcome in a higher monism, and the dualistic tendencies 
here represented in Hocking's thought must more thorough-
ly be subordinated to the pervasive presence of Other 
Mind which alone can be accounted ultimately real. 
This, then, is a general statement of what is 
held to be a major point of weakness in Hocking's meta-
physical thought. In order to reinforce this contention 
it will be well to cite briefly two more specific points, 
which are subsidiary to this tendency toward metaphysical 
dua l ism . 
(1) The Attempts to Overcome Dualism. It has 
been said that the root cause of the dualistic elements 
of Hocking ' s metaphysics in his continuing effort to main-
tain the distinction between the organic and the inorgan-
ic, the mind and the body, in the universe as a whole and 
in the human self in particular . A large section of the 
previous chapter was devoted to outlining the relation-
1 . PTP ., 454 . 
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ship between Nature and Other Mind, and Fleming's dis-
sertation on Hocking's Philoso2h1 of the Human Self con-
siders the same problem in the context of human experi-
ence. The difficulty is fundamentally the same in both 
cases. While attempting, on the one hand, to maintain 
the distinction between body and mind, Hocking seeks, on 
the other, to relate them in ways which are here regarded 
as highly questionable. In other words, Hocking 's own 
efforts to overcome this metaphysical dualism cannot be 
regarded as successful. 
In his assertion that Nature is the "exact meta-
phor" of Other Mind Hocking goes so far as to maintain 
that every single fact or experience of consciousness is 
paralleled by a corresponding fact in the physical body. 
"To every shade of thought and motive," he writes, "there 
corresponds some change in the body, reflecting in its 
own different sphere each type of variation to which the 
inner state is subject. 11 2 Now what seems evident here is 
that there are actually two spheres of activity, the men-
tal and the physical, which are brought together in some 
kind of mysterious psycho-physical parallelism. But such 
a doctrine of parallelism can overcome a metaphysical dual-
1. See pp.231-5 above. 
2. MGHE, 262. 
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ism only by positing some kind of double aspect theory 
in which mind and body are held to be different facets 
of a tertium quid, and this in turn is seen to raise 
more difficulties than it resolves. For the nature of 
this third factor and the details of its relationship to 
mind and body still demand explanation, and in Hocking's 
view at least this possibility is left wholly unexplained. 
In sum, a doctrine of parallelism does not, and cannot, 
overcome the metaphysical dualism; the different spheres 
of activity, and thus of reality, still persist. As a 
matter of fact, it is better said that parallelism pre-
serves, rather than overcomes, a metaphysical dualism. 
However, the principal attempt to transcend 
dualism is made along the lines of the argument that the 
self actually includes its body. Hocking maintains that 
Natur·e is the body of Other Mind' , and similarly that one's 
physical frame is the body of his mind or self, and thus 
it follows, for him, that mind includes the body. But 
what does it mean to say that mind includes the body1 To 
take this idea seriously, it is here maintained, is to 
forfeit any adequate and intelligible view of the nature 
of consciousness, insofar as it suggests that physical 
objects are metaphysically a part of consciousness. Con -
sciousness includes, or is made up of, one's sensations, 
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feelj.ngs, and ideas, which in turn usually point beyond 
consciousness to physical objects in the space-time or-
der. But the objects themselves cannot be said to be a 
part of consciousness, and thus alsO _claimant to the 
title of metaphysical reality. To attempt to give the 
physical world metaphysical status of the same order ' as 
that of mind by including it as part of mind is to press 
too far the definition of mind, so that ultimately it 
loses all distinctive meaning or intelligibility. And 
that is just what Hocking tends to do. He seeks to main-
tain the reality of the physical world by making it a 
part of consciousness, and in so doing his concept of 
consciousness loses its essential significance. This 
kind of effort to overcome dualism must similarly be pro-
nounced inadequate. 
(2) The Priority of Mind over Body. It will be 
well to summarize and conclude this discussion of Hock-
ing's tendencies toward metaphysical dualism by attempt-
ing to set forth the substance of his various arguments 
for the metaphysical priority of mind over body. In other 
words, how does Hocking maintain the ultimate reality of 
consciousness in the face of the stubborn fact of the 
physical world? 
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The preceding section indicated two attempts 
to overcome a dualistic metaphysics, and to assert the 
primacy of consciousness. The first attempt issued in 
a psycho-physical parallelism which was wholly unsatis-
factory, while the second, in which it was held that 
mind included body, vitiated any intelligible idea of 
consciousness. If these arguments are inadequate, what 
further basis is there for a monistic idealism? Two or 
three points can be cited briefly. 
First, there is the ever-present experience of 
value or meaning in human life which, for Hocking, indi-
cates the necessity of an Other Mind as the ultimate fact 
of the universe. The human self is fundamentally a val-
uing creature who finds meaning in his life and experience, 
and who is constantly aware that this vital core of mean-
ing is not completely funded in the limits of his own fin-
itude, that it must find stable anchorage in the larger 
reaches of reality. This elemental experience makes clear 
that the wholeness of reality must also exhibit value or 
worthfulness. And insofar as values are experience, they 
can exist only in, of, and for conscious minds. The physi-
cal world, inorganic and inanimate, cannot serve as an ade-
quate explanation for the existence of value in human life; 
it can serve only as an environment for purpose in which 
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and through which these values are expressed and acted 
out. The ultimate reality, therefore , must be of the 
nature of consciousness; Other ~~nd is the only S1~fi­
c1ent basis for meaning in human life. A single quota-
tion from Hocking's writings, which has been cited pre-
viously, summarizes this argument concisely: "The ex-
istence of objective meaning in the world ••• implies 
some kind of mental life at the core of reality. 111 The 
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priority of mind over body, therefore, is posited on the 
basis of value experience. 
Second, the experlence of the physical world 
also pointsto something beyond Nature or body as the ulti-
mate reality. Sensory experience; l ike value experience, 
also calls for tbe priori.ty of mind over body . In his ex-
perience of Nature, one is aware of the constant limita-
tions, frustrations, and modifications pressed upon the 
self by the inexorable activities and demands of the phys-
ical world . Nature furnishes objects for thought and al-
ternatives for action , and in so doing sets definite lim-
its for the free play of selfhood . Thus, in Hocking's 
view , the "Outer Reality" of Nature is "essentially cre-
ative in its constant action •• • creative of me. 112 or 
1. TP~ 495 . 
2 . MGHK, 286. 
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further, "Nature obstinate is Nature creative, and cre-
ative of mind. 111 The physical world through sensory ex-
perience, therefore, actually creates mind. But how is 
this possible? Mind cannot be created by that which is 
wholly non-mental ·.. The physical world of Nature by itself 
cannot be said to create mental life; consciousness is 
not the product of physical forces. Therefore it must be 
that behind the panorama of physical events there is a 
more fundamental reality which works through Nature to 
perform this act of creation. In sum, mind can be ere-
ated, limited, and modified only by that which is also 
mind. Sensory experience, therefore, points to the ulti-
mate reality of Other Mind at the "core of reality." or 
in Hocking's words, 
in immediately experiencing my 
Self as limited and determined in 
the ways described by an Absolute 
Other, I am experiencing that 
Other and Other M~nd. As space 
is found limited by no other than 
more space, so Self is found lim-
ited and individualized by no 
other than Other Selfhood.2 
However, it must be admitted that in the final 
results the abiding argument in Hocking's thought for 
the priority of mind over body, or Other Mind over Na-
ture, is not invested in the intricacies of a sustained 
1. MGHE, 287. 
2. MGHE., 288. 
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analysis of conscious experience or the physical world. 
Both value experience (which is primarily a feeling at-
titude toward that which is external to the self) and 
sensory experience (which also points beyond self) are, 
in Hocking's view, grounded in the immediate intuition 
of Other Mind. They indicate that there is external to 
the self something which is the same in kind as the ex-
periencing self, namely, consciousness, and they con-
firm that thls consciousness must be the ultimate real-
ity of the universe. In this vein Hocking writes: 
The ultimate evidence for the 
selfhood of the whole is not pri-
marily the evidence of argument, 
however, or of analogy, but that 
of immediate experience, inter-
preted by the dialectic. We, as 
a group of human selves, know 
that we are not alone in the uni -
verse; this is our first and most 
persistent intuition.l 
This immediate intuition of the primary fact of Other 
Mind is, for Hocking, 11 a point of certainty in philos-
ophy.2 Indeed, it is the point of certainty in which 
all adequate philosophy begins and with which it must 
continually develop its interpretation of experience 
as a whole. 
1. TP, 500 . 
2. TP, 501. 
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It is this primary intuition which forms the 
basis for Hocking 's metaphysical monism, although it is 
a very obvious fact, as the preceding discussion of ev-
idences of dualism has pointed out, that it is a monism 
which at times seems to hang precariously in doubt as 
he develops in detail l1is understanding of the relation-
ship between Nature and Other Mind, and the self and the 
body. 
ii. The Subordination of Finite Selfhood. The 
second point of weakness in Hocking's general metaphysi-
cal thought centers around the problem of the relation 
of the finite self to the whole of metaphysical reality. 
In the conventional terminology of philosophy this is 
seen to be the perplexing and perennial problem of the 
One and the Many, here expressed in the relation of the 
many individual, finite minds to the absolute, all-em-
bracing Other Mind. Briefly Hocking's position is this: 
ultimate reality is of the nature of consciousness, and 
as such must include finite minds and the absolute mind. 
Individual minds are both separate from and a part of 
Other Mind, and the eventual fulfillment of the destiny 
of finitude is to become one with infinitude. It may be 
said here that with his continuous emphasis on the event-
ual identification of finite minds and infinite mind 
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Hocking displaces finite selfhood as a vitally meaningful 
unit of rea l ity. 
It must be acknowledged that here again Hock-
ing accepts both horns of the dilemma of the One and the 
Many, and urges that they each be pursued in constant 
alternation. Hocking's definition of experience, dis-
cussed in Chapter II, emphasizes the distinct interval 
between individual selves and an external, independent 
reality which is subsequently shown to be Other Mind giv-
en (partly) in sensation. For polemic reasons Hocking 
has in that context chosen to emphasize the integrity of 
individuality. Further, his exhortations to individual, 
rational beings to assert their individuality, to partic-
ipate in "the prophetic consciousness," also constitute; a 
recognition of the uniqueness of individual personality. 
As a valuing, and hence valuable creature, the finite 
self has intrinsic worth. And yet, all this is seen to 
abide "under the shadow of the Almighty," for it is only 
as a part of ultimate reality that the experience of 
Nature, the fulfillment of destiny, and the exercise of 
value choices that the individual self can be worthy of 
notice. Speaking of God (in the sense of ultimate real-
ity) as other than one's own self and other than all 
other selves, Hocking points out that this reality in-
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eludes individual selves insofar as they are dependent 
upon it,1 and insofar as it serves as "intimate, infal-
lible associate ••• that alone is capable of establish-
ing human peace of mind, and thereby human happiness. 2 
There must be, in every way, the alternation between 
unique, individual selves and the all-inclusive Self, 
but ultimately from a metaphysical point of view the fi-
nal outcome is the stage when all finite selves are ab-
sorbed in the One and further alternation is neither 
possible nor necessary. 
Some further light on the relations of the One 
and the Many may perhaps be forthcoming from a closer ex-
amination of the idea of immediacy which is central to 
Hocking's idea of the experience of ultimate reality. 
From the discussion in Chapter II it should be obvious 
that there is no way of avbiding his insistent emphasis 
on the immediacy of metaphysical reality to the finite, 
experiencing self. As already noted, experience is re-
ferred to as "the region of our continuous contact with 
metaphysical reality. 113 11 an interplay"4 or 11 a meeting"5 
between the Self and the Real. With a similar emphasis 
reality is said to be "now before me"6 or 11 present to 
1. MGHE, 298. 
2. MGHE, 223 f. 
3. IviGHE, 215. 
4. MGHE, 285. 
5. Art.(l95l), 321. 
6 · MGHE , 96 . 
'· 
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e ul m • 
Now there are two senses in which immediacy 
is commonly used . In one sense, which for general pur-
poses can be here termed the metaphysical sense, it r e -
fers primarily to the nature of an experience, in which 
case it means that the object of a~areness--that is, 
what is being experienced-- is immediately present in t he 
mind. In the other sense, call it the epistemological 
sense , it refers primarily to the knowledge which may is-
sue from such an experience , and maintains that no in-
ference, reflection, or interpretation is necessary to 
establish the validity of the knowledge so acquired. 
Such knowledge is self-evident; it bears the marks of 
its own authority . The concern here will be primarily 
with immediacy in the first sense. 
To say that one has an immediate experience of 
something is to indicate that the object of exper i ence 
is immediately given in consciousness. However , it is 
plain that the only thing given to my consciousness 
without mediation of any kind is my consciousness itself. 
If it be true that it is impossible to conceive of one 
unique and individual mind being "inside" another unique 
1. MGHE, 310 . 
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and individual mind it becomes plain that the only way 
to conceive adequately this concept of immediacy is to 
say that one factor of the relation is not wholly unique 
and individual, but rather that it is at base really a 
part of the other factor. Other Mind includes all finite 
minds, therefore, and what is actually demonstrated in 
the immediacy of experience is the relation of a part to 
the whole, rather than the unmediated confrontation of 
two discrete wholes . And just as this relation applied 
between the individual parts and the whole, so also does 
it prevail between the parts inasmuch as finite minds 
know and experience each other only in and through the 
whole of which they all are a part. 
From all of this it should be apparent that 
Hocking denies the possibility of self-experience. In 
Hocking's metaphysical structure there is no provision 
for the "pure " individual ego 1 and while he may recognize 
the self's experience of itself in a general way, strict-
ly speaking it must be denied. For all experience, in-
cluding what may seem to pass as pure self-experience, in-
volves the reality of Other Mind , and it is impossible to 
experience one's own self without at the same time being 
aware of the compresence of not-self which is, ultimately 
Other Mind . Experience and knowledge of the self are there-
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fore inseparable from the experience and knowledge of 
that which is over against self, creating, determining, 
and limiting it at all times. Hocking maintains that in 
experiencing itself, the self always experiences itself 
as "limited and determined."! The self knows immediately 
its own finitude; indeed, it cannot escape it. Its will 
is always limited by factors over which it has only par-
tial control, factors resident in other selves or in the 
physical environment, which like the experiencing self, 
are also part of ultimate reality. Unless conceived arti-
ficially or in high abstraction, therefore, all self-ex-
perience is at the same time the experience of something 
other than that self. The self has no privacy, nothing 
which can be called exclusively its own. 
Now to be considered adequately, the problem of 
the privacy of self-experience must be approached on two 
levels, the metaphysical and the epistemological. From 
all indications, however, Hocking considers simultaneous-
ly the experience (the metaphysical approach) and the 
knowledge (the epistemological approach) of ultimate re-
ality, and what may be true on one level is carried over 
as also true on the other. It is desirable to look into 
this matter further. 
1. MGHE, 288. 
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(1) The Metaphysical Privac~ of Self-Experi:-
ence. Inasmuch as this discussion of the subordination 
of finite selfhood in Hocking's thought has been ori-
ented primarily in the concept of the ultimate meta-
physical identification of individual minds and the Oth-
er Mind, it is not necessary to restate that argument at 
this time. However, it is germane to the problem to 
point out that while Hocking, in his analysis of the na-
ture of experience, does seek to distinguish between the 
self which experiences and the Other Mind which is the 
object of all experience, he has failed to point out~ 
the experience of the self differs in degree or in kind 
from that Other Self which is experienced. Or to put it 
in the form of a question, Is the sense in which one ex-
periences the Other the same sense in which he experi-
ences himself? Hocking's answer ·would seem to be yes, 
' for there is no self-experience, he maintains, which is 
not also, at the same time, Other-experience. The ex-
perience of the self is the experience of the Other; both 
are metaphysically the same. 
However, this denial of genuine self-experience 
on a metaphysical plane seems to fly in the face of the 
lrre:pr.esstble. -. fact that all that is given to one is his 
own immediate consciousness, and that it is from this im-
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mediate consciousness of one's self that he must move 
beyond to the consciousness of Other Self. To maintain 
the validity of this distinction is not to deprive the 
Other of its status as the creating and sustaining power 
of the individual self, as Hocking would fear, for the 
arguments for the priority of mind over body would still 
prevail and the only agency which would be equal to the 
task of maintaining finite selfhood would be an infinite 
Self. In other words, it is still possible to maintain 
the authority of Other Mind as the ultimate metaphysical 
reality, while affirming the validity of self-experience. 
Hocking is correct in asserting the primacy of all con-
sciousness, but the weight of his emphasis on the experi-
ence of Other Mind overpowers the uniqueness of the in-
dividual's consciousness of himself. 
(2) The Epistemological Privacy of Self-Ex-
perience. To join the finite self with Other Mind on a 
metaphysical level is one thing, and it exhibits certain 
dangers, but to join the finite with the infinite on an 
epistemological level is another, which reveals even more 
serious problems. The assertion that the self, even in 
self-examination, can never be considered apart from the 
not-self which Is Other Mind brings up the problem of the 
discontinuities and disconnections of experience, and even 
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more critical, the problem of the possible obliteration 
of finite selfhood in death. The bulk of empirical evi-
dence bears in on all sides that the experience of a 
single self manifests an untold .number of interruptions, 
incompletions, and contradictions. To multiply these 
disconnections by the tremendous number of individual 
selves is to compound confusion, and to throw serious 
light on the nature of that reality which must include 
them in its totality. All these observations prevail a-
gainst the metaphysical aspects of the problem of self-
experience as outlined above, but far more seriously they 
counter against the epistemological side of the issue. 
For it would seem that the Absolute, despite all its ra-
tionality and homogeneity, is shot through with error and 
contradiction and- frustration. And if, even worse, the 
finite selves fail to "find themselves" and develop their 
destiny as part of the whole, and thereupon succumb to 
error and eventual extinction, it would seem that the Ab-
solute has literally consented to the possibility of its 
own obliteration. Error and evil may be present only in 
the part, but the defection of the part must in some way 
reflect the defection of an organic whole. 
The possibility of error in finite minds, or 
better, the all too frequent and undeniable fact of error, 
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is seen to challenge the validity of the whole, which is 
presumably perfect in truth. Thus, from an epistemologi-
cal point of view the denial of the privacy of self-ex-
perience has disastrous implications for the nature of 
metaphysical reality. 
However, this denial of self-experience also 
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has a serious defect on the level of the kinowledge of oth-
er finite minds. Hocking maintains, and rightly so, that 
our knowledge of other selves is communicated in and 
through the knowledge of Other Mind, with Nature serving 
as a common frame of reference and point of visible con-· 
tact. He goes beyond this position, however, in the as-
sertion that in the knowledge of the same object, individ-
ual finite minds actually become a part of one another, 
thus establishing a region of "literal common mind." The 
following quotation summarizes this view: 
The supposed isolation of minds is 
an illusion; ••• we share identical 
objects, and in so doing actually 
merge or coalesce in our being; •• 
• whatever meaning can be attached 
to the phrase, to be within the mind 
of another, is realized in the ac-
tual situation. 'l 
1. Art.(l930) 1 , 392. A passage in MGHE maintaining this 
same position that individual finite selves ultimately 
merge in their being is found on pp. 265 f. This passage 
is without question the most poetic passage in this book, 
and probably in all of Hocking's writings. 
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Thus 1 insofar as two persons in a room are 
simultaneously perceiving the same table 1 there is evi-
dence of a common mind. The fact that the table is 
viewed from opposite angles, that one may see it as dark 
brown in color the other as black 1 that one may regard 
it as suitable for a card game and the other for a work-
bench--all these considerations do not, in Hocking's view, 
eliminate the fact of a common mind with respect to that 
physical object. Even in the everyday experience of phys-
leal objects, which are also experienced by other selves, 
there can be no privacy.l Again, the denial of this pri-
vacy makes insurmountable the problem of error and in-
dividual differences in sensory experience. From an epis-
temological point of view, therefore, the denial of the 
privacy of self-experience works serious difficulties in 
Hocking's general metaphysics. 
Admittedly these are unhappy and unwelcome con-
clusions, but the logic of Hocking's argument seems to 
point in that direction. Such conclusions, however, w.ould 
not be necessary if the integrity and individuality of the 
1. Privacy is not even possible in the solitary perception 
of physical objects inasmuch as they are also part of the 
experience of Other Mind. As a matter of fact, the sensory 
experience of the physical world, whether shared with other 
selves or not, is always to be taken as evidence of the 
presence of Other Mind in which all experience is funded. 
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finite self were scrupulously maintained. Hocking 's 
tendency to subordinate the uniqueness of personal ex-
perience to an all-inclusive Other Mind must therefore 
be regarded as a point of weakness in his general meta-
physical thought. 
3. Concluding Remarks. 
It is now both necessary and desirable to draw 
together the many threads and lines of thought which must 
have been exhibited thus far, and attempt to state the 
abiding impact of Hocking's metaphysical thought as a whole. 
The Introduction, in laying out the plan of this disserta-
tion, made it clear that metaphysics was, fundamentally, 
an attempt to form an adequate description of ultimate re-
ality. It is hoped that subsequent chapters have been 
able to make clear Hocking's conception of experience and 
its relation to the ultimate reality which is Other Mind, 
including finite minds and Nature as part of itself. How-
ever, the initial chapter also pointed out that in Hock-
ing's view the metaphysical quest involved more than mere 
description, that it was in the last resort a search for 
the meaning of being. Insufficient notice has been given 
to the problem of the meaning of being, but it is that 
problem which can serve neatly to bring into common focus 
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various elements in Hocking's metaphysics. It will serve 
particularly well to convey the total impression of Hock-
ing's view of the relation between the self and ultimate 
reality, which, as pointed out in an earlier section of 
this chapter, is a question of utmost importance. 
Generally speaking, the problem of the meaning 
of being is, for Hockin g , the problem of values in human 
experience. In the section entitled "A Symposium on the 
Meaning of Life" in Thoughts on Death and Life, Hocking 
remarks that the presence of value in the individual life 
is at once the source and ground of meaning for that life: 
" •••• Insofar as worth is actually present and being en-
joyed, life is in possession of meaning." 1 In this same 
section he enumerates several "worths" which are able to 
give meaning to life, all of them grounded in varying de-
grees in the nature of metaphysical reality. Because they 
are arranged in an ascending order of inclusiveness and 
effectiveness, they provide some indication of the general 
development in the relation of the finite self to ultimate 
reality. It will be well to consider them in the order 
discussed. 
First named is the "worth of mere being alive," 
1. TDL, 128. 
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which 11 lies in the fact that the simple going-on of liv-
ing has an intrinsic satisfaction of its own." Play and 
undirected activity, even simple "idling or taking things 
easy," as well as pleasant and informal social intercourse 
with others--all these are instances of 11 this immediate 
sense of worth in living." This enjoyment of the worth 
of being alive knows no age limit; from infancy to old 
age it is experienced and enjoyed for its own sake alone 
without reference to ulterior ends. It is the !"holiday 
consciousness" which underlies the whole of life, giving 
it meaning and significance. ~lthough it is seldom ac-
knowledged in sober reflections on the problem of mean-
ing in life, it is pervasively present." But universal 
though it may be, based largely on the physico-emotiona l 
nature of man, it is more implicit than explicit as a 
source of meaning, and man would do well to look further 
to some more adequat e value which could provide firmer 
identification with ultimate reality and more direct guid-
ance to the meaning of life.l 
Hocking next s uggests the "worth in doing and 
in things done" as the source of meaning: 11 A man is likely 
to identify the meaning of his life with his work," he re-
marks. But w 01• k always seems to point beyond itself to 
1. TDL, 117-122. 
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some higher meaning or goal, and it is actually the per-
ception of that higher meaning which stimulates the in-
dividual to activity, to work, in order that by his 
work he may embody that meaning in his life. The fore-
most example in this regard is perhaps to be found in 
the artist, who , envisioning some meaning in the order of 
things, hastens to embody that meaning in a work of his 
own creation . There is, to be sure, an immediacy and 
with it a meaning, in the achievement itself, but that 
meaning always points beyond itself to somethin g else, 
and the ultimate source of meaning in life, which is none 
other than metaphysical realit~which serves as the in-
spiration and end of all work. 1 
The fact that life seems to hold meaning even 
for many whose history shows no significant work or 
achievement suggests to Hocking that not only is achieve-
ment inadequate as the sole source of meaning in life, 
even with its cosmic referent, but that there are some who 
"find a sufficiency of meaning for life in the experience 
of loving and being loved." Thus, he proposes next the 
"worth in love and appreciation" as the source of meaning 
in human life , and he further considers love not primarily 
in terms of individual perceptions of meaning or isolated 
1. TDL, 123-128. 
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strivings after something which is beyond, but rather in 
terms of sharing with other human persons the innermost 
aspirations and longings of the heart. Love requires the 
presence of others, or even a single other self, and 
sharing is marked as the essence of love, so that ulti-
mately love is "the presence of 'soul' to ' soul.'" The 
distinction between .the presence of other persons in the 
experience of love and in the experience of the worth of 
living is to be found in the attitude of the self toward 
that experience. In the latter instance the whole of the 
meaning is involved and exhausted in the enjoyment or i m-
mediacy, and the presence of another person is solely in-
cidental to the present enjoyment in consciousness. In 
the former case, however, there is a conscious reference 
to the presence of others, and this reference in loving 
confers a sense of worth not only on the person or per-
sons loved, but primarily (in the context of this discus-
sion) on the person who loves. Love serves as a source 
of meaning in human life because it confers a sense of 
worth both on the beloved and the lover, and 1"what con-
fers this sense cannot be worthless." However, the per-
manence of love on the human scene, seen beside the tran-
siency of human contacts and relationships, forces one to 
look beyond the present scene for the ultimate source of 
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meaning in life, or in Hocking's words, uThe stability of 
love requires the stability of a relation to some con-
crete object beyond the personal context." 1 It goes with-
out saying that this "concrete object" is none other than 
ultimate reality, which is again seen to be the indispensable 
partner in human experience. 
Hocking next looks to a synthesis of the two last-
named factors, the worth of work and the worth of love, 
and examines the "worth in serving causes"--a. union of 
love and power "as the source of meaning in life." This 
source is often accounted for in the colTl.mon phrase, nTo 
make the world a little better," and has much to commend 
it from an historical point of view since 11 it is perhaps 
the most widely separated of the meanings of life." The 
devotion to service in its highest expressions lifts the 
individual out of himself in acts of undefiled altruism, 
but in Hocking's words, "altruism, even in the noblest 
social level, is not a sufficient answer, ~eeause1 . . . 
buried in the satisfactions, valid and profotmd, of such 
creative good-will ••• there are assumptions about destiny 
1. TDL, 126-131. Brief explanation of two key words in 
this quotation may be desirable. By "concrete" Hocking 
means any specific object of thought, and by "personal" 
he means beyond one's own personal context, rather than 
11 super-personal." 
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and the frame of things which need a further voice." 
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Hocking thus continues to look further for the ultimate 
meaning of life. 
The final source of meaning suggested in this 
section is the mworth of fulfilling a destiny." Despite 
the fact tbat this feeling or sense of destiny in one's 
own life may be misread and abused, it can and does "con-
fer an ennobling sense of appointment and of inward re-
lat i on to the ultimate purpose of things." All life thus 
moves toward fulfillment in s orne future moment,· and each 
individual action is seen to bear 11 the stamp of cosmic 
appointment." More than any other group, the mystics 
are those who feel the simultaneous tug of bbligation and 
the push of power as they move nearer their goal. In this 
type of experience involving the "cosmic appointment" 
meaning enters life "not ·as a goal merely, but as an im-
mediacy--the highest." The values of life, which alone 
can give it abiding meaning, are grounded ultimately in 
the meaning and destiny which is at the heart of the cos-
mos, and man's own meanings are derived from the sense of 
his own intimate relation to that destiny. The worth of 
fulfillment is the value which, in its immediacy and its 
objective reference, includes and lifts up all the lesser 
1. TDL, 132-135. 
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values or worths which human life experiences. 1 
Here , then, are five kinds of experience which 
make some claim to represent or offer the meaning of hu-
man life: mere living, achieving, loving, serving, and 
fulfilling . Mere living resides in immediacy alone, but 
it is "pervasively present" .in all consciousness and in 
that sense is fundamental to all meaning. !chieving and 
loving, taken singly or together as serving, primarily 
turn on immediacy although, it is admitted, not without 
some more adequate reference to that which is beyond self. 
However, what Hocking requires of the highest value is an 
effective combination of both immediacy and objectivity, 
so that the immediacy of meaning may be firmly grounded 
in the metaphysical nature of things. That combination 
is here expressed as the worth of fulfillment in which 
man becomes fully aware of his "cosmic appointment" with 
the reality that is at the heart of the universe. 
It can be said that the course of human life is , 
or should be, to move through these successive stages of 
the experience of ultimate reality to win that ultimate 
and incomparable experience which is the fulfillment of 
human destiny. Metaphysics , and philosophy as a whole, 
can and do serve to chart out the path of development, by 
seeking to articulate the meaning of being and to exhort 
1. TDL, 136-138. 
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rational, finite selves to participate in the destiny 
which is given them at the peril of being judged not t o 
have lived. William Ernest Hocking, by the power and 
persuasiveness of his thought and personality, stands 
forth as one whose own sense of the "cosmic appointment" 
provides constant encouragement to others to find the 
meanings of their lives in the fulfillment of their 
destiny. 
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FOREWORD 
I 
This bibliography of the writings of Willi~m Ernest 
Hocking, distinguished American philosopher, is divided 
into three parts. Section A lists chronological] y the 
books published to date by Mr. Hocking, while Sedtion B 
records all his published works, including those Jnoted 
in Section A., also in chronological order. Sect ll on C is 
a general index of the principal topics considersld in 
Mr. Hocking's published works. 
Although every effort has been expended to !make 
this bibliography complete and accurate, it is possible 
that certain of the more casual items, such as l dtters 
to editors of newspapers or journals, reviews, add short-
er notices, may have been overlooked. The biblidgrapher 
would appreciate having errors and omissions brotight to 
his attention. 
Personal verification has been made by the 
1
bibli-
ographer of all but a very few of the entries. ~hose 
articles for which this verification is lacking are 
marked by a double asterisk ( .;H~o). I 
It will be observed that explanatory mater~al re-
garding the contents or arguments of the books, art i cles, 
and reviews listed here has been kept to a minim:fn . No 
attempt has been made to reproduce tables of contents, 
summaries, critical notices,or reviews as is cus ~ omary 
in some bibliographies. This bibliography is of~ered 
primarily as a systematic compilation of Mr. Hoc Ying 's 
published works; with the index in Section C invl 1stiga-
tors can go directly to the source material. 
Information provided for each entry should be suf-
ficient for identification. Notice of translations and 
revised editions of books is generally included J nder the 
I initial entry. For journal articles, the name o~ the 
publication, the volume number, date of issue, a1d page 
numbers are recorded in that order. 
i Space is provided herein for the addition of titles 
published subsequent to January 1 1 1951. I 
I 
(341) 
The gratitude of the bibliographer must be ex-
pressed to all those persons--librarians, editor~, col-
leagues, and students--who have aided in this un4ertak-
ing. But special thanks must go to Mr. Hocking for 
courtesy and co-operation which have been manife~t since 
I the inception of this project. Without his assistance 
this work could not have been completed. I 
Colby College 
Waterville, Maine 
July 1, 1951 
I 
. I 
Richard C. Gilman 
SECTION A 
The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 
A Philosophic Study of Reli~ion. 
Yale University Press, 1912. 
Human Nature and Its Remakin~. 
Yale University Press, 191 • Revised edition, 1923. 
New printing with additions, 1929. I 
Morale and Its Enemies. 
Yale University Press, 1918. 
I Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights. 
Yale University Press, 1926. 
Man and the State. 
Yale University Press, 1926. 
The Self: Its Bod! and Freedom. 
--yale University Press, !9287 
(342) 
Types of Philosopht. 
1 Charles Scribner s Sons, 1929. Revised edition, 1939. 
The Spirit of World Politics. 
Macmillan Company, 1932. 
I 
Re-Thinking Missions. (Editor, and author of first four 
chapters.) 
Harper and Brothers, 1932. 
George Herbert Palmer, 1842-1933: Memorial Addresses. 
(editor) 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. 
Lasting Elements of Individualism. 
Yale University Press, 1937. 
Thoughts on Death and Life. 
Harper and Brothers, 1937. 
Living Religions and a World Faith. 
Macmillan Company, 1940. 
What Man Can Make of Man. 
Harper and Brothers, 1942. 
(343) 
ion. 
, ~prll,l942 
I Science and the Idea of God. 
University of North carolina Press, 1944. 
Preface to Philosophy. (with others) 
Macmillan Company, 1945 .• 
Freedom of the Press: • Framework of Principle. I 
University of Chicago Press, .1947. 
(344) 
SECTION B 
1. "What is Number?" 
Intelli~ence : A Journal of Education. 
18(May 5, 1898), 360-362. 
*~~his article is a criticism of the Dewey-Mcplel-
land method of teaching number, written whil e Mr. 
Hocking was principal of School Number One, at 
Davenport, Iowa, during the interim between col-
lege work at Ames , Iowa, and his transfer te Har-
vard. In an article published in the Journ~l of 
Philosophy in 1930, Mr . Hocking refers to t 1 is 
article as "my first philosophical essay." 
2. A Union for Ethical Action . (with Howard ton) 
3. 
Privately printed, 1964. 17 pp. 
This is a statement of principles and progr~ for 
an ethical movement of young men who would I' choose 
their life work with a sense of its signifipance 
for the general welfare and advance," and thus, in 
time , "create a nation morally significant ~n 
history." It was prepared by Mr. Hocking apd a 
student colleague at Harvard. Mr. Hocking ~ s the 
author of "The Principles of Union," pp. 1-5 , and 
co-author of "Plan of Organization," pp. 12 ~17. So 
far as can be determined, it is available oi ly in 
the library of the Harvard Divinity School. 
-----
The Elementary Experience of Other Conscious Being 
in Its Relations ~o the Elementary Experience or 
P Re ec s. 
, vi. 175 pp . 
This is Mr. Hocking's unpublished dissertat}on for 
the Ph.D. at Harvard, awarded in 1904. A note 
above the title describes it as 11 Philosophy l of 
Communication, Part I," thus announcing its cen-
tral theme and indicating the author's further 
plans for research and publication on that topic. 
The main thesis of this work, which might be re-
stated as ttHow We Know Other Minds ," is the l origi-
nal statement of Chapters XVII to XX of The Mean-
ing of God in Human Experience. This dissettation 
Is available only at the Widener Library, Harvard 
University. 
(345) 
4. "The Function 
Method. 11 
Journal of 
Methods , 2 
5. "The Transcendence of Knowledge." 
Journal of Philosophy, Psycholo!y, and Scieptific 
Methods, 3(January 4, 1906), 5- Z 
6. "The Group Concept in the Service of PhilosophJV. " 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Journal of Phi losophy, Psychologv, and Scleptlfic 
Methods, 3(August 2, 1906), 421-431. 
The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of H~an 
Happiness . I 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1907. l 8 pp. 
This is Mr . Hocking's first major philosophical 
address, given before the annual open meeti~g of 
the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Stanford University 
on October 13, 1906. The arguments of this ad-
dress are part;ially restated in Chapters XI and 
XXXII and Appendix II of The Meaning of God in 
Human Experience. 
Review of B. Weinstein, Die philosophischen Grund-
lagen der Wissenschaften. 1 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scie~tific 
Methods , 4(June 20, 1907}, 359-361. 
Review of 
schaften. 
Carl Stumpf, Zur Eintellung der Wis~en-
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, 1 and Scie l(l tific 
Methods , 5(May 7, 1908), 271-275· 
10. "Theory of Value and Conscience in Their Biolo~ical 
Context." I 
Psychological Bulletin , 5(May 15, 1908), 12~ -143. 
This article was reprinted in part under th1 title, 
"The Relations Between Idea and Value Understood 
11. 
12. 
13. 
through Biology," as Appendix II in The Mea:ning 
_____ o_f __ God in Human Experience, pp. 539-557. I 
"The Religious Function of State Universities JI" 
University of California Chronicle. 
lO(October, 19o8), 454-466. 
I 
I 
(346) 
Carl Stumpf, Die Wiedergeburt der Ehiloso-
1 
Sci~ntific 
"How Can Christianity Be the Final Religion?" 
Yale Divinity Quarterly, 5(March, 1909), 2§6-288. 
. I 
This article was originally presented as a~ ad-
dress entitled 11 The Finality of the Christ-tan Re-
ligion," before the George B. Stevens Theological 
Club of the Divinity School of Yale Univer~ ity. 
The date of the addr ess is not given. 
14. "The Boy Law-Breaker." 
Boston Transcript, 79( April 17, 1909), Sec t III,2. 
This is the report of an interview "with Professor 
Hocking of Yale who has just been visiting !Massa-
chusetts Institutions of reform." The article con-
' tains full and accurate quotations of Mr. ~ocking's 
views. I 
I 15. "Two Extensions of the Use of Graphs in Elementary 
Logic." · I 
University of California Publications in Ppilos-
~~ 2(May 17, 1909), 31-44. 1 
I Ppilos-
16. "On the Law of History." 
University of California Publications in 
ophy, 2(Sep~ember 17, 1909), 45-65. 
17. Review of Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organ~zation. 
Yale Review, 18(February, 1910), 420-422. 
(347) 
18. 
19. "The Relation of the Efficient Church to Phi osophy 
and Current Thought. 11 · 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Yale Divinity Quarterly, 7(May, 1910), 17-19. 
This is a recorder's summary of an address by Mr. 
Hocking, given before the "Conference Concerning 
the Efficient Church," at the Yale Divinit~y School. 
The date of the conference was not indica ed. 
----
"How Ideas Reach Reality." J 
Philosophical Review, l9(May, 1910), 302-, 18. 
This article is reprinted in part under ttie title, 
"The Knowledge of Independent Reality," a~ Ap-
pendix III in The Meaning of God in Human !Ex-
perience, pp. 558-573 . 
Review of Thomas Cuming Hall, The History o Ethics 
within Organized Christianitt. I 
Yale Divinity Quarterly, 7 Janua ry, l9ll)J 98-100. 
Review of Theodore de Laguna and Grace Andrl s We 
Laguna, Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in iModern 
Philosophy. I 
Bryn Mawr Alumnae Quarterly, 5(April, 191~ ),35-37. 
~HfThis review by Mr. Hocking is unsigned, a~d is 
included in the "Literary Notes" Section Gf this 
journal. 
o. 
I Review of Lloyd P. Jacks, The Alchemy of Th~ught. 
Yale Review, l(October, 1911), 161-163. I 
I 
This article is published in the first vot ume of 
the New Series of the Yale Review. 
1 
{348) 
25. The Meaninp of God in Human Experience: 
A Philosopnic Study of Religion. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912. 
xxxiv, 586 pp. 
This is Mr. Hocking's major work to date. It was 
first published in June, 1912, and has be n 
through eleven printings through January, Jl948. A 
few verbal changes were made for the secomd print-
ing, but the structure and paging were un t ltered. 
Four supplementary articles are appended yo the 
text, namely, "Note on the Subconscious;" 1 "The 
Relations Between Idea and Value Understo~d 
through Biology,'' (also published in Psyclttologi-
cal Bulletin, 1908); 11 The Knowledge of Indepen-
dent Reality," (also published in part in JPhilo-
sophical Review, 1910); and "Note on Leubafs 
Theory of the Nature of the Mystic's Love of God." 
26. "The Meaning of Mysticism as Seen through its Psy-
27. 
28. 
chology." 
Mind, 2l{January, 1912), 38-61. 
This article was published in part and with sub-
stantial revision as "Note on the Meaning Jof 
Mysticism," in The Meaning of God in Humat:;~ Ex-
perience, pp. 350-355. 
Review of Hermann Graf Keyserling, Prolegom~na zur 
Naturphilosophie. . I 
Philosophical Review, 22{January, 1913), 81-82. 
Review of James H. Leuba, A Psychological SJudl of 
Origin, Function and Future. 1 
anuary, 1113) , 
This article also appeared in the Journal of 
Philosophy, Ps chology, and Scientific Me~hods, 
June 5, 3 , - , with e o o~ing in-
troduction by the editors: "The followin~ review 
by Professor Hocking was published in the_ IBryn Mawr 
Alumnae Quarterly for January, 1913. It ijas ap-
peared to the editors so interesting and ~mportant 
as to merit reprinting." 
(349) 
29. " Message from the Faculty." 
Yale Divinity Quarterly, lO( May, 1913), 20. 
This is the summary of a statement by Mr. ~ock­
ing, which is included with statements fro . other 
faculty ~embers of the Yale Divinity Schoo • The 
summary was not written by Mr. Hocking. 
30. "Conference on the Relation of Law to Social nds." 
Journal of Philosophl, Psichology, and Sci~ntific 
31. 
32. 
Methods;-TO ( Septemoer 11, 1913), 512-528. ___ _ _ 
This is an informal report by Mr. Hocking on the 
Conference on the Relation of Law to Sooi 1 Ends, 
held at New York on April 25, 26, 1913. t con-
sists principally of brief summaries of t~e pa-
pers and addresses, which constitute not ~n of-
ficial report, but rather "A series of pe] 1sonal 
i mpressions." 
--- -
Review of Emil Carl Wilm, The Problem of .Re]igion. 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychologyf ana Sc~entific 
Methods, 16[December 18, I9I3), 7 9-720. 
Review of Josiah Royce, The Problem of Chrijtianity. 
Harvard Theological Review, ?(January, 19 4), 
167-112. 
33. "The Significance of Bergson." 
Yale Review, 3(January, 1914), 303-326. 
34. Review of Jame s Y. Simpson, The Spiritual I~terpre­
tation of Nahure. 
Harvard Theological Review, 7(April, 1914), 
273-274. 
35. Review of Alfred Fouillee, Equisse d'une In erpre-
tation du Mende. -- I 
Philosophical Review, 23(July, 1914), 451-453. 
(350) 
36. "What is the College For? The Place of Prepa ation. 
Education, 35(January, 1915), 287-300. 
This is an address before the 29th annual Eeet-
ing of the New England Association of Co11
1
eges 
and Preparatory Schools, held in Boston on No-
___ v_e_m_ber 6, 1914. I 
37. "Policing the World. 6 
Letter to the Editor, Sprin~field (Mass.) 
lican, 72(December 15, 1915}, 10. 
I !Repub-
This letter by Mr. Hocking was in reply to an 
editorial appearing in this newspaper on ~ecem­
ber 8, 1915 in which his views on the basic 
moral issues in the first World War were sl
1
everely 
criticized. The title of this letter was 
1
assigned 
by the editor, whose answer to Mr. Hocking ac-
companies publication of the letter. 
38. 0 The Culture Worth Getting in College." 
School and Society, 3{January ~5, 1916), ~0-84. 
This is an address before the Harvard Teac~ers' 
Association, date not given. 
39. "Original Human Nature and Its Reconstructio]." 
Yale Divinity Quarterly, 12(March, 1916). 87-95. 
This is a summary of Mr. Hocking's lectures on 
the Nathaniel W. Taylor Foundation, given !at 
Yale in 1916. The summary was made from ~otes 
taken during the lectures, and was not written 
by Mr. Hocking. The substance of these lectures 
was later expanded and published in 1916 under 
the title, Human Nature and Its Remaking. j 
40. "A Bad Citizen to His Class Secretary." 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 18(April 12, 191 }, 
534-536. 
This letter to the secretary of the Class of 1901 
:tt Harvard is signed "B.C." for Bad Citizen. 
I 
( 351) 
41. "The Holt-Freudian Ethics and the Ethics of Rpyce." 
Philosophical Review, 25(May, 1916), 479-5~6. 
'l1 he sub-title declares this article to be 1'A 
Study of the Bearing of Psychological Concepts 
upon Ethical Theory." It is also publishe9. with 
other articles in Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce 
on his Sixtieth Birthdal, pp. 251-268, in a sepa-
rate edition of this special issue of the Philoso-
phical Review. 
42. "Professor Josiah Royce." [ 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 19 (September 28, 1916) 
4-6. 
43. "How Can an Infinite God Be Concerned with Man?" 
Pilgrim Teacher, 32(November, 1916), 751-7153. 
This publication is available at the Cong~ega­
tional Library, 14 Beacon Street, Boston. 
I 
44. "Progress in Philosophical Inquiry and Mr. Lovejoy's 
Presidential Address." I 
Philosophical Review, 26(May, 1917), 329-331. 
This short -article is one of several publ~shed 
comments by selected individuals on the P~esi­
dential Address of Arthur o. Lovejoy befo~e the 
annual meeting of the tmerican Philosophical As-
sociation in 1916. All comments appear u~der 
the single title. 
I 
45. "The Rhilosophy of Waldo Emerson Forbes, '02. 11 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 19{June 7, 1917) J 
679-680. 
46. "The Religious Thought of Arthur James Balfour." 
Congregationalist, 102(!ugust 16, 1917),202-203. 
This publication is available at the Congbega-
tional Library, 14 Beacon Street, Boston. 1 
47. 
48. 
49. 
I 
I 
(352) 
"Ethics and International Relations." j 
Journal of Philosophye Psychologyg and Scientific 
Methods, 14 (December , 1917), 69 -700. I -
This article presents several theses which Mr. 
Hocking puts forth in a discussion of "whether 
the idea of sovereignty is incompatible w~th the 
acknowledgment of moral obligation by states." 
It formed part of the discussion of 11 Ethids and 
International Relations" at the December, 1 1917 
meeting of the American Philosophical Ass1ciation. 
Human Nature and Its Remaking. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. 
xiv, 496 pp. 
This book is based on Mr. Hocking's Lectures on 
the Nathaniel w. Taylor Foundation, given [before 
the School of Religion at Yale during the lacadem-
ic year 1916. A new and revised edition i as pub-
lished in 1923, which contains an article on "The 
Dilemma in the Conception of Instinct, as applied 
to Human Psychology," (reprinted, with slfght 
changes, from the Journal of Abnormal Psy9hology 
and Social Psychology, 1921}, ana an essay en-
titled "Tfie Source of Obligation." Thes e raddi-
tions appear as Appendix I and Appendix II, re-
spectively, in the revised edition. A ne r1 edi-
tion was again published in 1929. 
It might a~so be noted that an abridgment of 93 
pages was published by the University of Minne-
sota Department of Philosophy in 1940 for 1 their 
use as a text in ethics. The abrid&ment, j which 
is multigraphed and bound in heavy paper, was 
made by Alburey Castell, and bears the same 
title as the larger work. I 
Morale and Ita Enemies. I 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918, x[v, 200 pp. 
Much of the background for this volume was gained 
during Mr. Hocking's experiences at the B!ritish 
and French fronts in France during the su!mmer of 
1917. An introductory "Note of .,Acknowle 4gment 11 
(353) 
announces that 0 Some of the substances ~f this 
book has already been presented in the ~orm of 
lectures to the Training Corps at Willi~ms Col-
lege in the winter of 1917, and as the Bromley 
Lectures at Yale in the spring of 1918. J I also 
presented for preliminary criticism by ~he ser-
vice a set of psychological theses in T~e In-
fantry Journal for April, 1918; •••• Three of the 
chapters have appeared in approximately Jtheir 
present form: the first and second in Tne Atlan-
tic Monthly current, the fifteenth in t e Yale 
Review for July 1918."' 
50. 11 What is Christianity'?" 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 20(February 
388. 
This is a brief chapel talk given at 
ing the week of February 11, 1918. 
51. "The War Zone and What Lies Behind It.n 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 20(February 
411-414. 
21, 1919}, 
I Ha vard dur-
28, 1918)' 
This is a lecture on the war 
vard on November 7, 1917. 
I delivered at Har-
52. "Fundamentals of Mill tary Psychology .t• 
Infantry Journal, 14{April, 1918), 717-~24. 
This article presents a series of these~ con-
stituting a systematic outline of the s~bject. 
It is based in part on lectures on military 
psychology, given at the Naval War Coll,ge at 
Newport, R.I., and at the U.S. Naval A.c~demy 
at Annapolis. It is this article which is re-
rerred to in Mr. Rocking's introduction to 
Morale and Its Enemies (see #49 above}. A 
small part of this article was reprinte~ by the 
Infantry Journal in a volume entitled Infantry 
Journal Reader (New York: Doubleday, Doran and 
Company, 1943}, which contains a select on of 
articles from that journal over a perio of 
40 years. 
(354) 
53. "Sovereignty and Moral Obligation." 
28(April,l International Journal of Ethics~ 
314-326. 
1918), 
54. "Personal Problems of the Soldier." 
I 
I 
Yale Review, 7(July, 1918), 712-726. 
This article was published in substantially the 
same form under the title, "War and Women J" as 
Chapter XV in Morale and Its Enemies. 
55. "Religion in War-Ti~e." 
~lan~ic Monthly, 122(September, 1918), 316-387. 
56. "Morale." 
57. 
Atlantic Monthly, 122(December, 1918), 721-728. 
I 
This article was published in approximately its 
present form under the titles, "Why Morale Counts, 
and How Much," and "What is a Good Morale?" as 
I Chapters I and II, respectively, in Morale and 
Its Enemies. 
I 
"The Diplomacy of Suspicion and the League of 
Nat ions." I 
University of California Chronicle, 2l(April, 
~1~9~1~9~),~a~3~-~9~5~.---------------------- I 
This article was given as an address befo4e the 
Philosophical Union of .the University of Cali-
fornia on March 28, · 1919. 1 
58. "The Question of Instincts." 
National Police Journal, 5(November, 1919?, 21, 
22, 31. 
I This is the report of 11 a lecture delivered be-
fore the Berkeley (Calif.) Police School.r No 
date is given for the lecture, and no editorial 
comment accompanies its publication here. IHow-
ever, the article, which was published from notes 
taken at the lecture, contains several inf c-
(355) 
curacies and sweeping generalizations which do 
not at all times convey a correct impression of 
Mr. Hocking 's views. 
The Union List of Serials, which identifi~s li-
braries holding certain publications, is ~n error 
in its listing of the uournal in which th~s arti-
cle appeared. So far as can be determined, this 
issue of the National Police Journal is a ailable 
only at the New York Public Library. 
59. "Answer to a Threat." 
Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 70(0ctober 
25, 1920), 14. 
During the Presidential election campaign of 1920 
Mr. Hocking took a vigorous stand in behalf of 
American's entry into the League of Natioqs, which 
was one of the campaign issues. One of h;s efforts 
was an 18 page manuscript entitled , "Fourteen 
Points on the Campaign," and this let t er t o the ed-
1 itor of the Times is based in part on that other-
wise unpublished article. A simila r lett ~r appeared 
in the Springfield (Mass.) Republican on ~he same 
date--77TOctober 25, 1920)--under the tit:j.e ".! 
Critical Campaign in American History." ('F itles, 
in both cases, were assigned by the edito~ s.) 
I In the letter to the Times Mr. Hocking puts forth 
a reply to Republicans who claim that the lelection 
of Harding, the Republican candidate, woutd insure 
the United States entry into the League a~d who at 
the same time deny that a Democratic vict~ry would 
do the same. He holds that a Republican yictory 
would not lead to this country's participation in 
the League, and he further identifies him~elf as 
one of "the habitual Republican voters whb want a 
prompt and honest entry into the League ( 1 nd who 
for that reason) can do no other than vot for 
cox ••• " 
60. "Is Social Service the Modern Religion?" 
Lett.er to the Editor, The Association Mo.E_j hl;!:, 
15(April, 1921), 134-135. · 
This journal is now called The YWCA Magaz~ne. 
61. 
(356) 
"The Dilemma in the Conception of Instinct, as Ap-
plied to Human Psychology." 1 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psycholqgy,l 
l6(June-September, 1921), 73-96. I 
I 
This article is reprinted with slight chaqges as 
Appendix I in Human Nature and Its RemakiQg 
(New and Revised Edition). 
I 
I 
62. "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent to God for all Prac-
tical Purposes?" Journ~l of Religion, l(September, 1921), 482-496. 
I 
I 
63. "The Motive of the Mother. 11 I 
Christian Register, lOO(December 8, 1921)~ 1158. 
This is a brief reply to a problem raised ~ by the 
editors of this journal entitled "Can a Person 
ever be Disinterested?" Mr. Hocking's brief 
article is one of several contributions u~der 
various titles. 1 
I 
64. "The Metaphysics of Borden P. Bowne. 11 I 
Methodist Review, 105 (May-June, 1922), 371-374. 
This article is one of several in a secti bn en-
titled "Some .Appreciations of Borden Park~r 
Bowne," which were written by 11 a few truly repre-
sentative scholars." The greater part ofl this 
issue of the Methodist Review is g iven tol inter-
pretations and appreciations of Bowne and
1 
his 
place in philosophy. I 
65. 11 Frofess or Palmer at Eighty." 
Uarv;ard Graduates Magazine, 30(June, 
516-522. 
I 
I 
19221) 1 
I 
I 
66. "Fiske Re-Anticipated." 1 
Journal of Philosophy, 19 (August 3, 1922 )j,441-442. 
The name of this journal was · formerly thei longer 
title, Journal of Philoso:£2h;y, Psychology,! and 
Scientiric Methods, The title was changed with 
the issue of Vol. 18, No. 1, January 6, ~921. 
----
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
67. 
I (357) 
~ I 
"Les Principes de la Methode en Philosophie Re-
ligieuse." I 
Revue de MGtaphys ique et de Morale, ·· ~9 ( Octpbre-
Decembre, 1922), 431-453. I 
This issue of the Revue is announced as "ntunero 
exceptionnel," inasmuch as it surveys the r mouve-
ment gen~rai de la pen see ame"ricaine • 11 Also in-
cluded in this issue are articles by John ~ewey, 
Ralph Barton Perry, E. G. Spaulding, and others. 
The French translation of N~. Hocking's article 
was made by Gabriel Marcel. 
68. "What Are Human Motives Today'? 11 
Relig ious Education, 18(February, 1923), 21 . 
This is an abstract ("Advance Paper") of 1-ci.> . 
Hocking 's remarks at a forum on the progra~ of 
the 20th annual meeting of the Relig ious Educa-
tion Association, held at Cleveland, Ohio, IApril 
11-14, 1923. 
69. "Instinct in Social Psychology." 1 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
18(July-September, 1923), 153-166. 
This article is in criticism of theories im The 
I --Social Philosophy of Instinct by c. c. Josey 
(New York: Charles Sc r ibner's, 1922). 1 
------ I 
70. "Illicit Naturalizing of Relig ion." I 
Journal of Religion, 3{1Tovember, 1923), 56T-589. 
This is the published form of the Dudleian iLec-
ture for 1920, although date and place of the 
_____ l_e_c_t ure are not given. I 
71. 11 Innnanuel Kant and International Policies." ! 
Annual Report of the Directors of the Amer ~ can 
Peace Society, 96( May, 1924), 19-28. 1 
This article was given as the annual addre J s be-
fore the 94th annual meeting of the Americ~n 
~eace Society, held at Wash ing ton, D.C., on May 
3, 1924. I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
72. "Leaders and Led. tt 
Yale Review, 13(July, 1924), 625-641. 
73. Review of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, 
The Idea of Immortality. 
Journal of Philosophy, 2l(August 14, 1924), 
469-471. 
74. "The Shady Hill School. 11 
Privately printed, 1925. 
(358) 
This is a statement of the principles of t e 
Shady Hill School, which was founded in 1911~5 by 
Mr. and Wws. Hocking. A brief, three-page ro-
chure, it was an attempt to formulate the das-
tinctive principles of elementary educationt 
worked out in the school's first ten years. Other 
statements of the Shady Hill purpose and program 
were written at this time by George Herbert 
Palmer, Thomas Whitney Surette, and Kathari e 
Taylor, and the four statements were sent tp 
parents and friends of the school on the ocpasion 
of a proposed move to a new location in Cam~rid.ge. 
Mr. Hocking was the author of several brief writ-
ings on the principles of Shady Hill School which 
are 11 the grass-roots of what I have to say pn 
primary education, which sometime I shall nrve to 
work out in systematic form •••• to present t 1ie positive program of a better founded educational 
<!>utlook." I 
Of these writings, however, which were for ~ri­
vate distribution, the bibliographer has viewed 
only the one cited above. 
75. 11 The Postulates. 11 
Article in Immanuel Kant, 1724-1924. 
(E~ c. Wilm, ed.) pp. 37~49. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. 
This is an address given at Jacob Sleeper Hall, 
Boston, on the 200th anniversary of Kant's irth, 
April 22, 1924. Addresses by G.H. Palmer, M W. 
( 359) 
Calkins, Ro~coe Pound, and others, deliver d 
at the same occasion, are also included in this 
volume. 
76. 11 The Influence of the Future on the Present. tt 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 27(April 9, 1925), 
817-823. . -
This is the report, takeri originally in sha
1
rt-
hand, of an address delivered at a symposium at 
Harvard University on March 11, 1925. Othelr 
speakers on the panel were C. I. Lewis, L. T. 
Troland, and~. N. Whitehead, although the r ad-
dresses are not included here. 
77. Review of James H. Leuba, The Psychology of 
ligious MysticismL and Charles A. Bennett, ~A~--­
osophical Stud~ or Mysticism. 
Saturday Review of Literature, 2 (October 3, 1925), 
173. 
78. Review of James H. Leuba, The Ps chology of R1e-
ligious Mysticism, 
Journal of Philosophy, 22{December 3, 1925), 
688-693. 
79. "Osmosis: The Object of Social Work." 
Survey: Midmonthly, 55(December 15, 1925, 361-362 • . 
80. The Present Status of the Philosoph of Law a , d of 
Rights. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926.viii, 97 pp. 
Mr. Hocking notes in his Preface that "this small 
book is intended to play a part in a larger scheme. 
There is now in the press a work on Man an the 
state,--a general philosophy and psychology of po-
litical life. A philosophy of the state iB incom-
plete without some indication of a philosop y of 
law. The present essay sketches the outlin~ of 
what I consider the guiding principles in tt~ls 
field.'' The author adds that he hopes later to 
publish a volume on rights-- 11 the rights of 1 en and 
(360) 
of nations." Since that time three partia l treat-
ments of that subject have appeared: the cbnclud-
ing chapters of The S~rit of World Politi~s (1932); 
an article entitled "Ways of Thinking .k\bou~ Rights" 
1937); and a paper for the International Congress 
I 
of Philosophy at Amsterdam entitled "On tht Pres-
ent Position of the Theory of Natural Righ
1 
11 (1949). 
Future articles in this field are presently contem-
plated by Mr. Hocking. 
81. Man and the State. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. 
xv, 463 pp. 
82. "The Creative Use of the Curriculum." 
Progressive Education. 3(July-August-Septe ber, 
1926), 291-206. 
This is an address delivered before the 1926 con-
ference of the Progressive Education Association 
held in Boston. 
83. nAddress of Welcome." 
Article in Proceedin s of the Sixth Intern tional 
Congress of Phi osophy, 6. (E.s. Brightman, ed.) pp. lxxv-lxxvii. 
New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. 
This is the address of welcome to members ) nd del-
egates of the Sixth International Congress of Phil-
osophy, held. at Harvard University in 1926. Mr. 
Hocking delivered this address as presiden and 
representative of the Eastern Division of ~he 
American Philosophical tssociation. 
84. "Mind and Near Mind." 
Article in Proceedin s of the Sixth Intern tional 
Congress of Phi osophy, 19 6. 
(E.S. Brightman, ed.) pp. 203-215. 
New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. 
This article is reprinted in its entirety i ' The 
Development of American Philosophy by Walte rr:-
Muelder and Laurence Sears (Houghton Miffli 
Company, 1940), pp. 491-499. 
85. "Religion of the Future • " 
Article in Religion and Modern Life. 
pp. 343-370. 
New York: Charles Scribner's SonsJ 1927. 
(361) 
This article is contained in a volume of l~ctures 
by various persons given for the Phillips Brooks 
House Association at Harvard during the ac&demic 
years 1924-1926. Specific dates of the individual 
lectures are not indicated, nor is any sin~le au-
thor or editor listed as responsible for this 
I 
volume, although L.B.R. Briggs is the auth , r of 
the introductory note. 
86. "The Arteries of Education." 
Simmons College Review, 9(August, 1927), 1 11. 
This was a Commencement Address delivered t 
Simmons College, BostonJ on June 11, 1927. 
87. Review of Count Hermann Keyserling (ed.), 
The Book of Marriage. 
Yale Review, l7(0ctober, 1927), 165-170. 
88. The Self: Its Body and Freedom. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928. 
ix, 178 pp. 
This is the published form of the Dwight H~rring­
ton Terry Lectures given at Yale Universitw in 
1926. 
89. "What Does Philosophy Say'?" 
Philosophical ReviewJ 37(March, 1928), 133 153. 
This is the Presidential Address before the an-
nual meeting of the American Philosophical As-
sociation, Eastern DivisionJ in Chicago on De-
cember 27-30, 1927. It is reprinted in pa t as 
"What Philosophy Says" in An Anthology of ecent 
Philosophy, pp. 33-44, edited by D.S. Robi son 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1929). 
90. Review of Joseph Alexander Leighton, 
The Individual and the Social Order. 
Philosophical Review, 37(September, 1928), 
513-516. 
91. Types of Philosophy. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. 
xv, 520 pp. 
(362) 
This volume was originally prepared as a ~yllabus 
for an introductory course in Philosophy at Har-
vard, taught by Mr. Hocking. A revised e ition 
was published in 1939. In 1932 a translation 
into Chinese was made at Shanghai by Shih ~ing 
Chu, a former student, and for that editio Mr. 
Hocking wrote a short preface (pp. 1-5). he 
last chapter, entitled "Confessio Fidei," was 
omitted from this translation in order to ~nelude 
it in a special second edition. The secon edi-
tion, however, was never published because of the 
outbreak of hostilities in China. 
93. "Did Dr. Holmes Leave Something Out? 11 
Christian Century, 46(0ctober 30, 1929),13~4. 
This is one of several replies from variou 
sources, all included under the common tit e, 
in reply to an article by John Haynes Holmr,s 
on 11 A Humanistic Interpretation of Prayer, r' 
which had appeared in the October 16th issue 
of this same journal. 
94. "The Working of the Mandates. 11 
Yale Review, 19(December, 1929), 244-268. 
95. "Social Censorship." 
Outlook and Independent, 153(December 11, 929), 
579. 
96. 
97. 
"Some Second Principles. 11 
Article in Contemporary American Philosoppy: 
Personal Statements. (George Plimpton Ada~s 
and William Pepperell Montague, eds.) Voll. I, 
pp. 383-400. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930. 
"Action and Certainty." 
Journal of Philosophy, 27(April 24, 1930), 
(363) 
225-258. ' l 
This is a paper on John Dewey's thought r ad a~ 
a joint meeting of the Eastern and Westerb Di-
visions of the American Philosophical Ass~cia-
______ t_i_o_n, December 30, 1929, in New York Cityf[ 
98. "Palestine: An Impasse ?" 
99. 
Atlantic Monthl~, 146(July, 1930), 121-13~ . 
This article appears under this title as 1hapter 
XXI of The Spirit of World Politics, pp. ,35-362, 
although acknowledgment of its previous p~blica­
tion is not contained in the Preface or b ~dy of 
that book. 
The Dilemma of Rel!gious Knowledge 
by Charles j\. . Bennett. (editor) 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. 
Mr. Hocking is the editor of this book by C. A. 
Bennett, published posthumously, and wrote the 
Preface, pp. ix-xv. 
100. "Our Western Measuring Stick Carried East." 
~, 31(September, 1931), 554-559, 600-6, 4. 
101. "The Ethical Basis Underlying the Legal Righu of 
Religious Liberty as Applied to Foreign Misdions." 
International Review of Missions, 90(0cto er, 
1931), 493-511. 
(364) 
This article, admittedly unfinished in form, con-
sists of "notes contributed by Professor Hocking 
to a discussion of religious liberty by a~repre­
sentative group in .,(:imerica. 11 It was also pub-
lished separately as a pamphlet by the In er-
national Missionary Council (New York), umder the 
. I 
title, Principles of Religious Liberty: ±he Eth-
ical Basis Under! ing the Le al Right of Religious 
Liberty as Applied to Foreign Missions. --
102. The Spirit of World Politics: With S ecial Studies 
103. 
104. 
o the Near East. 1 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. xi 571 pp. 
Three documents, appended as pp. 533-562, were 
not written by Mr. Hocking. 
Re-Thinking Missions: A La af ,er One 
Hundre Years. wi h o hers 
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1932. 
xv, 349 pp. 
This is "the report of the Commission app<Dinted 
I by the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry ~o study 
missions in the Far East and to make reco~enda­
tions concerning their future." Mr. Hocking was 
Chairman of this Commission of Appraisal, land 
editor of this report of which he wrote P~rt I, 
Chapters 1-4, entitled "General Principles." 
"The Ontological Argument in Royce and OtherL " 
Article in Contemporary Idealism in Amerida. 
(Clifford Barre t, e • pp. 45-66. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. 
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Josiah 
Royce. 
105. 11 Can Values be Taught?" 
Article in The Obli ation of Universities to the 
Social Order. Pratt Fairchild, ed. 
pp. 332-3"5'CJ. 
New York: New York University Press, 19 
106. 
This is an address a·t New York Uni versi t 
on November 17, 1932. 
(365) 
"The Place and Scope of Missionary Education." 
Article in Educational Yearbook, 1933: I 
International Institute of Teachers Coll~ e, 
Columbia University. I.L. Kandel, ed. 
pp. 5-31. 
New York: Bureau of Publications, Teac ers 
College, Columbia University, 1933. 
·. 107. \tWha t is a Lost Soul1" 
Chicago Theolo,ical Seminary Register, 
23(March, l933 , 9-lo. 
This is the transcribed record of Mr. Hopking 's 
statement in answer to the question phra~ed in 
this title, given during the discussion eriod 
which followed one of his Alden-Tuthill ec-
tures at the Chicato Theological Seminar , 
January 24-26, 193~: 
108. "Wnat If God Is Gone?" 
Christian Century, 59(March 8, 1933}, 329-331. 
This article is primarily a review of Henry 
Nelson Wieman, D.C • .Maclhtosh: , and Max Carl 
Otto, Is There A God? 
109. "Josiah Royce (1855-1916)." 
Article in Enc clo edia of the SocialS iences. 
(Edwin R.A. eligman and Alvin Johnson, eds. 
Vol. 13, PP• 45lb-452a. 
New York: 'l'he Macmillan Company, 1934. 
110. "The Evolution of the Soul." 
Privately printed, l934. 38 pp. 
This is the text of an address delivere 
the Plymouth Congregational Church, Lan 
Michigan, in November, 1934, on the Wil 
Ayres Foundation. 
in 
ing, 
iam F. 
(366) 
111. "Christianity and Intercultural Contacts. 11 
Journal of Religion, 14(April, 1934), 127 r l38. 
This article is one of the Haskell Lectur~s, de-
livered at the University of Chicago duri g the 
summer of 1933. It is also published undr the 
same title in Modern Trends in World Religions, 
edited by A.E. Haydon University of Chic go 
Press, 1934), pp. 141-152. 
112. "Religion and the Alleged Passing of Liberal sm." 
Advance, 126(May 3, 1934), 86-88. 
113. trwhat Has Philosophy to Say A.bout Education? t 
Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 37(November 2, 1 34), 
161-164. 
This is an address before a convention of Eastern 
___ o_h_io_ Teachers, at Cle.veland, date not givr • 
114. George Herbert Palmer, 1842-1933: Memorial Ad-
dresses. (editor) · [ 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935 
This volume contains two addresses, one b~ Mr. 
Hocking, delivered on December 7, 1933, ap a 
meeting at Harvard University in memory of Pro-
fessor Palmer. Mr. Hocking's address is bn-
titled "Personal Traits of George Herbert j Palmer," 
on pp. 47-65, following an address by C.Mt. Bake-
well. Mr. Hocking is co-author, with Ral h Bar-
ton Perry and C. I. Lewis, of the "Faculty Minute 
on the Life and Service of Professor Palmrr, 11 
pp. 69-80. Although no editor is listed or 
this volume, Mr. Hocking assumed primary ditor-
ial responsibilities. 
115. "Evangelism: An Address on Permanence and C nge in 
. Church and Mission. 11 
Privately printed, 1935. 44 pp. 
This is an address delivered at Rochester,New 
York, on May 28, 1935, before a conventio 
called by the Modern Missions Movement. 
(367) 
116. uThe Meanin g of God and Human Experience." 
-1~~-Experience (The Annual CollE:Jge of Preachers, 
Evanston, Illinois), January 1-4, 1935, p • 61-66. 
117. 11 George Herbert Palmer (1842-1933),« 
Proceedings of the American Academ of 
Sciences, 9 February, 1935 , 533-535. 
This is a brief 11 Biographi cal Notice 11 on the re-
cent death of Professor Palmer. 
118. "The Future of Liberalism." 
Journal of Philosophl• 32(~pril 25, 1938), 
236-247. 
This is a paper presented at a symposium at the 
annual meeting of the Eastern Division o~ the 
American Philosophical Association in De ember, 
1934. A paper by John Dewey, also a par of 
the symposium and bearing the same title~ ap-
pears in this same issue of the journal. 
Some of the central ideas of Mr. Hocking's paper 
were expanded in the Mahlon Powell lectu es in 
1936 and published in Lastin Elements o~ Indi-
vidualism. (See #127 
119. "Does Civilization Still Need Religion?" 
Christendom, l(October, 1935), 31-43. 
120. "Dangers of a College Education." 
Lecture Recorder, 5(February, . l936), 206 ~209. 
This is the Commencement Address delivered at 
Mt. Holyoke College on June 10, 1935. 
121. "Hard Facts in the East.u 
,Asia, 36(March~ 1936), 151-153. 
122. "Cross-Currents in Asian Aims." 
Asia, 36(April, ].936), 235-238. 
l 
(368) 
123. "Chu Hsi' s Theory of Knowledge." 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 
1936), 109"-127. 
124. " Meanings of Life." 
Journal of Religion, 16(July, 1936), 253 l 283. 
This is a lecture on the Hiram JN' . Thomas Founda-
tion delivered at the University of Chic~go on 
May 14, 1936. It was later expanded and pub-
lished with other material under the tit]e 
Thoughts on Death and Life. \ 
125. "Misconceptions about Palestine." \ 
126. 
127. 
christian century, 53< July 1, 1936 >, 930r 32. 
Thoughts on Death and Life. \ 
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1937, x, 260 pp. 
This volume contains the Ingersoll Lectu~e on 
the Immortality of Man, entitled "Meanings of 
Death," which was given at Harvard in 193\6, and 
the Hiram w. Thomas lecture, entitled "Meanin gs 
of Life," presented at the University of Chicago 
in the same year, together with an "In~erl ude" 
entitled "A Symposium on the Meaning of iJife," 
and an Appendix on "Biology and the Meanir g of 
Human Life. u 
Lasting Elements of Individualism. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. xiv,l87 pp. 
This is the published form of the Mahlon ~owell 
lectures at the University of Indiana in \1936. A 
Swedish translation, made by Torgny T. Segerstedt 
and entitled Individual!smens Bestaende V~rde, was 
published at stockholm in 1939. 1 
I 128. "Ways of Thinking About Rights: A New TheorY! of the 
Relation Between rAw and Morals." I 
129. 
(369) 
Article in Law: A Century of Progress 5-
1935. Vol. II . Public Law an Juris ru e), 
pp. 242-265. . 
New York: New York University Press, 7. 
The three volumes of this series (Lettere L, 
A, and w, respectively) cow~emorate the c nten-
ary of the New York University School of aw. 
They are available at many law school libraries 
and at the State Library, State House, Bor ton, 
Massachusetts. 
"Philosophy and Undergraduate Education." 
Association of es Bulletin, 
3 March, 1 3 
This is an address before the 23rd annual meet-
ing of the Association of American Colleges, 
held at Washington, D.c., on January 14, ~937. 
The full title of this address was "The F~nction 
of Philosophy and Religion in Undergraduate Ed-
ucation." 
130. "Philosophy--the Business of Everyman." 
Journal of the American Association of Universit 
Women, 30(June, 1937), 212-2 
This is the text, considerably abridged, of an 
address before the convention of the Ame ican 
Association of University Women at Savannah, 
Georgia, in April, 1937. 
131. "Fact and Destiny." 
Glasgow: Mimeographed only, 1938. 17 pp. 
This is tb~ outline of the first five le tures 
in the first series of Gifford Lectures, Jgiven 
at Glasgow University in 1938. The comp~eted 
lectures have not yet appeared in publis ed 
form, although they are currently being repared 
for publication. Translations of this p elimi-
nary draft have appeared as follows: 
"Tatsache und Schicksal. 0 Part I. 
Die Tatwelt, 15(Marz, 1939), 36-46 
"Tatsache und Schicksal." Part II 
Die Tatwelt, 15(Juli, 1939), 87-97. 
"Fait et destin~e." 
Revue Philosophique, 127(Mars-Avri1,19 9 ) , 
113-135. 
( 370) 
With considerable editorial changes, part cu1arly 
in the first lecture, this outline also a peared 
as "Fact and Destiny (II)n in the Review of 
Metaphysics, 4(March, 1951), 319-342, fol ] owing 
a new article under the same title, "Fact and 
Destiny (IJ~ which had appeared in the pr vious 
issue of this journal. See entry #204 be ow. 
During the period in which these lectures were 
delivered at Glasgow, Mr. Rocking supplieq repre-
sentatives of the press (notably the Glasgow 
Herald and the Scotsman, of Edinburgh} w~ th 
fairly full condensations of the individu~l lec-
tures in advance. The Glasgow Herald pri ted 
them practically in full, with introducto
1
y re-
marks and an occasional change of verbs i l to in-
direct discourse, while the series in the Scots-
~ was more substantially abridged. The ten 
lectures of the First Series in 1938 appeared in 
the Glasgow Herald on the following dates !<report-
ing the previous days lecture): January 1e, 
January 21, January 28, February 4, Febru4ry 11, 
Fe.bruary 18, February 25, March 4, March ~1, and 
March 17. The ten lectures of the Second iSeries 
in 1938-1939 appeared in the same newspaper on 
the following dates: November 30, Decembe 1 3, 
December 7, December 10, December 14, Dec mber 
17, January 11, January 14, January 18 , ad 
January 21. 
132. "Th~ , Test of Religion." 
f' rotestant Digest, l(June, 1939), 32-34. 
An editorial note accompanying this artie e in-
correctly states that it is "from the for beaming 
book, Living Religions and a World. Faith.' 
(371) 
Although it is true that the MS. of that ook 
was being prepared for publication when t s 
article was submitted~ this is a piece written 
especially for this journal. 
Although listed in this journal as one of its 
editorial advisory committee, Mr. Hocking was 
never closely associated with it 1 and resigned 
early in 1941. The name of the journal wks later 
changed to The Protestant, and has finall~ sus-
pended publication within the past two years. 
133. Living Religions and a World Faith. 
New York: The W~cmillan Company, 1940. 
vii, 293 pp. 
This is the published form of the Hibbert Lec-
tures delivered at the Universities of Ca~bridge 
and Oxford in 1938. This book was also p~blished 
in 1940 by Nelson in Toronto and by G. Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., in London. 
134. "The Finer Arts of Pugnacity.n 
Article in The SEirit of Scholarship. 
pp. 43-51. 
Greencastle, Indiana: DePauw University, 1940. 
I This article was delivered as an address ~t DePauw 
University non the occasion of the . fiftieth anni-
versary of the founding of the Indiana Alpha Chapter 
of Phi Beta Kappa, December 17 and 18, 19~9." It 
is published here in "a commemorative vol')tme pre-
senting the program and principal addresses" of 
that observance. 
135. "Outline-Sketch of a System of Iv1etaphysics. 11 
Article in Philoso hical Essa s in Ivlemor of 
Edmund Husserl. Marvin Farber, ed. pp. t51-261. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 0. 
(372) 
136. "A Philosophy of Life for the American Farme (and 
Others).n 
Article in Farmers in a Chan in World: Tb.e Year-
book o:f Agriculture, 1940. Gove Hambidgel, ed.) 
PP• 1056-1071. 
Washington: United States Government Pr nting 
Of fice, 1940. 
137. "Dewey's Concepts o:f Experience and Nature. 11 
Philosophical Review, 49( March, 1940), 2, 8-244. 
This paper represents Mr. Hocking's contr bution 
to a Symposium o:f the same title , presented at a 
special session honoring the eightieth bi' thday 
of John Dewey at the annual meeting o:f t e Ameri-
can Philosophical Association at New Yor on 
December 28, 1939. Also contained in this issue 
is an article by Professor Dewey, entitled "Nature 
and Experience," in which he replies to ~is critics. 
His r eply to Mr. Hocking is to be :found dn pp. 
253-257 o:f that article. · 
138. " Herbert Vincent Neal as Man and Thinker." 
Privately printed: Tufts College, April 1, 1940. 
This is an address delivered in honor of Professor 
Neal at a memorial service at Tufts College on 
April 21, 1940. 
139. "Democracy and the Scientific Spirit.n 
American Journal o:f Orthopsychiatry, 
10 (July, 1940}, 431-436. 
This is an add.t1ess before the annual mee ing o:f 
the American Orthopsychiatric Associatio at 
Boston on February 22, 1940, which was part of 
8 A Symposium on Democracy and the Scient fie 
Spirit. " 
140. uLectures on Recent Trends in American Phil 
Scrip£S College Bulletin, 16(1941}, 7-44 
(373) 
This is the published form of two lectures at 
Scripps College in April, 1940. The pamphlet .in 
which it appears is also described as "Sclripps 
College Papers, Number Seven." The copy ~or 
this article was hastily proofread, and cf ntains 
many generalizations needing clarificatio and 
substantiation. Mr. Hocking has recently re-
ceived permission to write a new book on ~ his 
subject, using some of the material from these 
Scripps College Lectures. 
141. 1, V11ni tehead on Mind and Nature. n 
Article in The Philosophy of Alfred Nort 
Vfuitehead. -rPaul A. Schilpp, ed.) pp. 38~-404. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press!' 1941. 
This book is Volume III in the current ae~ies, 
11 The Library of Living Philosophers." 
142. "Tribute to Tagore." 
Article in Tributes to Tagore in America. p.4 
New York: India League of America, 1941. 
This brief tribute by Mr. Hocking is one of 
several presented at the Tagore Memorial t eeting, 
held in New York on August 26, 1941. These tri-
butes were collected and published (mimeographed) 
by the India League of America at its hea~quartera 
in New York . 
143. Review of Archibald A. Bowman , A Sacramental 
Universe: bein a Stud in the . Meta h sics lof 
Experience. 
Mind, 50(April, 1941), 176-184. 
144. "~'he Nature of Morale •11 
American Journal of Sociolog~, 
302-320. 
145. " A Positive Role for the United States." 
Harvard Guardian, 6( December, 1941), 15-
(374) 
This is an article in a student pU.blicati\on at 
Harvard. 
I 
146. "Theses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysilcs by 
a New Route." 
147. 
148. 
Journal of Philosophy, 38(December 4, 194
1
1), 
688-690. 
An editorial note in this issue of the Jo,urnal 
of Philosophy reports that several articl!es con-
tained therein were "abstracts of papers jto be 
readu at the 1941 meeting of the Eastern Division 
of the American Philosophical Association. It 
should be observed, however, that N~ . Ho 9king's 
article was not prepared for that meeting. 
0 The Meaning of I,iberalism: An Essay in Defilnition." 
Article in Liberal Theology: An Appraisa~ . 
(De.vid E. Roberts and Henry Pitney Van Dusen, 
eds.) pp. 47-57. I 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. 
This book is a volume of essays in honor lor 
Eugene William Lyman. 
1 
11 In Time. of War the Spiritual Task of the Ch
1
urches 
Becomes One of Peculiar Urgency." 
Article in A Righteous Faith for a Just and 
Durable Peace. (John Foster Dulles, Chailrman of 
Commission) pp. 12-18. 
New York: Commission to Study the Bases of a 
Just and Durable Peace (Federal Counci] of 
-------C-hurches), 1942. I 
149. "The Cultural and Religious Organization of \the 
Future .n 1 
Article in Toward International Organiza4ion. 
PP. 162-188. . I 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. I 
This volume is the publication of lectures by 
various persons given at Oberlin College jin 1941. 
No editor for the volume is recorded, al 
Ernest Hatch Wilkins, President of Oberl 
the author of a short preface. 
150. "What Man Can Make of Man." 
Fortune, 25(February, 1942), 91-93, 136-
142, 147. 
151. What Man Can Make of Man. 
(375) 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. vii, 62 pp. 
This book is a revised and extended form of the 
article cited in the preceding entry, an~ was 
published in December, 1942. It was tra~nl sla ted 
for publication in ·Germany under the tit e Was 
der Mensch aus dem Menschen machen kann (Mtlnchen: 
Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1949. 61 ~p.), 
and was also published in Japan in the s~me year 
(Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo, 1949}. The Japanesle tran-
slation was made by Paul Sawahito Yamamo~o, an 
instructor at the Japanese Biblical Semi9ary. 
Under the title, tt'I'he Psychiatrist and t~e Soul, 11 
a selection from pp. 51-54 of the Harpers edition 
was included in the volume On the Wisdom of 
America, pp. 41-42, edited by Lin Yu Tan (New 
York: John Day Company, 1950). 
152. "Science in its Relation to Value and Relision." 
Rice Institute Pamphlet, 29(April, 1942), 143-221. 
This is the published form of the "Rockwell Lec-
tures on Religious Subjects" delivered at the 
Rice Institute in 1942. 
153. "Letter to the Editor." 
Harvard Crimson, (April 24, 1942); 2. 
This is a letter on the situation in India. 
154. "The Near East. " (with others) 
University of Chicago Round Table, 
224(June 28, 1942}. 
(376) 
This is the record of a radio discussion by H.A.R. 
Gibb, Philip Ireland, and Mr. Hocking, on the 
University of Chicago Round Table progra~ heard 
over the National Broadcasting Company on June 
28, 1942. 
155. "A New East in a New World." 
Fortune, 26(August, 1942}, 107-110, 119-120, 
122, 124, 126, 131. 
156. nWhat .Price Victory?" (with others) 
America's Town Meeting of the Air, 
September 10, 1942. 
This is a radio discussion by a panel co posed 
of Crane Brinton, Alvin H. Hansen, Thoma~ Matters, 
and Mr. Hocking, with Kirtley Mather as ~ oderator, 
broadcast from Sanders Theater, Cambridg , on · 
September 10, 1942. The record of this 4iscussion 
is published by the American Education P~ess, 
Inc., of Columbus, Ohio, (Vol. 8, No. 20 ~ , while 
the 'l'own Hall office is located at 123 West 43rd 
Street, New York. 
157. 0 0n China's Rebirth." 
National Herald, Chungking, China, 
~October 12, 1942), 3. 
**This is a message to China on ••Double Ten Day,n 
published here in a periodical of the Ch~na 
Information Committee at its headquarter~ in 
Chungking. This brief notice was also p blished 
in China at War, brought out by the sam com-
mittee and distributed by the China News ·service 
of New York. 
158. lfAsia's Traveling Religions." 
Asia, 42(December, 1942), 683-686. 
This article was published under the tit~e, 
"Living Religions and a World Faith,u in ,_I The 
Asian Le~acy, pp. 193-214, edited by Artqur E. 
Christy New York: John Day Company, 194B}. 
(377) 
159 . ··-rrThe political-economic Settlement in the FJr East 
in the Light of the Christian Conscience." 
· Article in The Churches and a Lasting Pe~ce: 
A Study Book of the Regional Conference qf the 
Churches on a Just and Durable Peace hel~ at 
Hood College, Frederick, Maryland, June ~6-18, 
1943. pp. 38-39. I 
This is a brief report of an address by Mr. Hock-
ing at the above-named regional conferencle. At 
the time this booklet was published in 1~43, 
copies could be obtained from the Counci ~ of 
Churches and Christian Education of MaryJJand-
Delaware in Baltimore, and from the Washilngton, 
D.C., Federation of Churches. 
160. "Colonies and Dependent Areas." 
161. 
162. 
Privately printed: Universities Committee on 
Post-War International Problems, n.d. 
This is an article written for the Unive 
Committee on Post-War International Prob 
(Ralph Barton Perry, chairman), affiliat 
the World Peace Foundation (40 Mt. Verno Street, 
Boston). Although no date appears on the title 
page of this pamphlet, it was written in 1943. 
"How Can Our Schools Enrich the Spiritual J perience 
of Their Students?" 
Beacon, (October, 1943}, 195-206. 
**This is an address to the 11 Headmistresse ~ Associ-
ation of the East," at a meeting in New ork City 
on November 13, 1936. The title was assigned. 
Science and the Idea of God. 
Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North C rolina 
Press, 1944. ix, 124 pp. 
163. 
( 378) 
This is the t•mature formtt of lectures on "Con-
temporary Science and the Idea of God," qelivered 
on the John Calvin McNair .Foundation at ~he Uni-
versity of North Carolina in 1940. Thes lec-
tures were also given before the General Council 
of the Congregational Christian Churches at 
Durham, New Hampshire, in 1942. 
The Church and the New World Mind. (with others) 
St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 1944. J 
This book contains the Drake Lectures fo 1944 
delivered at the Drake Conference on nTh Church 
and the New World Mind. 11 Mr. Hocking is jthe only 
contributor with more than one lecture, ~d his 
consisted of the following: "Faith and World 
Order." (pp. 13-42}; "Culture and Peace, ~ 
( pp. 43-69); and "Statesmanship and Cbri~tiani ty , 11 
(pp. 70-97). Among the other lecturers ere 
Wilmott Lewis, Georgia Harkness, M. Sear~e Bates, 
G. Baez-Camargo, Cleo w. Blackburn, Walter w. 
Van Kirk, and Rufus M• Jones. 
164. l'The Mystical Spirit." 
Article in Protestantism: A Symposium. 
(William K. Anderson, ed.) pp. 185-195. 
Nashville, Tenn.: Commission on Course of 
Study ('l'he Methodist Church), 1944. 
165. n Value of the C ompara ti ve Study of Philosophy." 
Article in Philosophy--East and West. 
(Charles A. Moore, ed.) pp. 1-11. 
Princ~ton: Princeton University Press, 1944. 
An introductory note states that " This v~lume 
represents the results of the East-West ~hilo­
sophers' Conference held at the Univer s i y of 
Hawaii during the summer of 1939." M:r. . ocking' s 
article was prepared for the conference, although 
he was unable to attend. 
(379) 
166. l'Foreword." 
Article in The Bhagavadgita. 
(Swami Nikhilananda, tr.) pp. v, vi. 
New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekanda Center 1944. 
167. "America Does Have Something to Offer theN w E'ra." 
Alumnus of Iowa State College, 39(April 1944), 
1'76-179. 
This article is an abridged form of an a dress 
delivered by Mr. Hocking at a vesper ser ice on 
February 6, 1944, at the Iowa State College of 
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts. 
168. "Plan is Opposed as Source of Dissension." 
Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 
93(April 2, 1944), Sec. 4, BE. 
This letter expresses Mr. Hocking's oppo ition 
to the unrestricted opening of the Jewis Nation-
al Home in Palestine to all Jewish refugdes. It 
is one of "two letters of opposing point~ of view, 
on the proposed Jewish National Home in ljalestine." 
The other letter was written by Professo~ Carl J. 
Friedrich, Director of the School for Ovj rseas 
Administration at Harvard. The title of the 
Hocking letter as noted above was suppli~d by 
the editor; Mr. Hocking's own title, which was 
not published, was, "Palestine as a Placd of 
Refuge. 11 
169. "America's World Purpose. 11 
Life, 16(April 17, 1944), 103-104, 106, 09-110, 
112. 
A translation of this article into Chine e was 
I 
made in 1945 by s . Livingston Hu, and pu lished . 
in China' s Law Journal, (November, 1945) 43-56 • 
170. 11 0n the Treatment of Germany." 
Christianity and Crisis, 4(May 29, 1944) 3-4. 
171. uF'amine Over Bengal." 
Asia, 44(August, 1944), 345-349. 
172. "Is a World Police Possible?" 
Christian Century, 6l(November 22, 1944} 
1347-1349. 
173. 11 Economic Co-operation.n 
(380) 
Article in A Message to the Churches. pp 10-11. 
New York: Commission on a Just and Dur ble 
Peace (Federal Council of the Churches of 
Christ in America}, 1945. 
This article is actually Section 3 of Part II, 
~'Christian Standards and Current International 
Problems~n of the report to the churches ifrom the 
National Study Conference on "The Church's and a 
Just and Durable Peace," held at Clevela~d, Ohio, 
on January 16-19, 1945. Although his particular 
contribution to this report is unsigned, Mr. 
Hocking is listed as one of those who co stituted 
the "Conference Committee on the Message to the 
Churches. 11 
174. "Private Property and Property Systems." 
Article in Post War World. p. 3. 
New York: Commission on a Just and Dur l ble 
Peace (Federal Council of the Churches of 
Christ in America}, 1945. 
This article is presented as "the author s per-
sonal statement" which issued from Mr. Hocking's 
work as Chairman of one of the Commissiobs at 
the National Study Conference on "The Ch~ches 
and a Just and Durable Peace," held at Cleveland~ 
Ohio, on January 16-19, 1945. This stat~ment 
was presented in the form of a supplementary 
resolution, and although approved by the appro-
priate committee, it did not come up for vote in 
the final session of the conference. It is pub-
lished here in a newsletter reporting th pro-
ceedings, which was distributed by the F deral 
Council of Churches. 
175. 
(381 ) 
"Appendix to 'Buddhist Japan and World Peac j ' by 
Chan Wing-tsit." 
Article in Approaches to National Unit~. 
(Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, andol::lert M. 
Maciver, eds.) p. 488. 
New York: Conference on Science, Philo 
and Religion in their Relation to the 
cratic Way of Life, Inc., 1945. 
This is a brief, one-paragraph comment o 
by Professor Chan which was prepared for 
fifth meeting of the Conference on Scien 
sophy and Religion, held at Col~~bia Uni 
from September 7-11, 1944. 
a paper 
the 
e, Philo-
ersity 
176. "The Business of Business." 
Christian Science Monitor, 
1945}, 16. 
This article is a review of 
Tomorrow's Business. 
37(February r· 
Beardsley Ruml, 
177. "Death and Resurrection in the Life of Nati ns." 
(with others} 
University of Chicago Round Table, 
367(April 1, 1945}, 4-6. 
This is the record of a radio discussion by 
Charles Merriam, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Red-
field, and Mr. Hocking , with Ernest Colwell 
assisting on the University of Chicago Rqund 
Table program heard over the National Brdad.cast-
ing Company on April 1, 1945. 
178. "Arab Nationalism and Political Zionism." 
Moslem World, 35(July, 1945}, 216-223. 
Prior to its publication in this journal, this 
article was privately printed in 1944 by the 
League of American-Arab Committees for Democracy. 
(1907 Detroit Street, Flint 5, Michigan.} How-
ever, the journal reference is cited initially 
as being more readily available. 
(382) 
179. " A Discussion of the Theory of Internationa 
Relations. 11 
Journal of Philosophy, 42(August 30, 1945 ) , 
484-486. 
This is one of several contributions und~r this 
same title, primarily directed to theore ~ica.l 
issues in two particular paragraphs of John 
Dewey's Introduction to the re-issue of J ane 
Addams' Peace and Bread in Time of War. These 
contributions by various authors were su mitted 
on the request of the editors of this jo rnal. 
180. "The Atom and World Politics." (with others} 
University of Chicago Round Table, 
393(September 30, 1945), 1-11. 
This is the record of a radio discussion by 
Norman Cousins, William Fox, Leo Szilard, and Mr. 
Hocking on the University of Chicago Rou~d Table 
program heard over the National Broadcast! ng 
Company on September 30, 1945. 
181. nThe State of the Nation." 
182. 
University of Chicago Round Table, 
406lDecember 30, 1945), 4-7. 
This is the record of a radio discussion , y 
Ernest c. Colwell, chairman, T. R.Hogness, I-Rein-
hold Niebuhr, Robert Redfield, and Mr. Hobking 
on the University of Chicago Round Table program 
heard over the National Broadcasting Complany on 
December 30, 1945• 
"'rhe Immortality of Man .n 
Religion in Life, 15(W1nter, 1945-1946), -22. 
This is the Garvin Lecture for 1945 delivbred at 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Under the title, 
"Immortality in the Light of Science and hilo-
sophy," it was published in Man's Destin in 
Eternity,pp. 139-164, F. Lyman vindolph, uthor 
of preface, (Boston: The Beacon Press, 191 9). 
183. 
184. 
As with an earlier entry noted above, thi 
article ·was privately printed by the Garv~n 
Lecture Committe.e of Lancaster, Pa., prio~ to 
its appearance in Religion in Life. Howet er, 
the journal reference is cited initially as 
being more readily available. 
Preface to Philosophy: Textbook. (with others} 
New York: The Macmillan Company , 1946 . I 
(383) 
This volume is the work of four authors, *rand 
Blanshard, Charles William Hendel, John Herman 
Randall, Jr., and Mr. Hocking, who worked lto-
gether under the chairmanship of Chancellor 
William Tolley of Syracuse. Each author' ~ 
specific contribution is signed by him, al d Mr. 
Hocking is the au thor of Part I, entitled "What 
is Man?" (pp. 3-99), and Part V, "A World View,t' 
(pp. 413-504}. This is a textbook for in~ro­
ductory courses in philosophy, which was origi-
nally prepared under directions from the War 
Department as a text for American soldier~ in 
the field. It is supplemented by a compartion 
volume entitled Preface to Philosophy; Thd Book 
of Readings, under a different board of e itors 
"The Creed of Philosophical Anarchism." 
Article in Leviathan in Crisis. 
(Waldo R. Browne, ed.) pp. 348-356. 
New York: The Viking Press, 1946. 
This is not a new article, but a re-print ng of 
Chapter VII, entitled "State-Skeptics, ii, The 
Philosophical Anarchist," from Man and th State, 
pp. 90-103. The title of this selection as pro-
vided by the editor, and although it is a knowl-
edged to be from Man and the State, the s ecific 
chapter is not identified here. 
185. "The Treatment of Ex-Enemy Nations.t' 
Article in Christianity Takes a Stand: An 
Approach to the Issues of Today. (William 
Scarlett, ed.) pp. 42~56. · 
New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1946. 
(384) 
186. ~The Atom as Moral Dictator." 
Saturday Review of Literature, 29(Februa y 2, 
1946}, 7-9. 
187. nMetaphysics: Its Function, Consequences ad 
Criteria." ' I 
Journal of Philosophy, 43(July 4, 1946),~65-378. 
. I 
This article was read as part of a sympo~ium on 
this subject at the meeting of the Easte~n Divi-
sion of the American Philosophical Assoc+ation, 
____ Feb:uary 22, 1946, at Sarah Lawrence College. 
188. Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Prin ; iple. 
189. 
190. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19I7. 
This is a personal statement by Mr. Hock ng as 
a member of the Commission on the Freedo of the 
Press. ~Vhile there is general agreementfamong 
the Commission on these principles, Ivlr. : ocking 
assumes sole responsibility for the phil , sophical 
position which gives unity to this monog aph. 
Signed comments and criticisms by other !embers 
of the Commission are included as footno es, to-
gether with Mr. Hocking's replies. The hort 
statement of principles in the main report of 
this Commission entitled " A Free andRe ponsible 
Press,tt is Mr. Hocking's solution of the task 
assigned to him, to draw up a brief stat ment on 
which all members could agree. 
Freedom of the Press in America. 
Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1947. 24 pp. 
This is the Inaugural Address delivered 'Y Mr. 
Hocking on his entrance into office as g est 
professor at the University of Leiden, H ~ lland, 
on October 24, 1947. j 
"Justice, Law, and the Ca ses." 
Article in Inter retations of Modern Le 1 
Philosophies. Paul Sayre, ed. pp. 332 351. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 194 • 
(3e5) 
This book is a volume of essays in honor of 
Roscoe Pound, assembled for presentation on his 
75th birthday. 
191. "Old and New in Moral Philosophy." 
Article in There is Another China. pp. 1 ~ 1-176. 
New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. 
This book is a volume of essays in honor 
Chang Poling of Nankai. It is accompani 
UPublisher's Note," but the name of the 
is not given. 
of 
d by a 
ditor 
192. "Uber die gegenwM.rtige Situation der Philoslphie. 
Deutsche Beitr~ge, 2(1948), 533-548. j 
This article was originally given as a lecture 
before Professor Aloys Wenzl's Colloquiu* on 
Contemporary Philosophy at the Universit of 
Munich in April, 1948. 
193. uEthical Factors in Positive Law." 
Mtlnche.n: Mimeographed only, 1948. 
~H}This is an address before the Juristenta~ung at 
Munich in June, 1948, delivered under th~ auspi-
ces of the Office of Military Government J German 
Courts Division. The German translation-lor this 
article is entitled, Ethische Faktoren i$ 
positiven Recht. 
194. "Reply to the University of Leiden on Recei ing the 
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Philosophy an Letters." 
Article in Convocation of the Universit of 
Leiden (June 15, 1948 • pp. 17-24. 
Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1948. 
This is the record of the special convocJ tion of 
the University of Leiden to honor ~w. Ho 1 king. 
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195. "Foreword." 
Article in Reason in the Art of Living. 
(James Bissett Pratt) pp. vii-xi. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949 
196. "On the Present Position of the Theory of N tural 
197. 
Right. 11 
Article in Library of the Xth Internatio al 
Congress of P osop y. 
(F.W. Beth and H.J. Pas, eds.) Vol. I, PB·556-5§9. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1949. ~ 
This volume contains the proceedings of he Tenth 
International Congress of Philosophy, he]d at 
Amsterdam, August 11-18, 1948. 
These are the brief remarks by 1w. Hocki g in 
presiding at the afternoon session of the ter-
centenary observance. Mr. Hocking was h~dnorary 
cr~irman of the Congregationalist Commission of 
the Joint Commission of the Congregation 1 
Christian Churches and the American Unit rian 
Association. 
198. "Teaching in Dutch Universities." 
Main Currents in Modern Thought, 7(Autumn 1 1949), 95-96. 
This is an abridgment of an article whic appeared 
under the title, "Dutch Higher Education -Compara-
tive Impressions of a Visiting Harvard Professor," 
in the Harvard Educational Review, 20(Wi ter, 
1950), 28-35. 
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199. "Comment on 'Unity in Difference_( by Edgar S 
Brightman • " . \ 
Article in Perspectives in a Troubled Dec~de. 
(Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robl' rt 
M. Maciver, eds.) p. 444. 
New York: Conference on Science, Philos phy 
and Religion in their Relation to the D mo-
cratic Way of Life, Inc., 1950. 
This is a brief comment on a paper by Dr. 
man prepared for the tenth meeting of the 
ference on Science, Philosophy and Religi 
at Columbia University on September 5-8, 
Dr. Brightman's reply to Mr. Hocking's co 
is also included here. 
Bright-
Con-
n, held 
950. 
ent 
Mr. Hocking is also the author of brief comments 
on the article "Freedom and Rights" by Pa 1 Weiss 
(p. 508), and on Professor Richard Kroner's "On 
the Religious Imagination" (pp. 601-602), in this 
same volume. 
200. "The Binding Ingredients of Civilization." 
Article in Goethe and the Modern Age. 
jArnold Bergstraesser, ed.) pp. 252-283. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950. 
This is the text of a lecture delivered at the 
Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music esti-
val, held June 27 to July 17, 1949, in Asprn, 
Colorado. It was translated into German, s "Die 
bindenen Krlifte der Zivilisation," and pub ' ished 
in two parts in Deutsche Beitrli~e, 4(1950) 
Heft 2, 111-124; Heft 3, 199-21 • 
An abridgment of this article, entitled "A ds 
and Obstacles to World Civilization," was :pub-
lished in Measure, l(Spring, 1950), 93-108~ 
201. "Finest Event." 
Letter to the Editor, New Hampshire Morning Union, 
88(June 15, 1950), 4. 
This letter also appeared in the Manches ,er 
(N.H.) Evening Leader published by e s me 
management, on the same date. The title of 
this letter was assigned by the editor. 
202. "The New Way of Thinking." 
Colby Alumnus, 39(July 15, 1950), 3-7. 
(388) 
This is the Commencement ~ddress deliver d at 
Colby College on June 12, 1950. 
203. "Lattimore, 1 Patriot. 111 
Letter to the Editor, New Hampshire Morn ng 
Union, 88(August . 19, 1950), 4·.- I 
This letter also appeared in the Manches~er 
(N.H.) Evening Leader, published by the ame 
management, on the same date. The title of this 
letter was assigned by the editor. 
204. "Fact and Destiny (I)." 
Review of Metaph~~i~, 4(September, 1950), 1-12. 
This article constitutes "the program of the 
Gifford Lectures, first series, given at Glasgow, 
1938-39." It is the purpose of this art cle to 
relate the Gifford Lectures to the present state 
of philosophical discussion. An outline of the 
first five lectures appeared in the next issue of 
this same journal. 
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ADDENDA 
January 1 to July 1 1 1951 
205. "Fact and Destiny (II)." 
Review of Metaphysics, 4(March, 1951), 3 
This article constitutes the argument, o out-
line, of the first five Gifford Lectures, given 
at Glasgow, 1938-1939. The program of t e lec-
tures appeared in the preceding issue of this 
journal. Earlier publications and trans ations 
of this second article are reported unde entry 
#131 above. 
206. "Informing t he Armed Forces. 11 
Letter to the Editor, New York Times, lOO( May 
24, 1951), 34. • l 
This letter is a partial comment on a re ,ort on 
the need for education in the armed forc~ s, made 
by the Education Editor of the Times. In this 
letter M:r. Hocking asserts tbat 11 the que tions 
which the men in the service want answered are 
only in small measure 11 informational• ••• JThey 
are gropin g for political and philosophidal 
light." This letter recalls a long seri~s of 
reports made by Mr. Hocking to the Divis l on of 
Education of the 1Ji!ar Department during t *e first 
World War when he was inspector of educa ~ ional 
programs in army camps in northeastern U~ited 
States. The title of this letter was as igned 
by the editor. 
207. 11 Arab World's Alienation Seen." 
Letter to the Editor, New York Times. 
lOO(June 18, 1951),22. 
In this letter Mr. Hocking critic i~ es cufrent 
American policy of aiding Israel as the ole 
American ally in the Middle East, and th s 
tacitly implying approval of that countr 's gen-
eral policy toward adjacent Arab countri s. 
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(1915) 
"Political Philosophy in Germany. 11 
Journal of Philosophy, 12{0ctober 14, 
524-586. 1915), 
This article is a critical commentary on \John 
Dewey's recently published Ger::nan Philosqph;z: 
and Politics, and it is followed here b y \Pro-
fessor Dewey's reply, pp. 587-588. This cor-
respondence had been earlier published in the 
New Republic, Vol. IV, pp. 234 ff., and ~s in-
cluded here in the "Notes and News" sect on of 
the Journal of Philosophy. 
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SECTION C 
This Index, which is the joint effort of t e bibli-
ographer and Mr. Hocking, is not intended as an ~xhaustive 
compilation of all the principal ideas and refer~nces 
throughout Mr. Hocking's writings. It is primar~ly a list-
ing of the articles and books in which certain tl1pics are 
~ore or less prominently treated. Inasmuch as mo t of the 
books have detailed indexes, and nearly all the rticles 
are sufficiently brief to permit easy reference, the pages, 
chapters, or sections of the different writings re not 
cited here. The numbers following each topic re~er to the 
listing of Mr. Hocking's writings in Section B atlove. 
Aesthetics: 25, 48. 
Anthropology: 39, 48, 136, 139, 150, 151, 183. 
Art: 200. 
Bergson, Henri: 33, 91. 
Body and Mind: 25, 88, 183. 
Christianity: 13, 21, 32, 48, 50, 103, 111, 133, 159, 
163 ' 17 3 , 17 4 • 
Church and State: 81, 101, 103. 
Civilization: 102, 119, 149, 163, 200. 
Confucius: 123, 133, 191. 
Crime and Punishment: 14, 58. 
Descartes, Rene: 3, 25, 192. 
Dewey, John: 1, 92, 97, 137. 
Dialectic: 48, 150, 151, 192. 
East and west: 100, 154, 165. 
Economics: 159, 169, 173, 174, 176. 
Education: 1, 11, 14, 36, 38, 48, 52, 68, 74, 81 82, 
86, 105, 106, 113, 115, 120! 127, 129, 161, 19,, 206. 
Epistemology: 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 18, 20, 25, 33, 67, 
91, 97, 99, 123, 131. 
Ethics: 2, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 39, 41, 47, 48, 49~ 52, 
53, 54, 56, 63, 75, 81, 87, 88, 101, 102, 124, jl27, 
128, 134, 136, 144, 147, 150, 151, 152, 174, 176, 
191, 193, 195. 
Experience: 3,25, 131, 137, 143. 
Freedom: 88, 95, 146, 150, 151, 160, 188, 189. 
God: 25, 43, 108, 116, 162. 
History, Philosophy of: 16, 25, 102, 118, 119, 1 7, 200. 
Immortality: 73, 126, 182. 
Instinct: 48, 58, 61, 69. 
James, William: 25, 140. 
Kant, Immanuel: 71, 75, 131, 164. 
Laotze: · 133, 191. 
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Law, Philosophy of: 30, 48, 80, 81, 101, 102, 128, 150, 
151, 188, 189, 190, 193, 196, 200. 
Liberalism: 112, 118, 127, 147. 
Logic, 1, 6, 8, 9, 15, 131, 146, 199. 
Metaphysics: 10, 20, 22, 23, 2~] 26, 27, 35, 48, 64, 73, 4 
76, 84, 88, 89, 91, 104, 110, 126, 131, 135, 13 ' 141, 
143, 146, 162, 182, 183, 187, 192, 199, 204. 
Methodology: 4, 9, 18, 44, 67, 91, 131. 
Missions: 101, 103, 106, 115, 133. 
Mysticism: 25, 26, 48, 77, @1, 99, 124, 126, 164, 
Nature, Philosophy of: 23, 27, 34, 66, 126, 137, ~41,146. 
Near East, Middle East: 102, 125, 154, 168, 178, 207. 
Ontological ~ rgument: 25, 104. I 
Orient: 100, 103, 111, 121, 122, 133, 153, 154, 1B7, 159, 
171, 175. 1 
Oriental Philosophy: 103, 123, 154, 158, 165, 166 175, 
191. 
Other Mind: 3, 25. 
Palmer, George; 65, 114, 117. 
Perception: 3, 91, 131. 
Philosophy (general and about philosophy): 12, 18 44, 
89, 91, 96, 113, 129, 130, 136, 165, 187. 
Philosophy, History of: 140, 163, 177, 192, 204. 
Pound, Roscoe: 80, 128, 190, 193, 196. 
Pragmatism: 150, 151, 162. 
Psychiatry: 150, 151, 162. 
Psychology: 7, 10, 25, 26, 28, 39, 41, 48, 49, 52 54, 
55, 56, 58, 61, 68, 69, 77, 81, 84, 88, 110, 13 ' 144, 
150, 151, 162, 183. 
Public Affairs (including letters to editors): 
37, 51, 54, 57, 59, 94, 98, 125, 145, 153, 156, 157, 
159, 167, 168, 16·9, 170, 1<71., Ul8, 180, lSi!:., 18 ' , 186 , 189, 
20l, 203, 206, 207. 
Religion, Philosophy of: 11, 13, 19, 21, 25, 28, 9, 31, 
32, 43, 46, 48, 50, 55, 60, 62, 67, 70, 77, 85, \93, 
99, 101, 103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116, 119, 129 ~ 131, 
132, 133, 148, 150, 151, 152, 158, 162, 163, 16~, 173. 
Rights, Philosophy of: 80, 101, 128, 188, 193, 196. 
Royce, Josiah: 25, 32, 41, 42, 104, 109, 140. 
Science (general): 4, 8, 9, 139, 150, 151, 152, 1 2, 
18ii, 200. 
Self, soul: 3, 25, 48, 84, 88, ]07, 110, 141, 146, 150, 
151, 162. 
(393) 
Society, Philosophy of: 17, 30, 60, 62,69, 79, ' 0, 95, 
105, 139, 144, 147, 149, 150, 151, 162, 174, 88, 197. 
State, Philosophy of: 14, 37,47, 49, 51, 53, 57 71, 72, 
81, 92, 101, 102, 118, 127, 177, 184, 188, 18r · 
Symbol: 131, 135, 143, 204. 
Teleology: 131, 135, 162, 183. 
Value: 7, 10, 105, 124, 126, 136, 152. 
War and Peace: 49, 52, 54, 56, 148, 163, 170, 1~2, 180. 
Whitehead, Alfred: 140, 141, 16a. 
Whole Idea: 25, 131, 146. 
World Faith: 132, 149, 158. 
World Ordsr, world politics, and international , aw: 
47, 57, 59, 71, 94, 98, 101, 102, 133, 149, 1 o, 163, 
169, 170, 172, 173, 179, 180, 185, 186, 
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ABSTRACT 394 
This dissertation is an investigation i the 
general metaphysics of William Ernest Hocking. he 
attempt is made to expound and evaluate his meta hysical 
system as a whole, rather than to centerThaut
5
te,ntthioe:n on 
any single aspect of it in particular. con-
cern is with the basic metaphysical issues of thr ex-
perience, knowledge, and nature of ultimate reality, 
considered primarily in the context of man's relltion-
ship to that which is most real. 
Although there have been several studier of 
various aspects of Hocking's philosophy, particularly 
in mysticism and the philosophy of religion, the e have 
been no previous comprehensive investigations of his 
metaphysics as such. The method of procedure in this 
dissertation has been to concentrate primarily on Hock-
ing's own writings, with such attention to other thinkers 
as may have been necessary for clearer expressio and 
comment. 
The dissertation itself is divided into four 
major chapters. Following an introductory chapter on 
Hocking's view of the metaphysical problem in geheral, 
there follow three chapters which seek to develorl his 
metaphysics progressively by considering in turn man's 
experience and knowledge of metaphysical reality and 
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its nature. In these chapters the primary cones n 
has been to expound carefully and comprehensivelf the 
most important lines of Hocking's position. As r 
consequence, specific criticism and evaluation h s been 
deferred to the final chapter, which attempts to indicate 
the points of strength and weakness in his metap ysical 
thought. The complete Hocking Bibliography from 1898 
to 1951, which was published in 1951, is appends to 
the dissertation. 
Metap~ysics is .considered by Hocking to be 
the see.rch for some rational account of Being, o ulti-
mate reality, and particularly for a rational ac l ount 
which will serve to articulate the purpose and p~ace 
of human life in the schema of that reality. Thl con-
cept of a ttmetaphysical quest,~· which is fundamerl tal 
to human nature, is based on the thesis that ult mate 
reality is directly and immediately experienced t y the 
self in the idea of Other Mind. Hocking's definition 
of experience as uthe self meeting the world mor1 or 
less well" emphasizes the immediacy of this metabhysical 
event, and at the same time seeks to maintain thl dis-
tinction between the finite self and independentl reality. 
This concept of experience is best expressed in he 
complex phrase, by-a-self-of-a-world. 
Both sensations and feelings figure pro inently 
in Hocking's discussion of experience, and he at empts 
ABSTRACT 
to show that both point beyond the exparient to in-
dependent reality which is known in and through idea. 
The fact of this objective reference is articul~ted 
in Hocking's consideration of the relationship be~;een 
sense data, feeling, and ideas. While the sense y ex-
perience of the physical world is discussed by 
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in considerable detail, his greater emphasis is on 
feeling as the basic metaphysical experience. ~s con-
cept of the idea-feeling couple is a noteworthy con-
tribution :Jto philosophical thought at this point. 
Feeling is shown to involve two factors, will 
and intellect, or action and idea, and all feeli g is 
seen to be essentially a movement of the self to that 
which is at the moment beyond-self. This termin s or 
end of feeling is said by Hocking to be idea; in the 
idea-feeling couple idea and feeling are inextri ably 
joined. 
The idea-feeling couple is held in this dis-
sertation to be the clue to Hocking's view of th ex-
perience and knowledge of ultimate reality. union 
of feeling and idea in the immediate consciousne s is 
the significant occasion of the meeting between the 
self and the world. This is the basic metaphysi al 
intuition. However, while intuitions are both 
sign of metaphysical experience and the source o 
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metaPhysical knowledge, they cannot be regarded s true 
or authoritative until they have been submitted o the 
disciplines of rational thought, or intellect. r ock-
ing's well-known principle of alternation is cal~ed in-
to service here to affirm that intuition and intbllect 
must be pursued alternately in the quest 
cal knowledge. 
In Hocking's philosophy of idea, the te 
'idea' is used in two senses. The first is that of 
the ontological idea, or the idea of ultimate r~jlity, 
which is referred to generically as the whole-i, ea. 
Hocking's most characteristic name for this is tihl e idea 
of Other Mind. The second sense is that of empirical 
ideas, which includes all references to the spa, e-time 
order. The ontological idea is known in and t j ough 
itself; it has no essential affiliations with o her 
ideas; it is necessary and sufficient unto itse]f. 
Empirical ideas, on the other h and, must always be 
known in terms of each other, and most importan , in 
terms of the whole-idea, with which all experiel ce 
is interpreted and understood. 
In his epistemology Hocking is shown t~ be 
both an epistemic monist and an epistemi~ du~lijt. 
On the level of the ontological idea mon1sm 1s ~ ara­
mount; on the leve l of the empirical ideas, dua ism 
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prevails. The criterion of all truth is to be f und 
in the coherent structure of idea-systems, which include 
both ontological and empirical ideas. 
While constantly affirming that ultimat reality 
is of the nature of mind, Hocking is nonetheless l anxious 
to give due recognition to the facts of the phys cal 
world. A detailed analysis of the relationship tetween 
. I 
the physical world end metaphysical reality reve ls tha·c 
nature is to .be thought of in three ways: first, as an 
obj ect of common knowledge muong finite minds, w ich 
ful .. nishes t he occasion for the merging and event 1al 
identification of msny finite minds with Other ~nd; 
second, as the body of God, in end through whicJ the 
will of ultimate reality is expressed in symbol or meta-
phor; and third, as an environment of purpose 
dependable guarantor of value, which contribute signi-
ficance and stability to human life. 
In its widest sense the designation of ulti-
mate reality as mind means that reality is const ituted 
by the Other Mind, which is supreme, infinite, nd inde-
pendent, and the multitude of finite minds or s lves, 
I d the which, although limited by the physical world 
wills of other selves, nonetheless exhibit tain 
degree of independence. To determine more at ely 
the nature and characteristics of mind as the u timate 
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reality, a number of antitheses or antimonies ar 
examined, and in each case Hocking's concept of nd 
is seen to include both factors. Thus, the vast 
ness, the remoteness, the loftiness above the te 
of good and evil, the inactivity or non-assertiveness, 
the mysterious impersonality, and the completen+ s--
all these characteristics of ultimate reality be/long to 
the Absolute. The manyness, the nearness, the Iral 
qualities and activity, the vital personality, d the 
incompleteness are all most vividly expressed i I finite 
selves. In swn, however, it is the ultimate re ity 
of Ot~er Mind which includes them all. 
In evaluating Hocking's general meta.ph]sics 
it is important to give adequate recognition to the 
totality and interrelatedness of his thought. or 
Hocking's metaphysical system is something like the 
Absolute or Other Mind of which he speaks so freely 
and so fully--vast in its extent and organic in its 
structure. The attempt is made in this dissertJtion 
to evaluate his thought as a whole by singling aut 
what seem to be its points of greatest strength] and 
greatest weakness. These are cited in the cone usions 
below. 
A synoptic view of the meaning and sigJi-
ficance of Hocking's general metaphysics is to e 
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found in an examination of' several different typ s 
of value experience, which are arranged in an as end-
ing order or inclusiveness and effectiveness to ~ascribe 
the route of' development in the relation of the f inite 
self to ultimate reality. The unreflective enjo~ent 
of life, achievement in work and creativity, lov~ and 
appreciation of others, the dedication to worthy causes, 
and finally, the sense of 11 cosmic appointmentu i nful-
f'illing a destinytt constitute the successive st~es of' 
the experience of ultimate reality through whicJ one 
can win that immediate and incomparable experie] lce which 
is the fulfillment of' human destiny. It is the task 
of metaphysics, and philosophy as a whole, to cJ art 
the path of development, by seeking to articulate the 
meaning of' being and by teaching rational, fini e 
selves how to participate in the destiny which 
them at the peril of being judged not to have lived. 
The principal conclusions of this dissertation 
are as follows: 
(1) Hocking's general metaphysics is based on the 
thesis that man has a constant, pervasive, and Jnnnediate 
experience of ultimate reality, conceived as Ot 
(2) This immediate experience consists of b 
sensory and feeling intuitions, but insofar as 
is the more substantial factor of' human life, i is 
Mind. 
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the primary occasion for the experience of Othe Mind. 
Feeling, like sensation, can never be considers apart 
from idea. 
(3) The immediate, intuitive experience of· 
reality must be sub1nitted to the disciplines of 
before it can be regarded as adequate for metap 
knowledge. An alternation of intuition and int 
(reason) is therefore essential in the quest for meta-
physical knowledge. 
(4) Hocking's epistemology is both monistic and 
dualistic. Knowledge of the unity and wholeness of 
reality is monistic, whereas knowledge of its p rts 
and details is dualistic. 
(5) Hocking considers the relationship of t e 
physical world to ultimate reality, which is ofj the 
nature of mind, in three ways: (a) as the objec of 
comrnon knowledge among finite minds; (b) as the visible 
symbol of ultimate reality; and (c) as the envi] onment 
of purpose and guarantor of values. 
(6) Inasmuch as ultimate reality is of the ature 
of mind it consists of the absolute, or Other M~nd, 
together with all finite minds. To Other Mind Jre 
assigned the characteristics of unity, remoteneJs, 
independence of the tensions of good and evil, ~n­
activity, impersonality, and completeness. To Jhe 
ABSTRACT 
finite minds, considered collectively, are assigned 
the characteristics of multiplicity, imraediacy, moral 
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qualities and activity, personality, and incompleteness. ~ny adequate description of metaphysical realit1 , how-
ever, must take into account the characteristics of 
both Other Mind and finite minds. l 
(7) The principal points of strength in Hoc_ing 1 s 
general metaphysics are: (a) the functional def{nition 
of idea as something thought with, and a~ the constant 
factor of human experience; and (b) the articull tion of 
the relationship between feeling and idea as ex ,ressed 
in his concept of the idea-feeling couple. 
(8) The principal points of weakness in Hoc1ing 1 s 
general metaphysics are: (a) the tendency towarf meta-
physical dualism, which seems to be the result 0f his 
persistent attempt to recognize the claims and limi-
tations which the physical world exercises over the 
mental life; and (b) the tendency to subordinat finite 
selfhood to the all-inclusive reality of Other l ind, 
thus resulting in a deni~ of the privacy of seif-
experience. 
(9) The abiding influence of Hocking's general 
metaphysics is to be found in his interpretatioj of 
the need for man to relate hL~self effectively to 
what is ultimately real, and therein to discove the 
meaning and fulfillment of huinan destiny. 
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